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A B S T R A C T 
M i l l i o n s of smallholder farmers in many of the less developed coiontries 
engage in the c u l t i v a t i o n of perennial cash crops . The product iv i ty of such 
crops dec l ines with age necess i ta t ing p e r i o d i c asset renewal. Since planting 
and replant ing i s a long term investment, planning and p o l i c y formulation 
requires an understanding of the decision-making process of smallholder 
farmers. This study examines the case of the rubber smallholders of Sri 
Lanka and attempts to draw out the important t h e o r e t i c a l and po l i cy impl i -
cat ions of the i r behaviour. 
The h i s t o r i c a l development of cash cropping and the establishment of the 
rubber smallholding sec tor i s analysed in some d e t a i l and the major phases of 
this process are descr ibed. I t i s shown that the decision-making environment 
and the dec i s ion problem i t s e l f that farmers face has changed substant ia l ly 
in d i f f e r e n t per iods . In p a r t i c u l a r , attent ion i s drawn to the d i f f e r e n c e s 
between new plant ing and replanting. The l a t t e r problem is substant ia l ly more 
complex than the former. 
Using a conventional approach of investment theory, a model of asset 
replacement appropriate to the dec is ion problem fac ing a rubber smallholder 
i s developed. The model i s extended to the case where uncertainty i s 
e x p l i c i t l y inc luded. The impl icat ions of changes in such parameters as long 
and short run p r i c e expectat ions , d i f f e r e n t types of t e chno log i ca l change, 
subs id ies and taxes , e t c . f o r the optimal replacement time and the optimal 
replacement crop are discussed. 
On the b a s i s of a f i e l d survey carr ied out among a sample of rubber 
smallholders in 1975, the model i s tested with empirical data. Results 
suggest that there i s a s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e in the decision-making 
patterns of the b e t t e r - o f f farmers, who mainly use hired labour, and the 
(iv) 
poorer farmers who use family labour. The former group can be broadly 
considered to maximise (expected) profits as predicted by conventional 
investment theory. The existence of a replanting subsidy allows the poorer 
farmers to meet most of the unavoidable cash costs of replanting; for them 
the investment decision then reduces to one of 'labour investment' now, in 
expectation of future cash incomes, rather than primarily a choice between 
present and future cash incomes. Under the present set of circumstances 
the farmers in the two groups often come to the same decisions, but the 
underlying decision-making processes are different. However, the role of 
the replanting subsidy is crucial. Future changes in circumstances may 
lead to quite different decisions. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The Long Term Investment Decision of Farmers 
In many less developed countries, smallholders cultivating perennial 
cash crops constitute an important segment of the agricultural sector and 
play a significant role in the national economy. Historically, in many of 
these countries the development of such cash crop smallholdings accompanied 
the transition from subsistence to commercial agriculture. Thus rubber 
smallholdings in South and South-East Asia, cocoa smallholdings in West 
Africa and coffee smallholdings in parts of Latin America not only 
contributed significantly to the process of capital formation in the rural 
areas, but also represented an important expression of the socio-economic 
transformations in such areas. Today, millions depend directly and 
indirectly on these smallholdings for their incomes and employment. And 
their output is a major source of valuable export earnings for many of 
these countries. 
Like all biological assets^, tree crops experience declining productivity 
with advancing age. Therefore periodic renewal of the stock of trees 
through replanting is necessary if output levels are to be maintained (or 
increased). The development of new, high yielding varieties which have the 
potential for quite dramatic improvements in output levels reinforces this 
need for periodic asset renewal and indeed tends to shorten the economic 
life of the varieties previously planted. 
When the relative importance of these cash crop smallholdings is large 
in the national economy, such asset renewal becomes a matter of national 
interest, directly and significantly affecting the level of export earnings 
and domestic incomes. 
Many development plans, policies and programs adopted by governments 
of such countries show recognition of the problem. The rubber growing 
countries, Malaysia, Thailand and Sri Lanka, have ongoing problems aimed 
at facilitating replacement of the current stock of low yielding trees 
with high yielding varieties. The dimensions of the problem are quite 
substantial; in the world's rubber smallholdings alone, an average of 
one hundred thousand hectares need to be replanted each year.^ 
The success or failure of plans and policies with this objective 
depends on the individual decisions of large numbers of smallholders. 
The cumulative effects of their decisions can have a major impact on the 
development plans of many less developed countries. For individual 
smallholders, the issue of replacement of present trees is a major problem 
that has the characteristics of a long term investment decision. Therefore 
a prerequisite for successful formulation of a program of replanting by 
smallholders is a proper understanding of the nature and structure of the 
process of decision-making in relation to long term investment decisions. 
Surprisingly however, despite this obvious need for such research, 
this area has been largely ignored. Wliile the 1960s saw the beginning of 
a major research effort into theoretical and empirical investigations of 
the decision making process of farmers in the less developed countries, 
little or no attention was paid to this aspect, except for some long term 
supply response studies. Two factors may have contributed to this: first, 
the main policy emphasis in the agricultural sector was placed on the 
expansion of food production, mainly under the influence of the neo-
Malthusian predictions of the FAO studies of the 1960s. This led to 
^ On the assumption that a 30-year replacement cycle is optimal in the 
rubber industry. 
the concentration of much of rural research into studies on the short term 
aspects of farmers' decision making. Second, there was a quite widely 
held attitude (often expressed implicitly, but sometimes quite explicitly 
as well) among many research workers that low income farmers are incapable 
of undertaking long term investments owing to their strong preference for 
present incomes and consumption. Wliere research into long term decisions 
was undertaken, it mostly dealt with the early diffusion of cash crops and 
2 
had a strongly anthropological bias. 
Replanting programs, and policies designed to stimulate such 
replanting, have therefore been formulated with little knowledge of the 
actual decision making processes of the smallholders and have suffered in 
consequence. In Sri Lanka, from the late 1960s concern was expressed in 
official circles at the low rate of replantings on the rubber smallholdings. 
As the rubber industry is a major source of income and employment to a 
large sector of the population, and is an important foreign exchange earner, 
lack of adequate replanting would lead to major problems. Similar 
situations exist in other industries as well as in other countries and 
expressions of concern at weaknesses and inadequacies of the adopted 
policies has not been confined either to Sri Lanka or to the rubber 
3 industry. 
1.2 The Objectives of the Study 
The main objective of the present study is to investigate the 
planting/replanting decisions of rubber smallholders of Sri Lanka. 
^ For a review of the relevant literature see Chapter 4 . 
^ For example, such problems are observed in the coconut industry in 
Sri Lanka and in the rubber industry in Thailand and Malaysia. 
This essentially involves an inquiry into the process of long term 
Investment decision-making of tliese small farmers. 
In studying this, it is intended to pay particular attention to the 
nature of the farmers' intertemporal preferences, the main constraints in 
the decision-making environment and the impact of government policies 
such as the replanting subsidy schemes on farmers' decisions. 
A related objective is to investigate the relevance of conventional 
/ 
investment decision criteria for understanding and modelling farmers' 
actual decision-making and to suggest useful modifications. As part of 
this, attention will be given to the analysis of risk as a factor in the 
decision-making process. 
Implications will be drawn from this analysis as to appropriate 
policies for these long term decisions of smallholders. 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
The study comprises the following main sections: 
(a) An analytical review of the historical evolution of 
the rubber smallholder sector. The nature of the 
decision problem and the decision-making environment 
at different historical periods and the smallholders' 
behaviour in these situations are analysed and 
discussed in this section (Chapter 2). 
(b) The analytical framework is drawn from (i) the general 
literature on investment decisions and (ii) from the 
theories of decision-making in the context of family 
farms. In Chapter 3 the general theory of investment 
decisions is briefly reviewed and an asset replacement 
model appropriate to the problem of rubber replacement 
is specified and discussed. Chapter 4 includes a 
discussion of the relevant aspects of the theoretical 
models of decision-making on family farms. 
(c) Chapter 5 describes the field survey conducted in the 
course of this study. This took place over a period 
of six months from February to August 1975 on a field 
visit to Sri Lanka, and involved the collection of 
information on the actual decision-making process of 
a selected sample of rubber smallholders. It included 
the ascertainment of their time preference and risk 
attitudes as well as future expectations associated 
with alternative investment choices. 
(d) This information obtained from the empirical study is 
then analysed and applied to the model developed 
previously. Presentation and analysis of data is 
given in Chapters 6 and 7. 
(e) The final conclusions, including theoretical and 
policy implications are then presented in Chapter 8 
as a synthesis of the detailed insights into different 
aspects of decision-making gained from the study. 
CHAPTER 2 
THE TRANSITION FROM SUBSISTENCE FARMING TO 
CASH CROP AGRICULTURE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
RUBBER SMALLHOLDER SECTOR 
This chapter comprises four sections: the first traces the origins 
and early development of smallholder cash crop agriculture in the 19th 
century; the other three sections deal with the history of the development 
of the smallholder rubber industry through various stages from its 
beginning at the turn of the century to the present. Where appropriate, 
the analysis w i l l be given a wider context to take into account the major 
influences on the evolution of smallholder cash cropping over the period 
such as the growth of plantation agriculture and related socio-economic 
changes, fluctuations in international demand for these cash crops and 
the changing role of the government. The main aim is to provide a 
historical context to enable interpretation of the contemporary performance 
in the smallholder rubber sector and in particular to enable proper 
appreciation of the decision problems that the rubber smallholders now 
face. 
1 
Origins and Early Developments in Cash Cropping 
Until the 19th century the economy of rural Sri Lanka, both in the 
provinces which had been subjected to European rule for two centuries 
and those in the Kandyan Sinhala kingdom, remained largely a subsistence 
economy where cash and markets played no significant role. However, there 
was an established barter trade in certain goods between parts of the 
island and this meant that some of the provinces produced limited quantities 
F I G U R E 2.1 
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of agricultural produce for such barter. There is also evidence that in 
certain v i l lages , peasants used to collect 'wild ' coffee and barter it 
for cotton goods, e t c . , during the 18th century.^ 
2 . 1 . 1 Peasant Coffee Industry: Origins 
The major change in this situation was to occur in the 19th century 
with the expansion of peasant coffee cultivation. The earliest years of 
the 19th century already saw the existence of a small peasant-based coffee 
industry in the maritime provinces which came under British rule. This 
experienced a very rapid expansion in the first three decades of the 
century. Thus the quantity of coffee exported rose from about 94 ,500 lbs 
in 1806 to 261 ,500 in 1813 and to an-average annual figure of 2 , 0 6 1 , 4 0 0 
by 1826 (see Table 2 . 1 ) . Since there was no plantation coffee industry in 
this period, this increase in exports shows the rapidity with which 
peasant coffee expanded. There are no reliable figures on the area 
involved; however, considering the unscientific methods of planting and 
the primitive methods of harvesting and processing, this would have meant 
a considerable extension in area. 
Vanden Driesen (1953) attributes this rapid expansion to the high 
coffee prices that prevailed in this period, despite lack of any 
governmental support and the existence of discriminatory taxes in the 
United Kingdom against Sri Lankan coffee. 
It is not clear to what extent the peasants sold .their coffee for 
cash during the early years; probably much of it would have been used in 
barter trade with the itinerant Muslim traders who were said to have 
collected the village coffee grown ' in the gardens surrounding the peasant 
^ History of Ceylon, University of Ceylon, Colombo, 1973, V o l . I l l , p . 9 1 . 
homes, and along the wayside' and brought it to Colombo and Galle to be 
2 bartered for cutlery, cotton goods and trinkets. 
TABLE 2.1 
ANNUAL EXPORTS OF PEASANT COFFEE: 1806-1833 
Year Quantity (in lbs) 
1806 94,500 
1810 217,500 
1813 261,500 
1816-20 434,800 
(average 
annual) 
1821-25 1,100,000 
(average 
annual) 
1826-33 2,061,400 
(average 
annual) 
Source: Vanden Driesen, J.H., 'The History 
of Coffee Culture in Ceylon', Parts 
1 and 2, Ceylon Historical Journal, 
Vol. 3, No.l, July 1953, Vol.3, 
No.2, October, 1953. 
^ C.O. 54/146, Morton to Glenelg, 2 Jan. 1836; Tennent, Sir J.E., 
Ceylon: An Account of the Island, Physical Topographical with Not%ces 
of its mtural History, Antiquities and Production. 2nd ed. London, 1859, 
Vol. II, p.226 (quoted in Ameer Ali, A.C.L.). 'Peasant Coffee in Ceylon 
during the 19th Century', The Ceylon Journal of Historical and Socval 
Studies, Vol. II (New Series), No.l, January - June, 1972. 
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2.1.2 Plantation Coffee Industry: Origins 
The 1820s saw a change in the attitude of the Government. It began 
actively to promote the development of a coffee industry, at least partly 
to offset the loss in revenue from cinnamon which used to be the major 
export of the island. While emphasis was placed on the development of 
European-owned coffee plantations, some steps did have the effect of 
stimulating further the already rapidly developing peasant sector. Thus 
in 1824, Governor Barnes exempted coffee land from payment of the land 
tax (of one—tenth of the produce) and in 1829 he exempted those employed 
in coffee growing from the compulsory annual service required from all 
Sri Lankans. 
The plantation coffee industry began to establish itself in the 1830s. 
The encouragement and support from the Government which made land available 
to the planters, built roads to the remotest coffee growing areas and 
extended other facilities started a process of capital inflow for the 
establishment of coffee plantations. Thus agency houses, and later banks 
extended their operations to Sri Lanka and established branches and 
channelled funds into the industry. With the demand for land developing 
at an almost feverish pace, the Government enacted the controversial 
Ordinance 9 of 1841 which effectively seized large areas of land used 
for shifting cultivation ('chena' cultivation), pasture and other pursuits 
by villagers, by denying the rights of users and requiring legal titles 
for the land from peasants. Despite some fluctuations in the fortunes of 
the world coffee industry, the expansion of the Sri Lankan plantation 
coffee area was almost continuous up to the 1870s when the leaf disease 
Hcmilea Vestatrix arrived on the scene to destroy the entire industry. 
11 
2.1.3 Expansion of Plantation Coffee 
The expansion of plantation coffee, due to soil and climatic factors, 
was concentrated mostly in the Central Highlands though during its later 
years it expanded into the Southern province and parts of the Western 
3 
province (Figure 2.1). The plantation acreage rose from almost nothing 
in the early 1830s to over 160,000 acres by the end of the 1860s (Vanden 
Driesen, 1953). This was accompanied by the introduction of wage-labour 
on a large scale, involving primarily a migrant labour force from southern 
India. This migration, which began in earnest in 1839, developed rapidly 
thereafter to meet the demand for increased labour, which for reasons 
involving the rates of pay and conditions of work as well as cultural 
factors could not be met by recruitment from the native peasantry. While 
a large scale permanently resident labour force was not established until 
the development of tea and later rubber plantations, this migratory 
labour in the plantations nevertheless created a source of demand for 
certain consumer goods that could be purchased for cash. The importance 
of this aspect will be taken up later. 
2.1.4 Development of Plantation Coconut Industry 
Parallel with the development of the coffee plantations in the 
Central Highlands, a coconut plantation industry began to develop in 
other areas of the country. In contrast to the coffee plantations, Sri 
Lankans dominated the coconut plantation industry (though processing 
4 
and shipping was mainly in European hands). Labour requirements were 
met mainly from villages, during slack agricultural seasons, and working 
3 
History of Ceylony p.95. 
^ p. 103. 
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in this manner on coconut plantations seems to have been culturally-
acceptable to the Sinhala and Ceylon Tamil villagers. Coconut areas 
were concentrated in the Western, North Western and Southern provinces 
and thougli the statistical data is very unreliable on coconuts, the total 
acreage seems to have been substantially greater than that under coffee 
(Snodgrass, 1966). 
2.1.5 Transition of Village Agriculture from Subsistence to Cash 
Cropping 
These developments in the plantation sector are important in 
understand ing the processes that transformed village agriculture from 
subsistence to cash cropping, because they introduced a number of dynamic 
factors into the economic environment. These served to push village 
agriculture on the path of increasing commercialisation, as can be seen 
when the development of peasant cash cropping is examined. The early 
development of a peasant coffee industry has already been referred to. 
While the pace of development of the plantations overshadowed the 
expansion of the smallholder sector after the 1830s, the crucial role it 
played in transforming village agriculture in the period needs emphasis, 
helped along as it was by the direct and indirect effects of the 
development of plantations. 
The exemption of those involved in coffee growing from compulsory 
annual service, mentioned earlier, was followed by the introduction of 
the 'commutation' system. This allowed the grain taxes that were 
collected to be paid in kind with other crops (coffee, cinnamon, etc.) 
at a rate determined by the Government; later this was modified further 
for payments to be paid in cash. The system permitted the farmer to 
choose voluntarily whether he wished to pay the tax in grain or in cash 
(or kind) when it was first introduced in the late 1820s (Ameer Ali, 1972) 
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During the period of prosperity for the coffee industry,wnich with minor 
fluctuations lasted into the 1860s insofar as peasant coffee was concerned, 
large numbers of peasants volunteered to pay their taxes in cash from the 
proceeds of coffee sales. And even when later the system was made 
compulsory, there were no major complaints as long as coffee continued to 
prosper. Given the fact that coffee could be planted in lands that were 
not used for paddy which was the most important subsistence crop, this 
made good economic sense. 
However the inducement offered by the 'commutation' system was not 
the only one; the range of goods that could be purchased with cash 
increased with the development of the network of roads that developed 
together with the plantations. These roads, and the fact that plantations 
had a labour force that was paid cash wages, brought traders to the 
remotest villages where they established boutiques and shops. This was 
crucially important. It was not necessary for there to be prior 
development of cash cropping on a sufficient scale to attract traders; the 
labour force in the plantations offered a ready made market for consumer 
goods and the road system made them easily accessible. Once established 
however these trading centres were not confined to selling to the 
plantation workers. In the same way these roads were also used to 
transport peasant coffee. By reducing costs of transportation and 
marketing they led to higher returns to coffee growing for smallholders. 
This situation could be seen in terms of the Fisk-Shand model of 
transition from subsistence to cash cropping,^ in which they discuss the 
emergence of points of growth and stagnation in this process. These are 
^ F isk , E .K . and Shand, R . T . , 'The Early Stages of Development in a 
Primitive Economy: The Evolution from Subsistence to Trade and 
Specialisation ' in Subsistence Agriculture and Economic Develoipment, 
ed. C .R . Wharton, Chicago, Aldine , 1969. 
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related to the returns from cash cropping, the utility of money, the 
development of trading facilities and the supply of consumer goods, among 
others. The development of the plantations amongst the villages, at the 
pace and scale that it occurred, effectively removed the factors leading 
to stagnation in cash cropping among the peasants. The manner in which 
the demand for particular purcliased goods developed is seen, for example, 
in the fact that the average annual value of imported cotton goods 
increased from £161,064 in the five year period 1839-43 to £850,247 in 
the period 1869-73.^ As there was no significant urban population, these 
imports would have gone to the villages and to the plantation labour 
force. In the next two decades kerosine oil and matches too developed 
into popular household items in the Sri Lankan villages. 
While the above discussion concentrated on the case of peasant 
coffee, a similar process occurred with coconut. Coconut products were 
not only exported but a thriving domestic market developed for then, too, 
and in the latter half of the 19th century a big expansion in coconut 
smallholdings took place. It has been estimated that at the turn of 
the century 60 per cent of total cultivated area under coconut was in small-
holdings (Snodgrass, 1966) . Thus, though there were naturally regional and 
local differences in the manner and pace at which cash cropping developed 
among farmers, it is yet clear that the 19th century witnessed a major 
shift of the Sri Lankan peasantry from subsistence farming to cash crop 
agriculture. Even the collapse of the peasant coffee industry in the 
1860s followed by the plantation coffee did not reverse this trend as 
events showed, for this same process was continued subsequently with 
the expansion of smallholder rubber. 
^ History of Ceylon, p.148. 
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2.1.6 Resource Allocation at Farm Level In the Transition to Cash 
Cropping 
Here we shall examine more closely the manner in which cash crop 
agriculture became integrated into the overall agricultural patterns of 
peasant farming at the micro-level. We shall look at how the land, 
capital aiid labour inputs were applied to cash crop agriculture by the 
farmers. The different types of smallholdings that began to emerge by 
the latter half of the 19th century exliibited substantial differences in 
their input mixes. 
Typically the Sri Lankan peasants before the advent of cash cropping 
cultivated paddy in irrigated or rain-fed low lying lands and other crops 
(vegetables, coarse grains, etc.) on 'goda idam' ('high land'). There 
was little or no competition between paddy and the other crops for land 
since the type of land used for cultivating the latter was different. 
Most of the non-paddy crops were grown with techniques of swidden or 
shifting cultivation. Its importance differed between regions. 'Chena' 
(swidden) cultivation was economically more important and more extensively 
prevalent (relative to the population) within the dry zone. While 'chena' 
cultivation was resorted to in the wet zone in pre-British and early 
British times, it was, with some regional variation, of relatively less 
importance, though it was useful as a source of supplementary food.^ 
In addition some coconut trees, fruit trees, etc., were grown around the 
house on the typical farm. 
Since the 'chena' lands were thus sources of supplementary food only, 
it was not surprising that cash crop cultivation first developed at the 
^ Ihid. , p. 127. 
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expense of forests and 'chena' lands. As Roberts (1973) notes: 
In either case it was a significant agricultural development 
and a boost to productivity. The conversion of ' chena'' lands 
to cash crop holdings involved a change in patterns of 
agricultural organisation. It also represented a shift to 
high value crops and to more intensive forms of agriculture. 
From all accounts the intensity of land use was not high prior to cash 
crop development. Leaving aside considerations of the comparative 
labour inputs for the moment, available evidence suggests that the 
opportunity costs of conversion of such lands to cash cropping was quite 
low. In those areas which were adequately served with marketing 
facilities for the cash crops, the margin in returns would have been even 
more substantial. 
Cash crop smallholdings developed through the conversion of lands 
already owned and cultivated by farmers and through 'illegal' encroach-
ments into 'Crown lands'. There was also, especially towards the last 
decades of the 19th century, substantial expansion of cash crop smallholdings 
on lands bought from the Government and to a lesser extent fron villagers. 
'Jhile most oT such marketed lands were bought un by, mainlv foreign, 
coffee plantation interests in the Central Highlands, in other areas a 
considerable proportion was converted into cash crop, principally coconut, 
smallholdings. Since in the Central Highlands a substantial proportion -
according to Roberts (1973), perhaps as much as 49 per cent - of the non-
plantation coffee was held by Chetties, Kanganies and other Indian Tamils, 
purchase of land for establishment of smallholdings could not have been 
rare. Again, according to the same writer, approximately 50 per cent of 
the buyers of 'Crown land' between 1860 and 1889 purchased allotments of 
1 to 10 acres in extent, and the majority would have been used for 
establishment of cash crop smallholdings. Such Crown land was almost 
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always forest and its conversion therefore would have entailed little 
opportunity cost in terms of alternative land use. 
What were the capital and labour inputs involved in the establishment 
of such smallholdings? This would have depended of course on the type of 
land. If it was already used for 'chena' or some other type of 
cultivation, land clearance would have involved significantly smaller 
labour inputs than if it was thick jungle. Since clearance of land was a ( 
necessity for whatever type of cultivation was undertaken, the additional 
effort involved in planting coffee or coconut seedlings may well have been 
marginal. This is because both coffee and coconut are crops that could be 
planted at the same time as the normal 'chena' crops. Where land was 
purchased for the establishment of smallholdings, it is possible that the 
owners may have been unable (as absentees) or reluctant (as better-off 
farmers) to engage in manual labour. This, however^ need not have meant 
that additional capital had to be used in the establishment stage; there 
is evidence that even on bigger plantations 'the initial clearing of land 
was often effected by leasing out the land on an "ande" system (crop 
sharing system) for the cultivation of "chena" and garden crops' (Roberts, 
19 73) . 
Harvesting of both coffee and coconut is a seasonal job. There are 
no data available on whether hired labour was employed on any of the 
smallholdings for harvesting. It is likely that_, where family labour was 
not used, a crop-sharing arrangement would have been employed since such 
arrangements have been traditionally employed in agricultural activities. 
Maintenance would not have been allocated a large input of labour since 
from all accounts little maintenance was actually done. Thus a 
contemporary account of peasant coffee gardens describes them as being 
'always in a neglected condition - the young plants being hidden by weeds 
18 
and grass; the old trees grown so much together and so covered with moss 
and creepcrs' that they formed.one mass, impervlable to suii, air and 
light (Van Spaal, 1866). The condition of indigenous coconut 'estates' 
g 
has been described as being more akin to thickly planted mixed gardens. 
2.1.7 Advantages of Cash Cropping over Subsistence Farming 
Thus we could conclude that given the relatively small difference 
in the required inputs, cultivation of cash crops Proved more attract-
than subsistence farming. Since the major cash crops grown in 
the 19 th century, coffee and coconut, were both perennials, periodic 
clearance of new jungle lands (as required for 'chena' cultivation) was 
absent and further enhanced the attractiveness of cash cropping. The 
increasing monetisation of the economy and the expansion of roads, 
communications and trade during this period widened the range of goods 
that could be purchased with cash. Since the Central Highlands as 
well as parts of the Western province had been traditionally rice 
deficit areas, the cash earned from coffee and coconut could have been 
9 
used to buy rice (the preferred staple food) in the market; given the 
relative prices, the reduction in the production of the coarser grains 
grown in 'chena' lands could have been more than compensated for by the 
amounts of rice that could be bought from the proceeds of sales of the 
cash crops. As previously mentioned, if the cash crops were planted in 
'chena' lands, they would not have affected the effective subsistence 
agricultural output from such lands in the short run (until they grew 
sufficiently to prevent effective intercropping). The time lag between 
® Ibid. , p. 103. 
^ Available evidence suggests that a substantial proportion of the 
villagers did not have sufficient paddy lands to produce enough rice 
for year round consumption (see Wickramaratna, 1973). 
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planting and maturity of these crops again would have entailed little 
opportunity cost; in any case after two to three years the 'chena' lands 
had to be rested for at least a few years for them to regain the lost 
soil fertility, etc. 
Given these factors it seems likely that the decision to participate 
in cash cropping would not have posed great problems for the peasant. 
While the opportunity cost of so doing was conparatively small, the 
returns were correspondingly more attractive, with the utility value of 
cash increasing all the time. Though the cultivation of perennials was a 
long term investment, since the gestation period did not involve a 
substantial change in the normal levels of income, the dimension of time 
would have entered more as a factor enhancing its attractiveness; once 
planted the crop would continue to yield for decades afterwards. 
Even though there were fluctuations in international demand and 
prices, the peasants did not face or experience conditions that made cash 
cropping inferior to subsistence farming. The peasants therefore did not 
have occasion to seriously question the wisdom of increasing 
specialisation in cash cropping for a long period of time; at the end of 
which two parallel developments that took place during it made a reversion 
to subsistence farming nearly impossible. On the one hand the land that 
used to be available for shifting cultivation had been either taken over 
by the plantations or had been converted into cash crop smallholdings 
making it impossible for that system of cultivation to become practicable. 
On the other hand the peasants themselves had developed new patterns of 
wants and preferences based on the market exchange system that could not 
be easily changed. Thus on the whole, there was to be no turning back to 
subsistence farming for the masses of peasants who became involved in 
cash cropping in the 19th century. 
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The Smallholder Rubber Industry: The Period 
of Expansion (1900-1930) 
Tlie previous section traced the developments that took place in the 
19th century which saw the transition of large numbers of peasants into 
cash cropping and the establishment of cash crop smallholdings in the 
Central Highlands as well as in certain other parts of the island. 
Rubber, however^ did not become a smallholder crop until the early 
1900s, though it had been introduced to Sri Lanka in 1876 and had been 
cultivated on a limited scale in the plantation sector in the 1890s. In 
the 1880s, following the collapse of the plantation coffee industry^ tea 
took over as the main plantation crop particularly in the highlands.^^ 
From a mere 250 acres in 1873, tea expanded to more than 87,000 acres by 
1885 and by 1888 was established as the major export crop of the country^^-
a position it has held until today. 
Due to the fact that tea required expensive machinery for its 
processing, it was not suitable for smallholder cultivation when peasants 
did not have access to such processing facilities . Though some farmers 
did plant the crop and sold the green leaf to neighbouring plantations, 
it did not take the place of coffee as a widely grown smallholder crop. 
Thus the collapse of peasant coffee left a vacuum, particularly in those 
areas where soil and climatic factors ruled out coconut cultivation. 
Though there was a market in rice, and an increasing demand for it 
with the expansion in the plantation labour force, local paddy production 
^^ There was a brief period in which cinchona flourished before tea 
took over. 
^^ Ameer A l i , A . C . L . , Cinchona Cultivation in Nineteenth Centia>ij Ceylon: 
Modem Ceylon Studies, University of Sri Lanka, Vol . 5 , N o . l , January, 
19 74, pp.93-106. 
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rose very l i tt le , and probably did not even keep pace with the increase 
in peasant population. (The grain tax and limited availability of suitable 
land would have contributed to this . ) Since the same period saw a 
significant reduction in 'chena' cultivation, the total quantity of food 
produced locally probably went down and therefore it was not surprising 
that the per capita rice imports tended to increase in the last quarter 
of the 19th century. As mentioned in the previous section, the 
transition from subsistence to cash cropping could not be reversed easily ; 
thus the collapse of the peasant coffee industry created famine conditions 
in the Central Highlands. Thousands were prosecuted for failing to pay 
the taxes, while thousands died of famine.^^ The need for a suitable cash 
crop was therefore bound to be acutely felt by the farmers. 
2 . 2 . 1 The Beginning of tlie Plantation Rubber Industry 
It was under these conditions that the rubber industry began to 
develop. In the 1890s an increasing number of planters began to realise 
the potentialities of rubber and commercial planting on a substantial 
scale began. The turn of the century saw a rapid acceleration in the 
rate of expansion. The demand generated by the young motor car industry 
was pushing prices to higher and higher levels. The average value of a 
pound of rubber in 1900 was Rs . 1 . 5 7 . Since the price of a bushel of rice 
was around Rs. 4-5, this meant that the value of a pound of rubber in rice 
equivalents was about 10. Rubber price was, however, to climb s t i l l higher. 
In 1904 it touched R s . 6 / l b . The average price in 1905 was Rs . 3 . 92 / lb (in 
14 
rice equivalents nearly 30) and by 1910 it reached Rs . 5 . 1 4 / lb . 
^^ Wickrameratne, L . A . , 'Grain Consumption and Famine Conditions in Late 
Nineteenth Century Ceylon' , The Ceylon Journal of Eistovical and Social 
Studies, V o l . I l l (New Series) No .2 , July-December, 1973, pp.28-53. 
1 o 
History of Ceylon, p . 1 53 . 
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Administrative Reports, 1904, 1905 and 1910. 
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The feverish expansion in rubber cultivation that took place in the 
first decade of the century was reported as a direct response Lo Lhis 
price boom. Rarely-, if ever, has any crop promised returns as high as 
rubber did in this period. 
The Administrative Reports of the period record this phenomenon. 
Thus the 190A report of the Government Agent for Western Province stated: 
The boom in rubber was the agricultural feature of the year, 
during which the product reached the highest price it had 
hitherto realised viz. 6s.Id in the London market. 
Hitherto rubber cultivation has been entirely in the hands 
of the European planters, but enterprising natives are now 
taking up the product, though the ordinary cultivator still 
prefers to trust the old and tried coconut tree. 
By the end of 1904, 6759 acres that had been earlier planted with tea 
had been converted into rubber and rubber had spread to Sabaragamuwa 
province. 
By next year (1905) 'native' capitalists were bidding for land at the 
land sales for rubber growing and prices paid rose as a result of this 
competition. Rubber cultivation had now spread widely througliout the 
Sabaragamuwa province and was spreading into the Kegalle region. The 
Government agent for this region remarked that 'the most remarkable event 
in the history of the year under review was the extension of the 
cultivation of rubber . . , ' and recorded that considerable areas of 
1 . 15 
'chena' lands were sold by villagers to European planters during the year. 
By 1906, rubber had spread to the Central province and the Southern 
province and 'rubber growing goes on apace' stated one Government agent.^^ 
^^ Ibid., 1905. 
^^ Ibid., 1906. 
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2 . 2 . 2 Smallholder Rubber 
The year 1906 is significant because the o f f ic ia l Administrative 
records which up t i l l then were commenting on the sales of 'chena' lands 
by villagers to the European planters, first mention villagers themselves 
starting to plant rubber. The first recorded reference is to villagers 
in the Central province and Kegalle region, while it is quite possible 
that, particularly in the Western province, there may have been smallholder 
rubber by this time - due to the longer history of rubber in the region. 
The fact that there was a rapid extension of rubber in the Central province 
villages is significant because this was where the peasant coffee industry 
had originated and thrived. In the Kegalle region: 
The extent of land 'chenaed' i s , however, decreasing year by 
year , some of it being planted up with coconuts and arecanuts, 
and a large extent being alienated for rubber cultivation. ^^ 
By all accounts the smallholder rubber sector developed rapidly and 
the rate of diffusion of rubber among villagers was particularly fast. 
Many of the villages in the Western province, Kegalle and the Matale region 
(in the Central province) had some rubber growing in their villages by the 
time of the First World War. 
Data on smallholder rubber acreages are only rough approximations. 
However it would seem that the actual acreage under smallholder rubber may 
not have been very large until the 1920s, though large numbers of villagers 
had taken up rubber growing. This would indicate that' the holdings, on 
average, were fairly small. 
According to a census taken by the Rubber Controller at the end of 
1922, the total rubber acreage was divided as in Table 2 . 2 (no data on the 
number of holdings was given) . 
^^ Ihid. , 1906. 
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TABLE 2 . 2 
ACREAGE UNDER RUBBER BY HOLDING: 1922 
Holding size 
(in acres) Acreage 
10 or more 404 ,297 
Less than 10 38 ,814 
Total 443 ,111 
Source: Administrative Report of 
Rubber Controller, 1922 
The total acreage owned by 'Asiatics ' was estimated by Figart (1922) 
to be 128 ,000 acres in this year. Since it is fair to assume that all 
<10 acre holdings would have been owned by non-Europeans, these figures 
would suggest that there were already a considerable number of large 
rubber plantations owned by such non-Europeans. Tliis in fact seems to 
18 
have been the case. However the figure of 38 ,814 was probably an 
underestimation of the actual smallholder rubber area; the Rubber 
Controller 's annual report for 1938 records that of the existing small-
holder acreage, 63 ,842 acres were planted prior to 1922. Of these 45 ,430 
acres were wholly planted with rubber while 18,412 were interplanted with 
other crops. 
Until the post World War I period, there were no legal or political 
constraints on the expansion of the acreage under rubber. However, the 
slump in prices at the end of the war led to the establishment of the 
History of Ceylon, p .430 , 
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Stevenson sclieme aimed at Llie resLricLioa of rubber ouLpuL in Llie producer 
countries. Particuiarly in the 1923-24 period, new plantings were 
discouraged. However the impact of the scheme on the Sri Lankan rubber 
industry appears to have been less severe than in Malaya. When the prices 
increased in the subsequent years, especially in 1925-26, the acreage in 
both plantation and smallholder sectors expanded (see Table 2 . 3 ) . The 
smallholders supply response to price in terms of the acreage planted was 
clearly positive . The annual plantings rose from around 1 ,000 acres in 
1923 to 8 ,000 in 1925 , to 14 ,000 in 1926 and were 11 ,000 in 1927. In 1928, 
when the restriction on new plantings was off icially l i f ted , smallholders 
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actually surpassed the acreage planted by the large plantations. With 
the decline in prices , the acreage planted gradually went down until it 
was less than 1 ,000 acres in 1931 (see Figure 2 . 1 ) . Miile the rate of 
plantings was never again to reach the levels recorded in the 1920s, the 
smallholder sector had established itself by the 1930s as an important 
sector of the rubber industry with at least some 20 per cent of the total 
70 
acreage. [Using data from the Ceylon Yeav Book, Peiris (19 72) estimates 
that the actual acreage would have been substantially higher, close to 
150 ,000 acres, thus being closer to 30 per cent of the total area under 
rubber. ] 
2 . 2 . 3 The Process of Diffusion of Rubber 
In this section we shall look more closely at some aspects of the 
above described expansion of rubber smallholdings. Wliy did rubber prove 
to be so attractive? Which farmers became rubber smallholders? What 
influenced their decisions? What role did the Government, the plantations. 
^^ Administrative Re-ports of the Rubber Controller, 192 8, 
Ibid. 
TABLE 2.3 
AREA OF SMALLHOLDER RUBBER 
Year of planting Wholly planted Interplanted Total Cumulative total 
Prior to 1922 45,000 18,000 63,000 63,000 
1922 2,000 2,000 4,000 67,000 
1923 700 300 1,000 68,000 
1924 2,000 1,000 3,000 71,000 
1925 6,000 2,000 8,000 79,000 
1926 11,000 4,000 15,000 94,000 
1927 8,000 3,000 11,000 105 ,000 
1928 4,000 3,000 7,000 112,000 
1929 2,000 1,000 3,000 115 ,000 
1931 500 400 900 115,900 
1932 500 400 900 116,800 
1933 600 500 1,100 117,900 
1934 5,000 4,000 9,000 126,900 
Total 87,300 39,600 126,900 -
Source: Compiled from Administrative Re-ports of the Rubber Controller, 1922-1934 
NJ 0^  
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the village innovators and others play in this process? These are some 
of the questions that could serve to shed light on the decision-making 
processes of the rubber smallholders. 
The first point to note is that the Government did not play any 
direct role in the development of smallholder rubber, except to the extent 
that some people bought Crown land to convert into rubber smallholdings. 
There was no official encouragement, provision of facilities or extension 
advice given to the small cultivators. Indeed it was not until the late 
1930s that a rubber smallholder advisory service was established. On the 
other hand, in contrast to the situation in Malaya in this same period, 
there were no legal constraints to the cultivation of rubber, and no 
active discouragement or opposition from the Government. The development 
of the smallholder rubber sector was thus very much the product of a 
spontaneous response of various groups in the community to the economic 
opportunities opened up by market forces. 
It seems almost certain that the rubber plantations were the major 
agents of diffusion of the crop among the villagers. Both seeds and the 
technology of harvesting and processing were taken into the villages by 
the plantations that were established either in their midst or adjacent 
to them. Villagers employed on the plantations brought their know-how 
back into the villages, while the seeds were supplied (involuntarily) by 
the trees in the plantations. In this case the plantations, quite 
passively, played the role of nucleus estates, in the sense of centres 
for transmission of inputs and technology, very successfully. But they 
could play that role only because rubber possessed characteristics that 
facilitated ready acceptance and rapid diffusion among the smallholders. 
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2.2.4 Attraction of Rubber as a Smallholder Crop 
In terms of monetary returns, rubber was extremely attractive. As 
mentioned earlier, during the period up to the end of the First World War 
prices reached levels that have never been surpassed. At one stage one 
pound of rubber was equivalent to well over 30 lbs of rice in terms of its 
purchasing power. Since one acre of mature rubber, even if the rubber 
trees were low yielding and badly maintained, would have yielded over one 
pound of rubber a day, it is not surprising that it proved to be so 
attractive. To give another example, the price of a pound of rubber in 
Colombo was, at its height, close to half the monthly wage of a teacher 
in a Government school in a village. 
However, the attractive prices by themselves would not have been 
sufficient to induce or enable farmers to plant rubber. Rubber was a hardy 
plant which thrived in the wet zone and was not only easily planted, but 
needed little maintenance after the early months. Harvesting skills were 
learnt with comparative ease - at least to the extent that was considered 
necessary in the early years of the century when the more sophisticated 
tapping systems of later years had not yet been developed. Processing too 
was no great problem. After collection the latex was allowed to coagulate 
and to make sheet rubber it was passed through rollers. The rollers were 
comparatively simple machines and could have been bought by the better-off 
farmers and may have been used to process other growers' rubber. Even if 
rollers were not available, coagulated latex could still be sold and given 
the high prices for rubber, even such inferior rubber would have fetched 
quite attractive prices. However if rolling could be done, smoking of the 
sheets could be easily carried out in the kitchen. Every village kitchen 
has a 'duma', a rack above the kitchen fireplace where dried fruits, 
vegetables, etc., are kept to be smoked; this was a natural smoking place 
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21 for rubber sheets. Storage of such smoked sheets does not pose major 
problems, and in the early stages when marketing facilities were still in 
a primitive stage this would have allowed the smallholders to keep their 
rubber without deterioration until it could be sold. 
To sum up, the capital cost involved in rubber cultivation was small, 
the technology of harvesting and processing could be easily mastered and 
storage of the product or the maintenance of the trees did not pose complex 
problems. Thus it was ideally suited as a smallholder crop. 
The other major factor that has to be mentioned is the socio-cultural 
setting in which this expansion of rubber cultivation took place. The 
alternative crops available as sources of cash income in many cases were 
considered inferior not only in their purely cash returns, though this was 
clearly of major importance. Thus cinnamon, where it could be grown, 
needed skilled labourers to harvest the crop and traditionally cinnamon 
harvesting was the occupation of a particular caste group, and the caste 
connotation attached to work in cinnamon growing meant that labour generally 
had to be recruited from outside the village for such work since even the 
poorer farmers were reluctant to grow it and harvest it themselves even if 
the necessary skills could be acquired. Cultivation of rubber and its 
exploitation, though a new crop, did not demand a sudden radical dislocation 
in the social relationships within the village, nor did it interfere with 
the traditional village life centred around paddy cultivation which brought 
a sense of unity to the whole village through co-operation in work and in 
its rituals and related festivals. This is not to deny that the growth and 
further expansion of rubber cultivation, through the Increasing monetisation 
it stimulated, did work to break up the old village structures, but it did 
this behind the scenes so to speak, and did it gradually and unobtrusively. 
21 
Even today a substantial proportion of smallholde rs use this method of 
smoking which explains the very low percentage of unsmoked rubber sheets 
brought to the market in Sri Lanka compared with Malaya and Indonesia. 
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To the new moneyed interests investment in land was a way of achieving 
status within the village where 'the rich generally have prestige but it 
is the landed rich who have also esteem' (Ryan, 1957). Working for 
payment on the lands of a village landowner had always been acceptable for 
the poorer sections in the village - it did not have the effect of a 
radical lowering of social status in tlie village; what mattered was that 
the relationship between employee and employer was not purely monetary 
but also social, the actual payment for work done being supplemented by 
the employer's willingness to help in times of crisis and distress. Thus 
it was not uncommon for 'unhelpful' landowners to face problems obtaining 
labour at the normal wage rate even when sufficient unemployed labour 
was available in the village. On the other hand, acquiring land and 
providing employment (fulfilling the related obligations as well) were 
ways of climbing up the social ladder in the village. Rubber was there-
fore an ideally suited crop to these strata; it not only promised higher 
economic returns but also social returns in terms of the value system of 
the villages. 
The fact that rubber is a long lived perennial tree crop would also 
have helped to make it more acceptable to the rural Sri Lankans to whom 
tree crops have traditionally represented stable returns over an entire 
lifetime. Coconut, jak and fruit trees like mangos have always been 
planted with the belief that they are lifetime 'investments', which once 
planted would then yield forever. Provided the planting of rubber did 
not seriously interrupt the normal income of the farmer during its 
immature period, its long gestation period by itself need not have been 
a significant discouragement. The long life expectancy would also have 
itself introduced an element of stability and its survival was not 
crucially dependent on seasonal weather factors. For all practical 
purposes the farmers would have conceived of the income flow expected from 
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rubber trees as being of infinite duration. This would be hardly surprising 
in view of the fact that many of the European planters of the period shared 
this opinion. Thus Figart (1922) reported: 
To show the general feeling of the industry (on the question 
of the economic life of the rubber tree - J) the views of 
over 70 representative men are summarised below: 
(1) Do old trees on a European rubber estate show a 
decline in yield? In reply to this question 20 said there 
was no such evidence of a decline; several saw no reason for 
any decline in rubber which received proper treatment. 
(Ceylon planters generally fell into this group.) Fifteen 
said that rubber not properly treated in the past showed a 
decline. Twenty-six said there was evidence of a decline; 
of this number two limited their reference to certain types 
of soil. 
(2) What is the productive life of a rubber tree? In 
reply 16 felt that there was a lack of reliable evidence, 
nevertheless believed that the tree must have a definite life. 
Only 8 ventured a figure, 2 of whom thought 25 years would 
measure the productive period, 1 thought 30 years, 4 thought 
35 years, and 1 thought 40 years . . . 
2.2.5 The Costs of Establishing a Rubber Smallholding 
What were the costs of establishing a rubber smallholding in this early 
period? This would have differed among different groups of smallholders. 
At this stage, to facilitate discussion, we shall divide the smallholders 
into two main groups: the peasant farmers and non-peasant cultivators. 
We could classify those farmers who lived in the villages, whose main 
occupation was farming and who, in the main, used family labour in their 
farm operations as peasant farmers. The non-peasant cultivators would 
then include both the better-off villagers who used some form of hired 
labour in their farm operations as well as the non-villagers who had 
accumulated sufficient capital through paid employment, trade or some 
other activity and who were investing this capital in land establishing 
rubber smallholdings. Thus the latter category would include those who 
bought land from the Government at the land sales or from villagers for 
this purpose. 
32 
For the peasant farmers the monetary cost involved would probably 
have been quite small since the major operation involved would be the 
clearing of land which could have been done using family labour. It is 
possible that if some outside labour had to be used, then the payment 
could have been in kind - provision of meals, etc., or by labour in return. 
There is no evidence, nor any reason to believe that the early smallholdings 
had done anything much more than the clearing of the land and the planting 
of the seeds. For the non-peasant type smallholders, the major cost items 
would have been the cost of the land (if it was purchased) and the payment 
for labour used in land clearance and planting. The average price paid 
o o 
for Government land by non-Europeans was Rs.40.36 per acre in 1906. 
Using a wage rate of 50 cts per day (which was the urban wage rate and 
hence possibly higher than the rural rate), the cost of land clearance 
could have been around Rs.10-20 depending on the nature of the land. 
Thus the total cost for such a smallholder could have been from Rs.50-75 
per acre with the other expenses. Maintenance could have cost Rs.lO/year 
per acre assuming 20 man days work per year. If the trees reached maturity 
about the eighth year, the total cost could still have been around or 
below Rs.200. Since the price of rubber almost throughout this period 
was well above Rs.1.50 per lb, the revenue from the first year or two 
would have covered the entire investment, assuming yields as low as 
150-200 Ib/year/acre. Of course, many of the smallholders would have 
converted their own lands into smallholdings and these may have required 
relatively lower expenditure of labour for conversion into rubber small-
holdings. 
22 Administratrve Reports, 1906. 
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For the peasant farmers the major components of the opportunity cost 
in planting rubber would have been (a) the value of forgone earnings from 
the land and (b) the opportunity cost of the labour spent on the operations. 
2.2.6 The Opportunity Cost of Labour 
The difficulties of estimating the opportunity cost of labour, even 
when substantial information is available on the alternative uses to which 
it could have been put, are well known. In the present case, given the 
lack of much of the relevant information, it is impossible to make 
quantitative estimates and only some general observations can be made. 
The opportunities for paid employment would have varied from place to 
place. The main source of such employment would have been the neighbouring 
plantations, though opportunities may also have existed in the smallholdings 
owned by absentee landlords or better-off villagers and in some non-
agricultural activities such as road building, etc. During the paddy 
seasons, work in paddy fields would have been almost obligatory. Even 
under conditions when regular paid employment was available, it is 
conceivable that involuntarily 'unemployed' days (holidays, etc.) would 
have been available which could be utilised for work on one's own holding. 
Given the seasonal pattern of labour demand in the traditional agricultural 
activities of the villages, it would seem quite likely that those farmers 
not having opportunities for regular off-farm paid employment would have 
had substantial 'free' time whose opportunity cost would have been low. 
In these circumstances it is reasonable to conclude that the opportmity 
cost of labour - provided work on the rubber holding was done in the 
'free' periods - would not have been high. 
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2.2.7 The Opportunity Cost of Land 
In assessing the value of forgone incomes from the land it is 
important to bear in mind two facts: (a) a substantial proportion of 
the rubber smallholdings were in fact not purely rubber holdings but 
rubber interplanted with other crops (see Table 2.3), and (b) the general 
intensity of land use was quite low. 
The reports of the Government Agents on the villagers starting to 
grow rubber (quoted earlier) particularly mentioned the fact that they 
were converting their 'chena' lands into rubber. Since the normal 'chena' 
crops could have been grown at least for two or three years without 
serious detriment from the growing rubber plants, the loss in earnings 
in such cases would have been marginal. 'Chena' cultivation by its very 
nature demands that the land be rested after two to three years of 
continuous cultivation. Where rubber was grown in the home gardens, 
intercropping with other perennials would have been more prevalent. No 
information is available on the types of rubber smallholders who typically 
had interplanted holdings; however it would appear more likely that 
peasant farmers particularly would tend to do so, since their land 
resources would not be large, with a view to increasing total yields from 
the lands as well as a hedge against risk. That the latter factor may 
have been rather important is suggested by the fact that the proportion 
of interplanted rubber in the total annually planted area shows some 
relationship to the price movements; thus as price of rubber goes down, 
this proportion tends to rise (see Figure 2.2). 
With interplanting, the opportunity cost of growing rubber would 
have been quite low. Additionally, even in the relatively densely 
populated wet zone, the intensity of land use does not appear to have 
been high. Partly, this may have been due to the lower population pressures 
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Since alternative cash crops were confined to coconut and possibly 
cinnamon, both of which gave much lower monetary returns in this period, 
it is reasonable to conclude that the opportunity cost for a peasant 
farmer of converting land to a rubber smallholding would have been, in 
most cases, quite small. 
2.2.8 The Opportunity Cost of Capital 
Tlie non-peasant smallholders could have used tlieir capital either 
for consumption or other forms of investment; its opportunity cost would 
have depended on these available alternatives. Conspicuous consumption 
as a means of obtaining or maintaining prestige was quite common among 
the rural elites (De Silva, 1962). However, as mentioned earlier, 
acquisition of land was itself a way of achieving status. Roberts (1973) 
states that these rural elites sought'paddy land as an object of invest-
ment per se' and suggests that 'two different sets of criteria applied 
among the same people; one for wet paddy land and another for 'goda idam' 
('high lands'). According to Roberts, for investment in the latter, 
particularly in channelling their capital into cash crop smallholdings, 
the overriding motive was that of profit whereas acquisition of paddy 
land was motivated more for prestige and status reasons. However, it is 
difficult to draw such a sharp distinction; land - both wet paddy land 
and non-paddy land - has been valued for its own sake though probably the 
former more so. It was more a difference of degree than of a more basic 
difference in attitudes. Given the low profitability of paddy cultivation 
and the attendant high risks, in the absence of other, more attractive 
cash crops, investment in rubber would have had both economic and non-
economic attractions. It is possible that these non-peasant types may have 
had some sort of lexicographic ordering of preferences, such that they 
desired a certain minimum area of wet paddy land. Once that was satisfied 
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cash returns would have become the dominant decision criterion. Given the 
still prevalent attitude among.rural elites to possess 'sufficient paddy 
land to give enough rice to eat through the year' (see Chapter 7), this 
appears a reasonable assumption to make. Investing in trade and commerce 
would not have appealed to many either for reasons of status or in terms 
of the attendant risks, or for the necessity to break with the normal 
patterns of rural life, etc. Depending on the region, the amount of 
capital available for investment and the entrepreneurial outlook of the 
person^there were other choices open, such as money-lending, mining for 
23 
graphite or gems, cultivation of paddy, arrack or toll rents etc. 
However, for the big majority, investment in smallholder cash cropping 
would have been the major investment outlet, beyond the purchase of paddy 
land. 
Given these conditions, it is ^p.asonable to hypothesise that the move 
to smallholder rubber cultivation represented a rational econonic response 
to the circumstances faced by both groups of people. Their differences 
did not prevent them from undertaking the same type of investment, i.e., 
the establishment of rubber smallholdings; such differences affected 
mainly their choice of labour to be used in the operations relating to 
its establishment. 
The Period of Relative Stagnation (1930-1950) 
The period 1930-1950 was very much a period of stagnation for the 
smallholder rubber sector, as well as for the plantation sector. The 
price of rubber plummeted down to its lowest recorded prices during 
19 30-32 and large areas of rubber - both in the plantations and the 
smallholdings - temporarily ceased tapping. In 1932 it was estimated 
^^ History of Ceylon, p . 158. 
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0 / that about 40 per cent of the total rubber area was out of tapping. 
The rubber industry was the worst hit by the depressioni 
The value index of total exports fell from 100 in 1929 to 
44.68 in 1932 while that of rubber to 14.98 (value index) 
and 61.32 (quantity index). If we take 1925, the previous 
boom year, as our base, the total export price index fell 
to 69.52 while that of rubber to 6.35.25 
However this did not mean that rubber had become uneconomic for all 
producer groups. Even during the period of lowest rubber prices, to the 
peasant-smallholders it remained an economically viable and relatively 
26 attractive crop. Referring to this group Peiris (1972) states: 
This sector (peasant-smallholder) of the industry (on account of 
its low costs of labour) produces rubber at a lower cost than 
other classes of producers. During the early 1930s when the price 
was in the region of 10-15 cents per lb a peasant smallholder 
producing even 200 lbs per year (which was in fact lower than the 
average yield per acre per year - ed.) would have derived from it 
a net return which, at the low prices of other subsistence goods 
that then prevailed, he could have met many of his needs. 
For them, in the absence of alternative employment opportunities, 
tapping rubber was an economically rational thing. Though the peasant-
smallholders continued to tap their rubber trees even during this period, 
the expansion of the area under rubber almost ceased. The areas of new 
planted rubber in 1931-32 were the lowest annual figures since the early 
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1900s, when the industry began. The lowering of expectations and the 
acute financial distress that aggravated the need for current incomes 
made long term investments generally unattractive; this was particularly 
so in the rubber industry. 
^^ Administrative Re-ports, 1931, 1932. 
^^ The Ceylon Economic Journal, Colombo, Vol.15, December 1933, p.8. 
^^ Knorr (1945) has commented in similar fashion on the reasons for the 
Malaysian peasant-smallholder's preference for rubber during the same 
period of very low prices. 
^^ Administrative Reports of the Rubber Controller, 1931, 1932. 
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2 . 3 . 1 Hie Restrictions on New Plantings 
However^ the improvement in prices in 1933, even thougli the average 
price recorded in that year was s t i l l very low at only around 15 cts / lb , 
induced a renewal of interest in rubber. Tlie plantings of rubber in 
1934 by smallholders exceeded 8 ,000 acres, which was double the 
2 8 
corresponding figure for the plantation sector. However^ this expansion 
of new plantings was not allowed to continue in the next period. The 
International Rubber Regulation Agreement (IRRA) established in 1934 
decreed that new plantings should cease in its member countries (of which 
Sri Lanka was one) . Thus even thouglx prices rose almost continuously 
right up to the Second World War (except in 19 38 when the slump in the 
United States economy very adversely affected the rubber market)^ new 
plantings were not legally permitted until 19 39. 
During this period (1934-1941) replantings were permitted to an 
extent. However^ for the smallholders this was not desirable as their 
trees were s t i l l relatively young. Replantings, when they did take place, 
were therefore totally confined to plantations. 
There is evidence that the legal restriction on new plantings was 
not observed by many smallholders. The Rubber Controller's reports of 
this period record many instances of prosecutions for undertaking new 
plantings i l legally . The improving rubber prices increased its 
attractiveness to the smallholders under conditions where the terms of 
trade of rubber vis-a-vis subsistence goods were s t i l l quite favourable. 
The general improvement in the economic climate served to raise the money 
incomes available to particular strata in rural society who were interested 
in acquiring and investing in land. Though the expansion of the land area 
^^ Ibid., 19 34. 
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under plantations had practically finished by 1930, there appeared to 
be yet some room for the expansion of the smallholder sector. 
In 1939 the restriction on new plantings was lifted to an extent 
and permits were issued for the newplanting of 2996 acres by 'peasants'. 
It is not clear how this group was defined. The number of applications 
29 
far exceeded the number of permits issued, and showed the pressure that 
existed among villagers to undertake more new planting. In addition to 
the 'peasants', permits were also granted to 'middle class' cultivators 
to the extent of 16,022 acres. More permits were granted in 1940 and the 
total area actually planted in smallholdings in 1939 and 1940 was 
30 
14,080 acres. (This figure suggests that some of the 'middle class' 
permits were used to establish smallholdings.) 
2 . 3 . 2 The Second World War 
The outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 raised the demand for 
rubber greatly. The limited plantings allowed in 1939 and 1940 were the 
result of some relaxation of the prohibition of new plantings under the 
IRRA's restriction scheme. But the underestimation of the demand that 
was to be generated by the War by the Commission set up to administer the 
IRRA, and the complacency regarding the security of the major sources of 
supply, Malaya and Indonesia, was seen in the fact that until the fall of 
Malaya in 19 42, there was no significant step taken in Sri Lanka to 
expand output or the area. 
Even in 1941 (as well as in 1939-40) prosecutions were still made 
for undertaking new plantings. Replantings continued to be encouraged, 
even though the actual area replanted was not high. 
^^ Ibid., 1939. 
^ Ibid., 1940. 
42 
The situation changed suddenly in 1942 when Malaya was occupied by 
the Japanese. Restriction on exports was lifted; Sri Lanka now emerged 
as the major source of supply of natural rubber for the allied war 
effort. Replanting, except when the trees were yielding practically no 
latex, was strongly discouraged. Over 30,000 acres (5 per cent of the 
total acreage) were permitted to be brought under new plantings by the 
IRRC, mainly because with the rising prices, more intensive forms of 
tapping were being adopted by the producers, especially the smallholders. 
However, even then the administrative restrictions on new plantings were 
not lifted , and the Rubber Controller's report of 1942 states that 
prosecutions for i l l icit plantings were made in 1942 as well. But under 
the Rubber (New Plantings) Regulations promulgated in 1942 the area 
permitted for new plantings was extended and permits for over 50,000 
acres of plantings were granted in 1943. Plantings among the different 
producer groups are seen in Table 2 . 5 . 
TABLE 2 .5 
AREA PERMITTED FOR NEW PLANTINGS IN 1943 
* Area 
Producer group 
Capitalist 8,171 
Middle class 25,761 
Peasant 16,525 
Total 50,457 
Source: Administrative Reports of Rubber Controller, 
1943. 
* The definition of these groups is not clear. 
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Though the applications received and the permits granted were many, 
the actual plantings were far below the permitted figure, llie rising 
cost of l iv ing , the uncertainties generated by the War, the rise in wage 
rates as a result of the greater demand produced by war-related industries 
and enterprises all proved to be disincentives to new plantings. The 
original authorisation was subsequently reduced to 38 ,974 acres. Of this , 
only a l i t t le over 20 , 000 was actually planted and the rate of new 
plantings (both permitted and actual) was quite low in the subsequent 
years (Table 2 . 6 ) . 
2 . 3 . 3 The Capital Compensation Scheme 
As part of the effort to obtain the maximum possible supply of rubber, 
the British Government sent a commission to Sri Lanka in December 1942 to 
inquire into ways and means of increasing output. It recommended the 
adoption of a Capital Compensation Scheme whose main conditions were as 
follows: 
Each proprietor was asked to volunteer to tap, to complete 
exhaustion, 20 per cent of his acreage within a period of 
2 years from joining the agreement, as well as to intensify 
(but not slaughter tap) , to an intensity of 133 per cent 
the tapping on the balance 80 per cent of the acreage. 
Provided these conditions were met to the full satisfaction 
of the Ceylon Rubber Commissioner, His Majesty's Government 
undertook to repay the participants a sum of £45, say 
R s . 6 0 0 , per acre for the purpose of replanting that portion 
of the acreage which he had tapped to complete exhaustion 
{WhitelcoJ-Ferera Commission Report, 1947 ) . 
The reaction of the smallholders to this scheme was predictably cool. 
While 646 large plantations (which among them accounted for nearly one-
third of the total rubber acreage in Sri Lanka) volunteered to participate 
in the scheme (though many of them later withdrew for a number of reasons) 
only 160 out of 9 8 , 9 8 3 registered smallholdings volunteered. This 
confirmed that though smallholders may in general tap their trees more 
intensively than the plantations , this does not imply that they would 
TABLE 2.6 
PERMITTED AND ACTUAL AREAS OF NEW PLANTINGS; 
(in acres) 
1943-1946 
1 9 4 3 
Permitted Actual 
1 9 4 4 
Permitted Actual 
1 9 4 5 
Permitted Actual 
1 9 4 6 
Permitted Actual 
Capitalist 
Middle Class 
Peasant 
5,297 2,463 
20,826 10,768 
12,851 7,521 
268 
212 
45 
172 
87 
40 
889 
2,204 
1,580 
136 
1,191 
1,032 
723 
1,686 
1,294 
213 
502 
533 
Total 38,974 20,752 525 299 4,673 2,359 3,703 1,248 
Source; Administration Reports of the Rubber Controller, 1943-1946. 
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squander away their precious capital asset - the rubber trees - through 
overintensive tapping that would make it necessary for them to be 
replaced soon. 
Wliile the smallholders thus did not participate in this scheme, this 
does not mean that some intensification of tapping did not take place. 
War-time inflation on the one hand, and the relatively high rubber prices 
I 
on the other would have induced some intensification. Overall the 
I 
intensification in the entire industry, after producing a peak per acre 
average yield of 427 lb in 1942, declined steadily (see Table 2.1). 
TABLE 2.7 
YIELD PER ACRE OF RUBBER: 19 40-45 
Year 
Average yield/acre 
(in lb) 
19 40 327 
19 41 334 
19 42 42 7 
1943 368 
1944 372 
1945 349 
Source: IfhitelccbJ-Tereva Commission Report, 
1947. 
The combined effects of this intensification, the adverse effect on 
upkeep and maintenance of the preoccupation with output and the advanced 
age structure of the tree population were to pose serious problems for 
the entire rubber industry later. In addition to those problems, large 
areas of rubber planted in the higher elevations (Matale, Badulla, Kandy 
A6 
and Deniyaya areas) had been severely affected by the Oidiim heveae Stein 
leaf disease. Also substantial areas in other regions had been planted 
on marginal lands during the period of rapid expansion of rubber. Thus 
at the end of World War II, the rubber industry as a whole was in need of 
substantial rehabilitation. 
2.3.4 The Problems of Rehabilitating the Industry 
( 
Wliile the next decade (1950s) was to witness some expansion of the 
rubber area, by and large, extension of the land could not be carried out 
on a large scale any longer. Available and suitable land was quite 
limited and population pressures, particularly in the rubber growing 'wet 
zone' of the country, were increasing. Thus the rehabilitation of the 
rubber industry meant,above all, large scale asset renewal through 
replacement of the trees that were now reaching the end of their economic 
life span. 
This was the conclusion reached by the Whitelaw-Perera Commission on 
the Rubber Industry of Ceylon which was appointed in 1947 to investigate 
and report on the condition of the industry and the measures necessary for 
its rehabilitation. 
It estimated that approximately 36,000 acres (out of a total of 
146,617 acres) in the smallholder sector - comprising 23,966 holdings -
was yielding less than 250 lb/acre. Of these, over 40 per cent were at 
high elevations.^^ In addition, substantial areas would reach that stage 
in the next few years. Thus replanting was becoming an important problem 
for the smallholders. 
^^ Ibid., 1949, 1950. 
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On the overall situation, the Commission stressed that within one 
year or so about a third of th6 total rubber area in the country would 
become uneconomic and that urgent measures had to be taken to formulate 
and implement a large scale and rapid replanting program. 
On the question of a cash subsidy for replanting, it declined to 
recommend any for the bigger holdings though it urged the Government to 
take steps to reduce the rate of interest charged on loans for replanting 
purposes by the State Mortgage Bank. For the smallholders it recommended 
that for each tree over 24 inches in girth and 3 feet above ground level that 
was removed, one rupee be paid in addition to free planting material and a 
further grant of Rs.30 an acre be given on completion of necessary soil 
conservation measures. It opposed a per acre subsidy, on the grounds 
that the actual acreage of the smallholdings was often not known as they 
had not been properly surveyed. 
Though the Commission report was released in October 1947, for the 
next five years no significant governmental action was taken to actually 
implement their proposals and recommendations. With the slump in rubber 
prices in 1947, followed by the lean years of 1948 and 1949, more attention 
was paid to the maintenance of a floor price scheme, etc., which was 
primarily aimed at the short-term survival of the industry. Some 
replanting with high-yielding budgrafts was carried out, mainly by the 
large plantation sector. New plantings were very low on the smallholdings 
and almost no replantings took place. 
Post-war price inflation raised the cost of living (and the costs of 
production) while the rubber price continued to decline. An air of general 
pessimism about the future of rubber was current. Industrial strife and 
political changes contributed to a climate of uncertainty, viz. general 
strikes in 1946 and 1947, and the end of British rule in 1948. 
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The decline of the industry in this situation is seen from the figures in 
Table 2.8. 
TABLE 2.8 
ANNUAL PRODUCTION AND AVERAGE PRICE OF RUBBER: 1943-49 
Year Production (in tons) 
Price 
(Rs per lb) 
1943 110,622 .71 
1944 98,500 .98 
1945 97,500 .96 
1946 94,000. .93 
19 47 89,000 .65 
1948 95,000 .62 
19 49 89,500 .57 
Source: Administrative Reports of the Rubber Controller, 
1943-1949. 
Until the onset of the Korean War (1950) which helped to bring 
about conditions that made investment in rubber both economically 
attractive and an urgent necessity, the future of the entire rubber 
industry in Sri Lanka looked very bleak indeed. 
2.3.5. The Korean War Inspired Price Boom 
The effect of the war was felt above all in the prices. The prices 
which had declined drastically in the wake of the post-war recession 
responed in spectacular fashion to the demand for rubber created by the 
war and reached extremely high levels in the period 1950-51. (The 
average prices per pound in 1950 and 1951 were Rs.1.55 and Rs.2.15 
respectively, compared with 57 cents in 1949.) 
4 9 
The reaction of the producers to this leap in prices was immediate; 
all sections, from the large estates to the smallholdings, raised their 
output. The mature acre yield of the smallholdings (<10 acre group) in 
1950 was 34 per cent higher than in 1949, while the corresponding figure 
for the estates (>10 acres) was 22 per cent higher. However, when prices 
rose still higher in 1951, the smallholders failed to maintain this 
increased output. The output in 1951 was only barely above that of 1949. 
This failure was undoubtedly due to the fact that the huge increase 
in output in 1950 had been achieved through a high degree of 
intensification of tapping (in many cases slaughter tapping) of trees 
which had already almost reached the end of their 'economic' life spans 
(see Table 2.9). As the large scale absorption of village labour by the 
large rubber plantations in this period (recorded by the Rural Survey of 
1951) suggests, the increased output in the plantations may have been 
achieved mainly through bringing back into tapping extensive areas 
unexploited during the previous period of depressed prices. Peiris, G.H. 
(1972) has said that, living in the densely populated wet zone of 
Sri Lanka, the smallholders rarely possess reserve rubber land on which 
they can work when high price stimulates increased production and 
therefore the only method of increased output for them was intensification 
of tapping. Contemporary observations of rubber extension officers 
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support this view. 
The most important effect of this intensified tapping was to aggravate 
the already acute problem of uneconomic rubber; as already mentioned, the 
Whitelaw-Perera Commission in 1947 had estimated that within the next year 
^^ Ihid., 1949, 1950. 
3 3 
Personal communications from Extension Officers of RRISL, 1975. 
TABLE 2 .9 
AGE STRUCTURE AND TYPE OF TREES OF THE TOTAL RUBBER AREA IN 1951 
A A* 
Age Group Ordinary Rubber HY Rubber Total 
<6 years 1,509 30,125 31,634 
6 - 3 0 years 147,104 79,594 226 ,701 
>30 years 397,160 6 397,166 
Total 545,773 109,725 655 ,501 
Source: (Ceylon) Census of Agriculture, Part I I , 1951. 
" Ordinary seedling rubber. 
* * High Yielding rubber. 
U1 
o 
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or so one-third of the total acreage would be uneconomic. It seems 
reasonable to assume that after such intensified tapping in 1950-51, a 
very high proportion of the smallholdings would have ended up in a derelict 
condition. The fact that the output per mature acre in 1952 was 20 per 
cent below that in 1949, despite a comparatively high price and the 
inability of smallholders to increase per acre yields in 1956 when the 
prices rose substantially, supports such a view (see Table 2.10). 
TABLE 2.10 
YIELD PER MATURE ACRE OF RUBBER SMALLHOLDINGS AS A 
PERCENTAGE OF 1949 YIELD AND THE AVERAGE PRICE 
Year Yield Price (Rs per lb) 
19 49 100 .57 
1950 134 1.55 
1951 102 2.55 
1952 80 n - A . 
1953 93 1.35 
1954 96 1.10 
1955 95 1.28 
1956 88 1.45 
Source: Peries, G.H. (19 72). 
Calculated from official figures. 
The effects of the price boom, however, were not all negative, 
especially as prices in the subsequent few years continued to be 
relatively high (though lower than the peak prices of 1950-51). The 
most important effect was to dispel the gloom and pessimism that 
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pervaded the whole industry in the post-war period and to replace it with 
a new optimistic outlook. Prospects for rubber looked rosy again and the 
prophets of doom, who had predicted the collapse of the natural rubber 
industry faced with the growth of synthetics, appeared to have been 
confounded. 
The derelict condition of much of the rubber on the one hand and the 
enhanced future prospects of natural rubber on the other combined to 
produce conditions whereby the Government was prodded into action. A 
comprehensive program for the rehabilitation of the industry was drawn up 
and the launching of the Rubber Replanting Subsidy Scheme in 1953 
inaugurated a new phase in the development of the rubber industry in Sri 
Lanka. 
Asset Renewal in the Rubber Industry (1950 to present) 
The Rubber Replanting Subsidy Scheme (RRSS) was to be the major 
governmental instrument for renovating the rubber industry for the next 
two decades (and indeed, until the present). As such, it was to 
exercise considerable influence on the development of all sectors of the 
industry in this period. It is useful to look more closely at the 
objectives and the operation of this scheme and at the circumstances in 
which it originated. 
By the end of the 1940s, except for some forest reserves left 
uncleared for reasons of environmental protection, very little land 
suitable for rubber remained uncultivated. In fact, as previously 
mentioned, substantial areas that were only marginally suited to rubber 
had been cultivated in the periods of high prices and expectations. The 
Sri Lankan situation therefore was markedly different from that of certain 
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other rubber growing countries of this region, for example, Malaya, in 
that extension of cultivated area was not an option available for keeping 
the industry viable. 
Direct government intervention in the rubber industry had been 
confined to the attempts to curtail output and plantings during the 
periods of the restriction schemes and towards increasing output during 
the war years. Attempts to stimulate investment or to renovate the 
industry through direct intervention were absent until the Whitelaw-
Perera Commission of 1947 was set up. Even though the report, published 
in the same year, warned of grave consequences unless immediate steps 
were undertaken to rehabilitate the industry, five years were to pass 
before action was taken. 
By 1952 the effect of the decline in production of rubber on the 
export revenues of the country could not be ignored. Rubber was the 
second major export crop and declining export revenues directly 
threatened to precipitate economic and political crises. The situation 
of some 150,000 rubber smallholders could be ignored only at grave 
political risk in a country where a high degree of politicisation and 
electoral participation existed. In addition to the 'push' of these 
factors was the 'pull' of rosy expectations for rubber in the future. 
2.4.1 Replanting and New Planting 
One question is posed at the very outset of a discussion of this 
situation: UTiy was it necessary for the Government to intervene to help 
farmers to replant? After all, the massive and rapid development of the 
industry in the first three decades had taken place with little or no 
governmental support. 
This focuses on the important differences between new planting and 
replanting. 
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This was a question that was debated by policy-makers and by 
professional economists in Malaya, particularly in the post-war period. 
Since that debate brought out a number of characteristics of the small-
holdings as well as certain crucial constraints confronting them, it is 
useful to review it briefly at this point. 
The rubber restriction schemes and the laws on alienation of land 
for rubber cultivation had effectively stopped the expansion of the 
smallholder sector in Malaya by the 1930s. By the 19AOs the Malayan 
smallholders faced the problem of declining and uneconomic yields from 
their existing trees. Official policy prevented smallholders from 
opening up new land for rubber. Replantings were, however, permitted. 
The refusal to allow smallholders to open up new land was severely 
criticised by many, the most prominent being P.T. Bauer. Attacking this 
policy as dooming the smallholdings to extinction in a few years' time, 
Bauer argued persuasively for permitting the smallholders to open up 
new land for rubber which, he pointed out, was available in plenty in 
34 
Malaya. 
His argument in favour of lifting restrictions on new plantings was 
based on the assertion that replanting was almost impossible for the 
smallholders due to a variety of reasons, among which Were: 
(i) the technical difficulties of replanting part of a 
very small holding in view of the root competition 
from nearby mature trees and the retardation of the 
growth of young trees from the shading by the older 
trees. 
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(a) Bauer, P.T., Re-port on a Visit to Rubber Growing Smallholdings 
in Malaya. H.M. Stationery Office, London, 1948. 
(b) Bauer, P.T., The Rvbber Industry. London School of Economics 
and Political Science, Longmans Green and Co., 1948. 
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(ii) inability or unwillingness to face six or seven years' 
loss of income from'the filled stand until the maturity 
of the replanted area. (Bauer, 1957). 
Clearly the ability or willingness to face the loss of income for a 
number of years would vary among different smallholders. It would depend 
on his total income, dependency on the income from the holding to be 
replanted as well as the returns that could be expected from the old, 
low yielding trees. While sympathising with Bauer's criticisms of the 
restrictions on new planting, it is difficult not to feel that the 
difficulties of replanting were somewhat exaggerated. If indeed, Bauer's 
assertion that replanting was impossible for smallholders was true, this 
would have implied that if land was not available for new planting then 
the smallholders were, in fact, doomed. In the Sri Lankan situation 
then there would have been no hope for the smallholder sector. However, 
this aspect of Bauer's argument was criticised in the 1940s itself. Thus 
Benham (1949) wrote: 
Dr Bauer seems a little biased against replanting. If a 
good second stand can be obtained without excessive manuring, 
why not replant? How to induce and assist the smallholders 
to replant is a problem, for it is unfortunately not true 
that suitable land is available throughout West Malaya. 
In Sri Lanka, where the average size of the smallholding was smaller 
than in Malaya, the problems were even more acute, particularly for those 
farmers who were greatly dependent on the rubber holding for their cash 
incomes. The conditions that existed 30 or 40 years back in rural 
society had changed enough for the smallholder in such a situation to find 
it a nearly impossible task to replant, particularly if he were to replant 
with the available high yielding budgrafts or selected clones. 
56 
In terms of national interest, and the long term interests of the 
smallholders too, it was clearly desirable that replanting be carried 
out with high yielding varieties. Politically it was desirable for the 
Government to be able to alleviate some of the acute distress of the 
smallholders and to be able to raise rural incomes through such 
replanting. The RRSS was conceived primarily as a vehicle for the 
distribution of a cash subsidy for rubber producers, including small-
holders so as to induce and enable them to carry through such a 
replanting program rapidly. In doing this, it went beyond the 
recommendation of the Whitelaw-Perera Commission which declined to 
recommend cash subsidies to the larger holdings and plantations, instead 
calling upon the Government to make low cost credit available for 
replanting. 
2.4.2 The Rubber Replanting Subsidy Scheme 
The objective of the RRSS, when it was launched in 1953 was to 
replant 65,000 acres of rubber with high yielding clones during a period 
of five years. Later the scheme was extended for a further five years 
and now operates on a more or less permanent footing. The replanting 
targets have been modified in this period so that it now aims at an 
annual replanted area of 15,000 acres. This figure is based on an 
implied optimum replanting cycle of 33 years and an expected future 
rubber area of 500,000 acres. It is directly administered by the 
Rubber Controller. 
As mentioned, its main feature was to be a cash subsidy to be given 
to producers on an acreage basis. The amount to be paid varied among the 
three producer groups defined as (i) estates above 100 acres, (ii) estates 
between 10-100 acres, and (iii) smallholdings below 10 acres. The rate of 
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subsidy was changed a number of times subsequently (see Table 2.11). The 
subsidy was to be paid in a number of instalments so that officers could 
inspect the holdings periodically to ensure that it was being utilised for 
the purpose of replanting and maintenance of the replanted trees. 
TABLE 2.11 
RATE OF SUBSIDY FOR REPLANTING 
Period Size Group Subsidy/ acre (Rs) 
1953-61 >100 acres 700 
•k 
(4) 
10-100 acres 900 (4) 
<10 acres 1,000 (5) 
1962-65 >100 acres 1,000 (5) 
10-100 acres 1,100 (6) 
<10 acres 1,200 (6) 
1966-74 >100 acres 1,400 (5) 
10-100 acres 1,500 (6) 
<10 acres 1,500 (6) 
19 75-present >100 acres 1,900 (5) 
10-100 acres 2,000 (6) 
<10 acres 2,000 (6) 
Source: Administrative Reports of the Rubber 
Controller, 1953-19 75. 
* Figures in brackets refer to the number of 
instalments. 
Tlie first instalment was to be paid after the uprooting of old 
rubber trees and preparation of the land, the second after the 
establishment of new plants and the subsequent instalments annually 
thereafter, provided the holding was maintained in a satisfactory 
58 
c o n d i t i o n . In a l l cases , the holdings were inspected by an authorised 
o f f i c e r b e f o r e the a p p l i c a t i o n ' f o r the subsidy was accepted and be f o re 
payment of each instalment. As can be seen in Table 2 ,11 , the smallholders 
were paid a (marginal ly) higher subsidy. This r e f l e c t e d both an 
understanding of the greater problems fac ing smallholders as w e l l as the 
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e l e c t o r a l power exerc i sed by them. 
The payment of subs id ies was l a t e r extended to replanting with other 
approved crops of rubber holdings deemed to be unsuitable f o r rubber on 
a g r o - c l i m a t i c grounds. This i s done now in l i n e with the crop 
d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n program i n i t i a t e d in 19 70. 
F a c i l i t i e s f o r the d i s t r i b u t i o n of approved, high grade planting 
mater ia l to the smallholders were extended and i s now general ly done 
through the network of Rubber Depots of the Commodity Purchase Department 
s i tuated in the p r i n c i p l e rubber growing d i s t r i c t s . Similar arrangements 
have been made f o r the d i s t r i b u t i o n of f e r t i l i s e r , where the cost of the 
f e r t i l i s e r de l ivered i s deducted from the instalments of the subsidy. 
At i t s i n c e p t i o n , the scheme was intended to be financed wholly by 
a cess on exported rubber. Later the Government of China, a f t e r the 
s igning of the Rubber-Rice Pact in 1952, contributed in part to the Rubber 
Replanting Fund set up to f inance the scheme. Present ly , i t i s mainly 
f inanced by contr ibut ions from a consol idated fund which i s f inanced by a 
cess on the rubber exports . 
2 . 4 . 3 Response of Producers to the Scheme 
The response of a l l producer groups to the scheme was i n i t i a l l y very 
encouraging. In the f i r s t f i v e years of the scheme, the replanted area 
exceeded not only the o r i g i n a l target of 65,000 acres but even the l a t e r , 
revised target of 90,000 acres . Though the p lantat ions were quicker to 
^^ This aspect of the scheme thus contrasted with replanting schemes 
adopted about the same time in Malaya Csee, f o r example, Rudner, 1976). 
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take advantage of the scheme, the smallholders were not far behind and 
they maintained a consistently high annual rate of replantings during the 
first decade of the scheme's operation (see Table 2.12). 
A number of factors would have influenced the high annual rates of 
replanting recorded in the early period of the scheme. The first factor 
would have been the accumulated stock of very low yielding trees. Second, 
future expectations would have been high on account of the general 
optimism regarding the future of the industry, the availability of the 
high yielding clones which promised yields far superior to those of the 
old seedling rubber, and the stability of the economy in Sri Lanka in this 
period. Thus a favourable environment existed for people to invest 
confidently in a long term crop like rubber. The cost of living, while 
higher than the pre-war levels, was, on the other hand, rising but slowly 
in this period; there was an improvement in the real incomes of the 
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population. Problems of large scale unemployment had not then arisen. 
As can be seen from Table 2.12, the annual area replanted, after the 
very high levels of the first five years began to gradually decline, 
particularly from 1963 onwards. This decline occurred at a time when 
rubber prices too were entering a period of secular decline (see Table 
2.12). 
2.4.4 Problems of Data on the Smallholder Rubber Area 
Serious data problems arise when the planting and replanting patterns 
of the smallholders are examined in the period from 1950 onwards. However^ 
there does not seem to have been any replantings outside the subsidy scheme, 
Therefore the figures released by the Rubber Control Department can be 
considered an accurate guide to the total area replanted each year. 
^^ Tambiah S.J., 'Ceylon' in The Role of Savings and Wealth in Southern 
Asia and the West, ed. R.D. Lambert and B.F. Hoselitz, UNESCO, Paris, 1963. 
TABLE 2 . 12 
THE ANNUAL REPLANTED AREA UNDER THE RRSS 
AND THE AVEIUGE PRICE: 1953-1973 
60 
Year 
Large 
estates 
Medium 
estates 
Smallholders 
Average 
price 
CRS per lb) 
195 3 4 ,346 989 465 1 .35 
1954 9 , 4 0 8 5 ,126 3 ,923 1 .10 
1955 9 , 164 6 ,135 5 , 6 0 8 1 .28 
1956 10 ,803 7 ,012 6 ,770 1 .45 
1957 9 ,939 7 ,481 6 ,809 1 .13 
1958 8 ,270 5 , 8 2 1 6 , 547 .95 
1959 6 , 185 4 ,566 7 ,781 1 .25 
1960 6 , 1 6 4 4 , 538 7 ,191 1 . 23 
1961 7 ,617 4 ,135 6 , 933 1 .00 
1962 7 , 471 3 ,490 6 , 993 .97 
1963 7 , 071 2 , 694 6 , 147 .93 
1964 4 , 797 3 ,851 4 ,904 .90 
1965 4 , 498 3 ,171 4 ,832 .91 
1966 4 , 608 2 , 1 31 8 ,842 .89 
1967 4 , 664 2 ,120 3 ,302 .79 
1968 6 , 100 2 ,352 4 ,282 .88 
1969 6 ,225 1 ,747 4 ,112 1 .05 
19 70 4 , 998 1 , 708 3 ,533 . 91 
19 71 4 , 130 1 ,365 2 , 981 .80 
1972 5 , 2 8 3 1 ,109 2 , 350 .81 
1973 4 , 053 925 2 , 298 
1 . 18 
Source: Ceylon. Annual Reports of the Rubber Controller, 1953-1973. 
TABLE 2. 13 
REPLANTING PROGRESS IN SMALLHOLDINGS BY DISTRICT AT THE END OF 1973 
District Total area (acres) 
Replanted area 
(acres) 
Percentage 
replanted 
Colombo 27,159 19,889 73 
Kalutara 43,764 27,226 62 
Galle 16,502 8,041 49 
Matara 5,955 3,154 53 
Hambantota 20 20 100 
Ratnapura 21,923 10,566 48 
Kegalle 41,138 31,468 76 
Korunegala 1,500 640 43 
Kandy 3,296 1,212 37 
Matale 1,844 348 19 
Nuwara Eliya 20 20 100 
Badulla ) 
Monaragala) 20 20 100 
Total 15 3,141 102,604 63 
Source: Based on data from the Admin-istration Report of the Rubber 
Controller, 19 73. 
ON K' 
62 
Thus by the end of 1973, 102,604 acres had been replanted in the small-
holding sector (see Table 2.13). 
The total areas of different groups given by the Rubber 
Control Department and the figures given for new plantings are not 
reliable. The errors in the figures for the total area (of all groups) 
given by the Department were revealed by the Agricultural Census in 1962 
which showed that an area of some 105,000 acres registered at the 
Department as being under rubber was in fact either abandoned or under 
other crops. A smallholders' replanting survey of two selected villages 
conducted by Hansen (1969) found extensive discrepancies between the 
registered and actual areas. He found that in certain areas there were 
large areas of unregistered rubber. The Sample Survey of Rubber 
Smallholdings of 19 71-72 confirmed these findings and cast doubt on the 
picture of the age structure of the tree population given by figures from 
the Rubber Control Department, and consequently on the planting and 
replanting behaviour of smallholders in the 1950s and 1960s. Thus, 
according to figures given in Table 2.13, 37 per cent of trees are of 
pre-1953 vintage. Since there was little planting done in the 1930s and 
1940s, this would imply that a large proportion of the trees are well 
over 40 years of age. However, data collected in the 1971-72 sample 
survey show a quite different position. Only 4 per cent of the trees were 
over 30 years of age in 1971-72. In fact, over 85 per cent of the total 
was less than 20 years of age (see Table 2.14). Our own field observations 
tend to confirm this finding that only a tiny proportion of smallholdings 
1 , 37 is very old. 
^^ It was mentioned above that there is near unanimity in official circles 
about the disastrous implications of failure to achieve an annual target of 
replanting 3 per cent of the total acreage on which the RRSS operates. 
This is indeed surprising in view of the (well known) facts regarding the 
age distribution of the tree population. A 33 year optimum replanting 
cycle (assuming that such indeed is the case even though no economic analysis 
has ever been done to justify this figure), implies a 3 per cent per annum (cont d) 
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The proportion of replanted rubber in the smallholding sector, 
according to this survey, is given in Table 2.15. 
The proportion of the replanted acreage in the <10 acre group, computed 
from the data given in A Report on the Sample Survey of the Rubber 
Smallholdings of Sri Lanka (1971-72) shows that 49 per cent of the total 
acreage is replanted. Taken together with the information on the age 
structure of the trees given from the data in the same survey, this shows 
that significant new plantings have taken place in this period (1950s and 
1960s). Since new plantings are not eligible for a subsidy, most of the 
cultivators may not have taken the trouble to register their holdings or to 
obtain permission to plant. 
The total rubber acreage that has been newplanted according to the 
Rubber Control Department in this entire period is less than 10 per cent 
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of the area replanted. Since this acreage is not given in a disaggregated 
form, it is not known how much of this would have been planted by smallholders, 
A major problem with data given by the Rubber Control Department is 
that it does not allow disaggregation of the smallholdings (<10 acre) group 
further. This is a serious disadvantage particularly as the behaviour of 
different groups within the smallholdings group may be dissimilar. Thus 
there are no data available on the distribution of the pre-1953 smallholders 
rubber area between different size groupings within this sector. The age 
structure of the trees shown in Table 2.14 does not indicate any significant 
differences among these groupings at present. However, as shown in Table 
2.15, the ratios of replanted to new planted areas are clearly different. 
target for replanting only if the age distribution of the tree population 
is uniform; this however is obviously not the case. (Such a uniform 
distribution would imply that nearly 40 per cent of the trees would be over 
20 years of age whereas the actual figure is less than 15 per cent.) Thus 
the percentage of rubber which falls due for replanting in any given year 
varies, even if all other factors remain constant. 
^^ Administrative Reports of the Rubber Controller, 1950-1973. 
TABLE 2.14 
AGE OF SMALLHOLDINGS BY ACREAGE GROUPS 
A G E G R O U P S 
groups 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7-10 10-20 20-30 >30 Unspecified 
<2 3.0 2.0 4.4 5.0 4.4 4.5 15.8 • 49.5 8.8 1.6 0.1 
2-5 3.6 2.7 4.2 5.1 3.8 3.9 14.4 46.1 12.2 3.8 0.2 
5-10 3.1 2.0 3.8 4.6 3.2 4.5 15.0 50. 7 9.4 3.5 0.2 
Source: A Report on the Sample Survey of the Rubber 
Smallholdings of Sri Lanka (1971-72). 
0^ 
TABLE 2.15 
REPLANTING AND NEWPLANTING BY ACREAGE GROUPS 
AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL PARCELS 
Acreage 
group 
Replanted Newplanted Unspecified 
<2 32.9 6A.2 2.8 
2-5 52.0 46.1 1.9 
5-10 64.6 32.0 4.4 
Source: A Report on the. Sample Survey of the Rubber 
Smallholdings of Sri Lanka (1971-72). 
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There fore , i f the s i z e d i s t r i b u t i o n of the smallholder area in the 
pre-1953 per iod was s imi lar to the current d i s t r i b u t i o n , then we may 
i n f e r that many smallholders have abandoned t h e i r rubber holdings or 
replaced them with other crops ( i . e . , there has been l i t t l e r ep lant ing ) . 
On the other hand, the data may ind i ca te that new plantings were higher 
amongst the smaller ho ld ings . The true answer may l i e between these two 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s . 
2 . 4 . 5 The Replanting Response: An Econometric Analysis 
In the absence of sucli disaggregated data, the plant ing response of 
the smallholders can be inves t igated only at a very general l e v e l . This , 
t h e r e f o r e , l i m i t s the value of an econometric analysis of the acreage 
supply response of d i f f e r e n t producer groups as that carr ied out by 
Herath (1975) , f o r the inves t i ga t i on of behavioural patterns of d i f f e r e n t 
smallholder groupings. This analysis used a modif ied vers ion of the French-
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Matthews (19 71) supply response model to examine the replanting response 
of the large and medium plantat ions and the smallholdings sec tor (<10 
a c r e s ) , over the per iod 1953-71. 
The s p e c i f i e d funct ion f o r est imation considered the annual replanted 
acreage to be a funct ion of the p r o f i t a b i l i t y of rubber, the p r o f i t a b i l i t y 
of a l t e r n a t i v e crops , the expected change in y i e l d , a weather v a r i a b l e , the 
non-bearing acreage and the rubber replanting subsidy.. 
In the actual es t imat ion , the p r o f i t a b i l i t y of the a l ternat ive crops 
and the expected change in y i e l d were omitted. The former was omitted f o r 
the smallholders on the ground that no c l o se competitor to rubber was 
ava i lab l e as a cash crop ; the l a t t e r on the ground that y i e l d expectat ions 
would have remained s tab le over the per iod . 
^^ Herath, H.M.G., 'A Study of Supply Response o f Rubber in Sri Lanka', 
unpublished Master 's degree t h e s i s , Austral ian National Univers i ty , 1975. 
67 
Both these assumptions are open to serious criticisms. As mentioned 
previously, large areas of rubber have been converted to other crops over 
this period; this would indicate that at least in certain areas, and under 
certain conditions, there did exist close competitors to rubber. Regarding 
yield expectations, since this period saw the large scale introduction of 
high yielding clones and their diffusion among smallholders, the yield 
expectations would have changed substantially over the period. Given the 
weaknesses of these assumptions and the use of the Colombo consumer price 
index to deflate prices and the subsidy, the results of the estimation 
should be interpreted cautiously. 
According to Herath, the results 'clearly indicate the importance of 
profitability as a determinant of replanting by all groups'. Noting that 
the profitability variable explained approximately 70 per cent of the 
variation in the annual rate of replanting by the smallholders, Herath 
concludes that 'there is no evidence of alternative objectives being 
predominant in this group as the study shows the profitability variable to 
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be an important determinant of the replanting behaviour'. 
In other words, the implication of the estimated function is that the 
replanting behaviour of rubber smallholders seems to fit into a broad 
framework of profit maximisation. 
In the absence of further disaggregated data and analysis, the question 
as to whether all groups in the smallholder sector behave in this manner 
cannot be determined simply from this estimation. Particular caution is 
necessary because the skewed nature of the distribution of ownership 
concentrates a large proportion of the rubber lands in this sector in the 4i hands of the bigger smallholders. This could have the effect of obscuring 
Ibid. 
^^ A Report on the Sam-pie Survey of the Rubber Smallholdings of Sri Lanka 
(1971-72), Ministry of Plantation Industries, Republic of Sri Lanka, Colombo, 
1974. 
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a different pattern of behaviour of the smaller farmers. This is an 
empirical question and is part.of the subject of this study. Results of 
the field survey and discussion of this question are given below in 
Chapters 6 and 7. 
2.4.6 Conclusion 
The discussion in the previous sections has shown how smallholder 
cash crop cultivation and, in particular, smallholder rubber passed 
through a number of different stages in the course of its history. 
Within these stages the decision-making environment of the small-
holder has shown varying features. The early period of smallholder 
rubber was one of rapid and spontaneous expansion of new plantings. 
While it received an initial stimulus from the plantations, it subsequently 
developed a momentum of its own that lasted right up to the end of the 
1920s when the world-wide depression and the International Rubber 
Regulation Agreement ended it. It was a period when the intensity of land 
use and the opportunity cost of converting it into a rubber holding were 
low, price and income expectations high and the price of rubber relative 
to other cash crops and purchased consumer goods was extremely favourable. 
Then a period of relative stagnation followed which lasted for some two 
decades; the decision problems in this period were focused on the short 
term question of intensity of exploitation and levels of output and not on 
long term investments. Then the aftermath of the Korean War-inspired 
price boom found the industry in need of large scale asset renewal in 
an environment of market optimism, with high price and yield expectations. 
A sustained program of Government intervention scored some major initial 
successes. Presently, the same problem is posed in a much different 
situation of high inflation, political and social instability and 
deteriorating relative prices. The need for the replacement of the low 
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yielding rubber is, however, now even more acute, particularly from the 
national viewpoint. 
An understanding of the decision-making process of the smallholders -
particularly in relation to the long term investment called for in asset 
replacement of perennial crops - is an important prerequisite for 
effective policy measures. Here it is necessary to draw attention to the 
fact that rubber smallholders have been and are of two major types: those 
working on their own lands (using family labour) and smallscale 'investors' 
in rubber. The term smallholder - used in Sri Lanka to denote all who have 
less than 10 acres of rubber smallholdings - while sufficient for 
statistical purposes^ is inadequate and misleading when applied to questions 
of decision making. The differences between types of smallholders within 
this general category need to be taken into account. 
In subsequent chapters we will develop a model of asset replacement 
applicable to the problem of rubber replanting using the conventional 
approach adopted in investment theory. We shall then discuss the special 
features of peasant farms and the necessary modifications to conventional 
decision models on the basis of data obtained during the field survey. 
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CllAi'TER 3 
THE INVESTMENT DECISION UNDER UNCERTAINTY 
This chapter comprises two main sections. The first outlines the 
salient features of the investment decision in a market economy and discusses 
the S-ppropiriHt6 noi!TTi3.tiv6 cirit6iri.3 foi* int6irt6inpoir3.1 utility in.3.xiiiiis3.tion» 
The discussion, in general, will follow the Fisherian approach used by 
Hirshleifer (1970); this assumes that the utility function has only a single 
attribute: money. The second section will build up a model of the decision 
problem facing a rubber farmer under conditions of uncertainty. 
3.1.1 The Two Period Model 
An investment decision is essentially the problem of resource allocation 
over time between production and consumption, and includes the problem of 
choice among competing investment alternatives. 
Consider an individual facing the problem of allocating resources for 
consumption and production over two time periods - the present (T^) and the 
future (T^) - one time period from the present, where each time period is 
of equal length. 
Assume that: 
(a) a perfect market exists for the lending and borrowing of 
funds at a given market rate of interest; 
(b) productive opportunities (independent and regular) exist 
for the physical transformation of present incomes (or 
'consumption claims') to future and vice versa; 
(c) uncertainty is absent. 
Let the individual have (a) an initial resource endowment providing 
him with incomes Y and Y^ in the two time periods T and T,; and (b) a 
o 1 o i. 
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i n d i v i d u a l and i s c o n c a v e t o the o r i g i n i n d i c a t i n g d i m i n i s h i n g m a r g i n a l 
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two . s t a g e s . 
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Tl ie i n t i i v i d u a l f i r s t u n d e r t a k e s p h y s i c a l i n v e s t m e n t s t o r e a c h P 
and then b o r r o w s t o move a l o n g the marke t l i n e t o the h i g h e s t a t t a i n a b l e 
consuini) t i on p o s i L i o n . 
T h i s d i s c u s s i o n assumes t i i a t t h e m a r g i n a l r a t e o i r e t u r n on p h y s i c a l 
i n v e s t m e n t s w i l l f a l l b e l o w the marke t r a t e o f i n t i ^ r e s t ( on l e n d i n g , and 
b o r r o w i n g ) b e f o r e the i ntl i v i d u a l ' s i n i t i a l r e s o u r c e endowment becomes 
i n s u f f i c i e n t t o f i n a n c e t l i e l e v e l o f i n v e s t m o n l i n d i c a t e d . Of c o u r s e 
the j n d i v i d u a ] w i l l b o r r o w i f n e c e s s a r y t o f i n a n c e p h y s i c a l i n v e s t m e n t 
u n t i l the m a r g i n a l r a t e o f r e t u r n i s e q u a l Lo t.lie r a t e o f i n t e r e s t on 
b o r r o w i n g . I 'he a b o v e d i s c u s s i o n can e a . s i l y be e x t end iK l t o c o v e r such a 
c a s e . 
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In doing so, he reaches the highest attainable wealth W ^ 
corresponding to the market line M'M'. Since market lines connect 
combinations of equal present value, he thus actually maximises the 
present value. 
If (j) is taken as the price of a one year future dollar in terms 
of current dollars, then (}) = where r is the annual rate of ^^  
1+r „ 
* A 1 
interest. Then the highest attainable present value W = C + t7~ • 
^ o o l+r 
Thus a utility maximising individual makes his productive decision 
so that present value is maximised and then reaches his consumptive 
optimum through borrowing (or lending) in the market. 
Hirshleifer (1970) shows that the above conclusion can be 
generalised, in the absence of market imperfections and uncertainty, to 
cover the cases where productive opportunities are discrete or 
interdependent. And without assuming constancy of interest rates 
over time^it can be extended to the multiperiod case and also to the 
case where the problem is posed as that of choosing between current 
consumption and a perpetual income flow. The rule of maximising the 
present value always leads to the optimal productive decision so that 
through lending or borrowing the individual can then move to the utility 
maximising position. 
3.1.2 Divergence between borrowing and lending rates 
In the discussion in sub-section 3.1.1, the existence of perfect 
funds markets where an individual could lend or borrow at a single 
market rate of interest was assumed. 
However, when this assumption is relaxed and the existence of 
divergences between the lending and borrowing rates are taken into 
account, problems arise regarding the proper rate to be used in present 
value calculations. 
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luiuls and the optimum can be interpteted as a pre^a•nt value inaxinnim only 
in a f o r m a l i s t i c sense (Hirshleifer, 1970). 
Thus w h e r e such d i v e r g e n c e s l.ietween lending, and bi.u'rowiiig rates occur, 
the apj)ropriatc rate d e p e n d s on the individual's subjective time preference 
at t L tude;;. 
1 Investment l>ec i s i on unde r Unce r t a i nty 
Since future o u t c o m e s ,'ire never absolutely certain, investm.ent 
d e c i s i o n s aic invariabJy tai<en under conditions of unce r ta iri ty. 
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F.H. Knight distinguished between risk and uncertainty depending on 
whether the probability distributions of the outcomes were known or not. 
In line with much of the literature in modem decision theory, we shall 
assume that in individual decision making uncertainty can be subsumed 
under risk, with a subjective probability distribution expressing the 
beliefs and convictions of the person regarding the future outcomes. 
Risky choices are intrinsically more complex than choices under 
certainty. Rational choice is a subjective choice; the only criterion 
for judging whether a particular decision is 'correct' is to check whether 
it best corresponds to the decision makers' beliefs, attitudes and 
preferences. Thus the criteria for optimal choice directly involve the 
decision makers' risk attitudes; no completely 'objective' criteria for 
choice nf even tae productive optimum under uncertainty exists. 
We shall first consider the problem of choice among risky prospects 
whose outcomes are incomes in the same time period. This will then be 
extended to the case more relevant to the long term investment decision 
problem of choosing among risky prospects whose outcomes are incomes at 
different time periods. 
3.1.A The Expected Utility Rule 
The 'expected utility rule' provides a framework for decision making 
under uncertainty, which takes into account the risk attitudes and beliefs 
of the decision maker. It states that, provided there exists a unique 
'cardinal' preference scaling function for risky prospects, generally 
called a 'utility function' in the literature, then the 'utility' of any 
risky prospect can be calculated as the mathematical expectation of the 
utility function. Then the decision maker should act in such a manner as 
to maximise the (subjective) expected utility if he is to be consistent 
with his preferences. 
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Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) and others have shown that such 
a function can be constructed pn the basis of a set of axioins or 
postulates of 'rational choice'. Thus for a risky prospect with a single 
dimensioned consequence the postulates of ordering and transitivity, 
continuity and independence are sufficient for such a function to be 
2 
constructed. 
(i) Ordering and transitivity 
A person either prefers one of two risky prospects 
or is indifferent between them. 
If a person prefers a particular risky prospect -
say a^, to a^ (or is indifferent between them) and 
prefers a^ to a^ (or is indifferent between them) 
then he will prefer a^ to a^ (or be indifferent 
between them). 
(ii) Continuity 
If a person prefers a^ to a^ to a^, then there 
exists a subjective probability P(a^) other than 
zero or one such that he is indifferent between a^ 
and a lottery yielding a^ with probability P(a^) 
and a^ with probability l-P(a^). 
(iii) If a^ is preferred to a^, and a^ is any other 
risky prospect, a lottery with a^ + a^ as its 
outcome will be preferred to a lottery with a^ and 
a^ as outcomes when P(a^) = P(a2). 
The utility function that is constructed on the basis of these axioms 
is such that the scale in which utility is defined is arbitrary and has 
2 Anderson, J.R., Dillon, J.L. and Iiardaker, J.B., Agricultural Decision 
Analysis (1977). 
' ' I I i I ( , U' 11' V. M \ I I I' iK' c i ;; i oil ,m, I I y;; I ;; j I 11 ,il .m c i ii v.i i i .m L mule i .1 
[ l o s i L i v c , J. i i ic.ir L 1 ;in:; I "oriii.-iL. ion . 
Thr v n l i t l i l y ol l l ioiu ' [lo;; L ul a h ' ; ; in l lu: ciMilrxL ol ;u;HKiL t c a i i i l e 
d e c i s i o n m a k i n g h a s been d i s p u t e d . Thus e x p e r [ m e n t a i p s y c h o l o g i s t s h a v e 
f o u n d t h a t many j j eo i i l e a r c n o t [ ) e r [ e ( : t l y t r c i i i s i l i v e i n t l i e : r c l i o i c e s , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y when t h e a J t e m a t i v e s a r e c o m p l e x . However , t l iey p o s s e s s an 
i n t u i t i v e a p p e a l and a r e u s e f u l a s t h e y a l l o w a f o r m a l f r a m e w o r k t o be 
ccjns t r u e t e d f o r a n a l y s i s of d e c i s i o n s u n d e r u n c e r t a i n t y . 
The s h a p e of t h e u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n c o n s t r u c t e d on t h e b a s i s of t h e 
a b o v e p o s t u l a t e s d e p e n d s on t h e r i s k a t t i t u d e s of t h e d e c i s i o n m a k e r . 
I 'has 1 rom t h e ohserv i - t l ( o r e l i c i t e d ) p r e f e r e n c i ' s of a d e c i s i o n maker 
among r i s k y p r o s p e c t s a u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n of t h i s ty i ie can be c o n s t r u c t e d 
v/hich wou ld t h e n r e v e a l t h e p a r t i c u l a r r i s k a t t i t u d e s of t h a t p e r s ( j n . 
Z) 
M 
M o n e y 
f i c u i u : 3. '3 
UTILITY TUNCTLONS SIIOK'INC; I) 1 FL-IIRHNT 
RISK ATTITUDES 
77 
Figure 3.3 shows three utility functions expressing different risk 
attitudes. Curve A is concave and displays diminishing marginal utility 
of income. It expresses risk aversion. Curve B expresses risk preference 
and curve C, the 45° straight line, expresses risk neutrality. For an 
individual having a utility function of this type (C), maximisation of 
expected utility would be equivalent to maximising expected profits. 
Conversely the commonly postulated profit maximisation in economic 
literature implicitly assumes a linear utility function. In general if 
U(x) is the mathematical function describing the utility function, then 
(i) U'(x) > 0 implies positive marginal utility of money, 
(ii) U''(x) < 0 implies risk aversion, and 
(iii) U'''(x) > 0 implies decreasing aversion to risk with 
increasing wealth. 
3.1.5 The Mean-Variance (E-V) Approach to Portfolio Selection 
Markowitz (1952 and 1959) and Tobin (1958) pioneered the Mean-Variance 
approach to portfolio selection and subsequently it became the best known 
and most widely used approach to practical decision making where choice 
among risky alternatives was involved. 
Essentially, it considers the mean (expected value - E) and the 
variance (V) of expected income associated with a particular asset (prospect 
or project) as the relevant factors for selection of an expected utility 
maximising portfolio. All combinations of risky assets (or projects . . .) 
are grouped into two disjoint subsets composed of 'efficient' and 
'inefficient' portfolios; a portfolio is efficient if no other portfolios 
having the same (or smaller) variance has a larger mean and if no other 
portfolio with the same (or larger) mean has a smaller variance. The (risk 
averting) person can choose from the efficient subset according to his 
preferences. 
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Feldstein (1969) and Borch (1969) showed that this approach was 
consistent with expected utility maximisation only if the individual's 
utility function was quadratic or if the expected income is normally 
distributed. 
A quadratic utility function implies increasing risk aversion with 
increasing wealth and fails to meet the commonly observed and intuitively 
rational requirement of decreasing risk aversion with increasing wealth. 
Empirical evidence also suggests that in many instances the expected 
incomes of assets may be non-normally distributed. However, Tsiang (1972, 
1974) has defended the use of Ilean-Variance analysis for investors who 
regularly take rather small risks in relation to their total wealth, on 
the grounds that the deviation of the E-V choice from the expected utility 
maximising choice would be minimal. 
3.1.6 The Stochastic Dominance Approach 
Another approach that has been suggested is that of using the so-
called 'Stochastic Dominance' (SD) rules. Though the computational 
problems are greater, this method is superior in a theoretical sense to the 
E-V approach in that it conforms more closely to the maximisation of expected 
utility. (The First, Second, Third and Fourth degree stochastic dominance 
rules are usually denoted as FSD,SSD, TSD and FSD respectively.) These 
rules, using increasingly strong assumptions about the utility functions of 
the decision makers are used to order the risky prospects (projects) through 
the inspection of the income distributionsassociated with each prospect. 
Table 3.1 shows the summary of assumptions and rules for SD orderings. 
til (U denotes the i derivative of the utility function U(s), F and G i 
denote the (less than) cumulative density functions of tx<ro prospects 
with probability density functions f(x) and g(x) where x (usually taken 
to be the income) does not take values outside the range (a,b) ). 
79 
TABLE 3.1 
SUMMARY OF ASSUMPTIONS AND RULES FOR 
STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE ORDERINGS 
FSD SSD TSD QSD 
U^>G U^>0 U^>0 
U2<0 U2<0 U2<0 
F^(x)<G^(x) U^>0 
F^(x)<G3(X) U <0 
4 
F2(b)<G2(b) F^(x)<G^(x) 
F2(b)<G2(b) 
F2(b)<G^(b) 
Source: Anderson, J.R., 'Risk Efficiency in the Interpretation of 
Agricultural Production Research', Review of Marketing and 
Agrioultural Research, Vol. 42, No.3, September 1974. 
First degree stochastic dominance assumes only that decision makers 
prefer more to less of x (i.e. U(x) is monotonically increasing between 
a and b) . SSD also assumes risk aversion and TSD assumes in addition 
decreasing aversion to risk with increasing wealth (U^^O, assumed in TSD, 
also usually implies preference for positively skewed distributions). 
Thus the ordering rules are progressively stronger in their assumptions 
and the stochastically efficient sets will be progressively smaller with 
the application of higher SD rules. All of these rulings require as 
necessary conditions that (i) the lower bound of a dominant distribution 
not be less than that of an unpreferred distribution, and (ii) that the 
mean of a dominant distribution is always greater than that of unpreferred 
distribution. However it has been pointed out that while these rulings 
place a very high, even inordinate, emphasis on the lower extreme values 
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of uncertain prospects, 
when people talk of risk in farming it is usually the prospect 
of falling into the lower tails of probability distributions 
of yields, prices,profits or sustenance consumption that they 
have in mind. It thus seems appropriate to focus attention on 
these tails. Indeed this is the rationale for the emphasis on 
'safety first' and 'safety fixed' criteria in work related to 
this. (Anderson, 1974). 
Empirical evaluation of the usage of the Mean-Variance criterion and 
the Stochastic dominance criteria have shown that 'in general, the most 
significant difference between the Mean-Variance results and the SSD and 
TSD results is the tendency of stochastic dominance to eliminate from 
consideration the low return, low variance portfolios' (Porter and 
Gaumnitz, 1972). 
More recently Porter (1974) has suggested that an approach similar 
to the Mean-Variance approach, but using 'semi-variance' (where 'semi-
variance' is measured as the expected value of deviations below the mean 
or below a critical (target) value) instead of variance, can give a 
theoretically more appealing decision rule. This would lead to greater 
consistency with the SD rules and thus better conform to expected utility 
maximisation. Fishbum (1977) has further generalised this approach, 
concentrating on a risk measure that assumes that 'decision makers in 
investment contexts frequently associate risk with failure to attain a 
target return'. 
3.1.7 Time and Choice under Uncertainty 
Time adds another dimension to the problem of choice under uncertainty. 
Optimal choice would now demand that the time preference attitudes of the 
decision maker be taken into account in addition to his risk attitudes. 
An investment could be thought of as yielding a sequence of dated 
incomes. It has been shown that a cardinal intertemporal utility function 
can be constructed with a slight modification of the postulates of rational 
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choice (discussed earlier in sub-section 3.1.4), which could be used with 
the expected utility rule to evaluate the preference scaling of such 
sequences. 
Conceptually a multi-dimensioned utility approach which considers 
incomes in different periods as multiple attributes with substitution 
possibilities would be the most satisfactory method for optimal choice 
where risky long term investment choices are considered. However, the 
data and computational problems involved make this impractical in most 
cases. 
The methods that are used in practical, normative decision analysis 
adopt a number of different approaches such as the following: 
(1) Use of a 'risky' discount rate (higher than the riskless 
rate) to discount uncertain future incomes in the 
computation of present values. Different classes of 
investments classified by their 'riskiness' could have 
different 'risky' discount rates (Hirshleifer, 1970). 
3 
(2) Find the 'certainty equivalent' for each period and 
compute the present value for each sequence of certainty 
equivalents (Hirshleifer, 1970; Jean, 1971). 
(3) Use stochastic linear programming or chance-constrained 
programming with the objective function as the present 
value and the constraints reformulated in probabilistic 
form (Byrne et al. , 1971). 
(4) Use the means and higher moments of the probability 
distribution of the present values - calculated mathematically 
^ The decision maker would be indifferent between the 'certainty 
equivalent' and the risky income. For a risk averter this would be 
lower than the mathematical expectation. 
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or generated from a Monte-Carlo type simulation model -
within a Mean-Variance or a Stochastic Dominance type 
approach (Hillier, 1969, 1971; Jean, 1970; Reutlinger, 
1970) . 
A weakness of many of these approaches that concentrate on the 
present values however, is that they fail to explicitly take into 
account the decision maker's preferences regarding the time sequence of 
the cash flows. 
3.1.8 Conclusion 
This section outlined briefly the utility maximisation approach to 
intertemporal choice and indicated the framework for incorporating market 
imperfections and uncertainty. It has been shown that in principle it is 
possible to make an optimal choice from a number of choice alternatives 
provided all the relevant subjective parameters relating to the decision 
maker's expectations and preferences are known. However, in practice the 
elicitation of all these subjective parameters may be exceedingly 
difficult. This holds when the number of periods considered and the 
number of possible states is above a very small number, even when the 
restrictive assumption of a single attributed (income) utility function 
is made. Thus in actual practical situations, a number of methods have 
been developed for use in (normative) decision making, which however 
have to make further restrictive assumptions, if the solutions are to 
conform to utility maximisation. 
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In this section we shall build up a model of the decision problem 
faced by rubber smallholders within the general framework outlined in 
the previous section. Thus we shall assume that the smallholders operate 
in a fully monetised market economy where income can be considered as a 
single, homogeneous consumption good. A profit maximising model will be 
developed first, assuming perfect markets and absence of uncertainty. 
These assumptions will be relaxed later. 
3.2.1 The Decision Problem of the Rubber Smallholder 
The rubber smallholder faces a major investment decision problem 
when the existing stand of rubber trees on his land enters the phase of 
declining yields. 
Two related decisions have to be made at this stage: 
(a) When should the existing trees be replaced? 
(b) What should replace the current rubber trees? 
Therefore the problem could also be approached as a problem of asset 
replacement where both the optimal replacement time and the optimal 
replacement asset have to be decided. We shall therefore use the literature 
on asset replacement, together with the general theory on optimal 
investment decisions, in the building up of the models. 
Let us begin by considering the general asset replacement problem. 
The model discussed is basically that used by Perrin (19 72), Samuelson 
(1976) and others. 
Let a crop^ which is considered for replacing the current stand 
of rubber trees have: 
^ This formulation need not be confined to the case of replacement with a 
crop, though in the subsequent discussion it will be assumed that this is 
the case. The case where sale of the land is considered could be seen as 
(cont'd) 
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an 
(a) a net revenue function over its lifetime such that R(t) 
is the net revenue at age t years, and 
(b) a salvage value S(T) at the end of its life span at age T. 
Let p be the interest rate which when compounded continuously gives 
annual growth rate of i (i.e. p = Ln (1+i) ) - the market rate of 
interest per annum for both lending and borrowing. 
The net present value (NPV) of the earnings from this stream E. over 
its entire lifeLime vjouJ.d be given by, 
T 
NPV = / R(t)e~P^dt + S(T)e"P^ (1) 
The condition for maximisation of the net present value is given by 
equating the derivative of NPV with respect to T (age of replacement) to 
zero, 
i.e. R(T) + S' (T) = p S(T) (2) 
where the prime indicates the derivative. 
Assuming that replacement of this crop would be by the same crop over 
an infinite number of cycles,^ the objective would become the maximisation 
of the NPV of the entire stream of earnings from such replacement. 
The present value of the entire stream of earnings is then given by. 
T 
NPV = f R(t)e"P^dt + S(T)e"P^ + e"^^ oo o L 
• T 
/ R(t)e~P^dt + S(T)e"P^ o 
T 
/ R(t)e"P^dt + S(T)e"P^ 
0 
+ . . . 
an alternative decision generating a perpetual annuity equal to the market 
rate of interest. Also, the replacement asset can be of a general type 
including point input-point output, point input-continuous output, etc. 
^ This assumption of an infinite number of replanting cycles greatly 
simplfies the mathematics and when considered in relation to long lived 
crops does not materially affect the results to any significant extent. 
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= NPV 1 + e-P^ + + 
1-e -PT 
NPV (3) 
The condition for maximisation of equation (3) gives; 
R(T) + S' (T) = p 
= P 
S(T) + NPV 
S(T) + NPV 
This is also expressed as. 
R(T) + S' (T) = 
1-e -pT 
- T 
f R(t)e~P'^dt + S(T) 
(4) 
(5)' 
Equation (5) can be interpreted as stating that at the optimal 
replacement age marginal revenues will equal marginal opportunity costs, 
where the latter costs are the flow of earnings which would be realised 
from the replacement crops with a T year replacement policy. The 
right hand side of equation (5) can be interpreted as a perpetual annuity 
formed by the total discounted revenues plus the salvage value. 
These results can now be used to provide the optimal choice criterion 
for the rubber smallholder. The steps in this would be: 
(1) Choose that crop which has the highest net present value 
(assuming an optimal replacement policy) to replace the 
current stand of rubber trees. 
^ When data is available in discrete form, this equation can be expressed 
as, 
R(T) + AS(T) = -T Z (1+i) '^ R(t) + S(T) t=l l-d+i) 
where i is the rate of interest, 
and AS(T) is the change in salvage value in year T. 
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From the discussion of the model in sub-section 3.2.1, it is clear 
that: 
(a) If the expected level of the perpetual annuity firom 
replacement by the best crop is greater (lower) than 
the net revenue from the current trees in the next 
period, then he will decide to rcplacc (delay replacement of) 
the current trees. 
(b) The decision on whether replacement of the current 
rubber trees would be done by rubber or some other crop 
will depend on the respective levels of the expected 
annuities from them. 
We v/ill now proceed to discuss the effects of changes in the expected 
prices, yields, discount rate and costs, including a replanting subsidy, 
(a) Effect of changes in price expectations 
In discussing the effect of changes in price expectations it is 
important to distinguish between long term and short term expectations, 
(i) A rise in the long term price expectation of rubber 
without a corresponding change in the short term 
expectations will shift the expected annuity curve 
upwards without affecting the current net revenue 
(NR) curve and will result in earlier replanting 
(provided of course that this expected annuity from 
rubber is greater than that from an alternative crop). 
(ii) A rise in the short term price expectations (which 
does not induce a rise in the long term price 
expectations) will affect only the NR curve, shifting 
it upwards without affecting the expected annuity and 
thus results in a delay in replacement. 
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(iii) The case where both short and long term expectations 
change is ambiguous in its impact on the replacement 
date, affecting as it does both the NR and expected 
annuity curves. The result will depend on the 
relative magnitude of changes, discount rate, etc. 
Tills suggests therefore that there is no simple relationship between a 
change in price and replanting. And this has important implications for 
the specification of price/replanting relationships in supply response 
models. Most long run supply response models for tree crops have ignored 
the negative impact on removals in a particular year that may be caused 
by the high short term price expectations (see Ady, 1949; Bateman, 1965; 
Stem, 1965). The failure to take this into account may well have 
contributed to the 'loose' fit of many estimated functions. 
(b) Effect of yield expectations 
Yield expectations would mainly be influenced by technological 
changes. However, depending on whether such changes are embodied or 
disembodied the effect on replacement date will vary (Etherington and 
Jayasuriya, 1976). 
(i) Embodied technological change (e.g. improved clone) 
will raise yields of replanted trees. Since the 
(current) net revenue curve remains unchanged while 
the expected annuity moves upwards, the result will be 
earlier replacement, 
(ii) Disembodied technological change (in rubber) will 
raise both the NR curve and the expected annuity, 
while also changing their shapes. Hence the 
direction of change of the replacement date is not 
immediately obvious and will depend on the nature 
of the change as well as the discount rate. 
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Provided the replacement crop chosen is not rubber, 
and if the (disembodied) technological change is 
insufficient to change the ranking of alternative 
crops, then the effect will be to delay replanting 
since the current net revenue will go up without 
affecting the expected annuity from the replacement 
crop. 
(c) Effect of changes in rate of interest 
There is no unique relationship between the discount rate and the 
level of the expected annuity. However, it has been generally observed 
that for most of the assets which generate income flows over their life-
time (in contrast with the point-output type assets encountered in 
forestry economics and the wine aging problem), there appears to be an 
inverse relationship (see Jayasuriya, 1973; Etherington and Jayasuriya, 
1976). The effect therefore appears to be to delay replacement when 
the discount rate increases. 
(d) Effect of clianges in costs 
An increase in the expected costs, if it relates only to the future 
replacement asset would lower the annuity and thus delay replacement. 
A replanting subsidy will affect the annuity favourably moving it upwards 
and induce earlier replacement. It will also improve its attractiveness 
in relation to the competitive crops. 
3.2.3 Risk and Uncertainty 
The simple model of profit maximisation discussed above excluded 
considerations of risk and uncertainty. However, risk and uncertainty 
are pervasive elements of the farmer's decision making environment and 
as such should be incorporated in any model that attempts to come closer 
to reality. 
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When the assumption of perfect knowledge (i.e. absence of uncertainty) 
is relaxed all future (net) revenues considered in the above model are 
replaced by (subjective) probability distributions. And optimality 
criteria under such circumstances should incorporate the beliefs and risk 
attitudes of the farmers. 
The literat on optimal replacement policies for biological assets 
under conditions of risk and uncertainty is not extensive. Scobie (1967) 
used programming methods in a study of replacement policies for Merino 
sheep while Faris and Ward (1968) also used dynamic programming methods in 
a study on replacement of plum trees. In the latter study, the pioneering 
study in the field of tree crops, they concluded that the incorporation of 
stochastic elements into the decision problem did not give results markedly 
superior to those obtained from a deterministic model. A Monte-Carlo type 
simulation model, using data from the Malaysian rubber industry generated 
results that were interpreted in similar fashion (Etherington and 
Jayasuriya, 1976a). 
All these models implicitly assumed risk neutrality on the part of 
the decision maker. They concentrated on the expected values of the 
stochastic income flows so as to derive the optimal replacement policy on 
the basis of maximising the expected value of the income stream. 
A modified version of Figure 3.4 (shown as Figure 3.5) can be used 
to illustrate the impact on the replacement decision when it is assumed 
that only the income flow from the replacement asset would be uncertain. 
Compared with the single level of annuity expected under any 
particular set of conditions, it is shown in Figure 3.5 as a probability 
distribution of annuities - the shape of this distribution being 
superimposed in the figure at the right. 
Where the NR curve intersects the mean (the mathematical expectation) 
of the annuity will indicate the optimal replacement time (T^) for a 
9 1 
O) 
D 
C 
0) > 
a) 
cc: 
'2 '0 '1 
Time 
A F'l ofiabiiity cli s I r il)ut ion of liic|l\f'St expected 
CHHIU I t les 
B , higliest expected ontimty 
FlCUKi; 3.5 OPTIMUM KF.IM.ACI'.Ml'.NT TfMK Wlll'N lU'TUHNS 
FRDM I;i;I'I,A(;I;Mi';NT is unci^k'I'ain 
d e c i s i o n maker. However, a r i sk averse d e c i s i o n maker would 
l i n d L t: o|UiiTi„T,l Lo r ep l a ce at, a i a l e r dat.e (e.j,',. '1 j ) , exact Lime: 
depend ing on t.lio degree of r i s k a v e r s i o n . f Jreater ri ! ;k ave rs i on would 
imply a loy\ger d e l a y . S i m i l a r l y a ri j ;k [ ) re fe r r i ng d e c i s i o n maker wouJd 
replacc? at. an e a r l i e r da te ( e . g . 
When a l l Llie iiicoiiie f lows enLe r i ng Llie d e c i s i o n problem ( i n c l u d i n g 
Llie net revenue from the cu r ren t t r ees ) are consideret i as s t o c l i n s t i c 
Lnc(jn!e f l ows , the problem can be reduced e s s e n t i a l l y to tlie common problem 
ot choosin)', .uiiong, a ;;eL ol r i s ky as.sets (income t'lows)', p rov ided i t i s 
assumed that tiu! d e c i s i o n malcer';; p re fe rences IDr p a r t i c u l a r income 
se(iuences are r e l a t i v e l y u n impo r t a n t . 
Thus a l l replaceiiKMit crojis cou ld be c.onsidered as asse ts h av i ng 
p a r t i c u l a r d i s t r i b u t i o n s .of ( p e r i i e t u a l ) annLr i t ies a ss t j c i a i ed v/ith them. 
('I'liese cou ld be coniputed or ob t a i n ed from s imulat icMi models as d i s cussed 
'J 2 
in B u b - s e c l i o n 3 . 1 . ' / ) . 'I'lic cxpticLed reveiiut' 1 roin the c u r r e n t t r e e s would 
a l s o p o s s e s s a p a r t i c u l a r p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n . 
Tlien a Mean-Var iance type approach or one based on S t o c l i a s t i c 
DoinJnance r u l e s could be used to d e r i v e tlie ojUinial c h o i c e . This i s 
i l l u s t r a t e d u s i n g F i g u r e 3 .6 in a Mean-Variance (S tandard i J e v i a t i o n ) 
f raniework. 
D 
C 
c 
o 
o 
c 
o 
(D 
"D 
T ) 
O "O 
c. o 
(7) O 
Direction of 
incteciiing ullHly 
/ 
hJR It), 
C C 
hAeun v a l u e of a n n u i t y 
FIGURE 3.6 
Oi'TIMUM REFl.ACEMl-NT DECISION UTU'N 
ALL INCOME FLOWS ARE UNCERTAiN 
i l and I ' i ' r e i i r e sen t two f a m i l i e s of ind i f 1 e re nee c u r v e s . The 
d i f f e r e n t c u r v a t u r e of the i n d i f f e r e n c e curves e x p r e s s e s d i f f e r e n t r i s k 
a t t i t u d e s . Thus I ' l ' show g r e a t e r r i s k a v e r s i o n . ^ 
A^, A^, A, r e p r e s e n t the Mean-Standard i ^ j v i a t i o n (|J, 0 ) of 
1 z J q 
income f lows ( a n n u i t i e s ) a s s o c i a t e d with four p o s s i b l e rep lacement c r o p s . 
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lie needs a g r e a t e r i n c r e a s e in the mean (C'H>CIi) tt) a c c e p t an equa l 
inc ic j a se in v a r i a b i l i t y . 
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NR(t) shows the time path of (y, a) of the net revenue from the 
present asset (the shape of the time path as drawn in the figure is based 
on the likelihood that the variability (a) would decline with the decline 
in the yield (and mean revenue, U) over time). For simplicity it is 
assumed that the A's have (y, o) which remain constant over the time 
period under consideration. 
A^ and A^ would dominate A^ and A^ since they would have higher y 
and lower o . 
The choice then would be between A^ and A^ for replacing the current 
stand of trees. We will assume that the decision maker chooses A^ in 
preference to A^ as that would accord better with his preferences. 
At any stage between NR(t)^ and .NR(t)2, the present asset is 
preferable to A^ as it would be on an indifference curve with higher 
utility. However if NR(t) is to the left of NR(t)2, then the alternative 
A^ would be preferable and optimally replacement should take place at 
time t^ (provided of course that the expectations from alternatives remain 
unchanged) . 
I'I' represent a family of indifference curves of a person with a 
greater degree of risk aversion as mentioned earlier. Arguing as above 
it is clear that the replacement date in this case t^ would be later than 
t^. Thus increasing risk aversion leads to later replacement. 
This approach, in addition to the assumption of a single attributed 
(money income) utility function also assumes that only the annuity and 
its variance (or the NPV) is important to the decision maker. Using 
Stochastic Dominance rules, it is possible to overcome this limitation 
provided sufficient information on the distribution of the annuity is 
available. The more serious drawback is that it does not take into 
account farmers' possible concern over the level of incomes in each time 
period. 
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3 .2 .4 Conclusion 
This sec t ion has developed a model of p r o f i t maximising decis ion 
making under condit ions of per fec t markets and per fect knowledge. The 
assumption of per f e c t knowledge was l a t e r relaxed and the Impact of 
uncertainty on the optimal decis ion was explored on decis ion makers 
having d i f f e r e n t r isk a t t i tudes . 
The s i tuat ion under Inqjerfect markets was not discussed s p e c i f i c a l l y 
s ince that a f f e c t s primarily the appropriate rate of discount. As 
indicated in Section 1, the degree of the divergence between lending and 
borrowing rates and the ind iv idua l ' s time preference att itudes w i l l be 
important here. They are part ly empirical questions and w i l l therefore 
be taken up l a t e r . 
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CHAPTER 4 
CHARACTERISTICS OF FAMILY FARMS AND 
THE DECISION MAKING ENVIRONMENT OF RUBBER SMALLHOLDERS 
Resource Allocation in Peasant Farming 
^ . l . I Characteristics of Family Farms 
The model developed in Chapter 3 for the decision problem facing a 
rubber smallholder assumed that (money) income could be considered as the 
single homogeneous consumption good entering into the utility function 
of the smallholder. Where the smallholder uses unpaid family labour in 
farm operations, particularly in the context of an imperfect labour 
market, this assumption is no longer valid . 
Since family farms which use family labour in their operations combine 
the features of a firm and a household - involving both production and 
consumption in the same economic unit - the conventional optimising model 
of the firm becomes inadequate. Like a large proportion of the rubber 
smallholdings, hundreds of thousands of family farms of this type are 
found in all the rural areas of the less developed countries. 
Failure to take into account the special characteristics of the 
family farms leads to tragi-comic errors in analysis and policy recommend-
ations in the agricultural sector; thus 'The Studies in the Economics of 
Farm Management (1954-57) ' in India concluded that a big proportion of 
farmers were running their farms at a net loss. This example indicates 
the need to consider the concrete conditions of family farms with greater 
care. 
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The recently developed models, in particular the seminal works of 
Fisk (1962)5 Sen (1966)^ and Nakajima (1969)? have extended this approach 
to analyse the position of farm-households (or to entire societies [Fisk]) 
at various stages in the process of transition from subsistence farming to 
full commercialisation, in the course of economic development. 
Basically these models postulate a family welfare (utility) function 
that has leisure (or labour) as one component in addition to 
other consumption goods. This is then maximised subject to the production 
function which has family labour as an input and any other relevant 
constraints to yield the appropriate marginal conditions for an optimal 
equilibrium. The implications of these conditions are then explored under 
various assumptions regarding the nature and shape of the utility function 
and the production function, and different constraints. 
In particular such models have explored the patterns of labour 
allocation under conditions where a labour surplus exists. Under certain 
plausible assumptions regarding the conditions in the factor markets of 
the rural areas, the existence of a 'wage gap' between the wage rates 
outside the farm and the real cost of labour inside it can be quite 
reasonably explained. And it is unnecessary to postulate that the marginal 
6 
productivity of labour is zero for surplus labour conditions to exist. 
^ Fisk, E.K., 'Planning in a Primitive Economy: Special Problems of 
Papua New Guinea', Economic Record, Vol.38, 1962, pp.462-78. 
^ Sen, A.K., 'Peasants and Dualism with or without Surplus Labour', 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol.74, No.5, 1966, pp.425-50. 
^ Nakajima, C., 'Subsistence and Commercial Family Farms: Some_ 
Theoretical Models of Subjective Equilibrium' in Subsistence Agriculture 
and Economic Development, ed. C.R. Wharton, Aldine, Chicago, 1969, 
pp.165-85. 
^ Sen, cp. cit. 
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4.1.3 Intertemporal Resource Allocation in Family Farms 
All these models however have limited their field of analysis to 
the allocative decisions of the farm family in a single time period. 
Intertemporal resource allocation in a farm-family context has not been 
modelled or analysed within such a framework. Thus the available 
literature on the multi-period (long term) investment decisions of farm-
families tends to be almost wholly qualitative and descriptive. 
The literature on this can be broadly divided into two groups: (a) 
those dealing with the empirical analysis of processes which are the 
consequence of farmers'^ long term allocative decisions, and (b) those 
discussing the farmers' preferences and attitudes pertaining to such 
decisions. Rather surprisingly no synthesis of the empirical results and 
their implications with the observations made on farmers' intertemporal 
preferences, etc., has been done. 
Thus the process of diffusion of cash crops in the less developed 
countries has received a great deal of attention from researchers. As 
much of such diffusion has involved perennial crops like rubber, coffee 
and cocoa, these processes have at the same time involved long term 
investments made by hundreds of thousands of peasant-farmers throughout 
these regions, and have contributed significantly to capital formation in 
these areas. The discussion of the manner in which the cultivation of 
perennial crops took place has been confined mainly to the period where 
its undertaking did not pose a significant reduction in the normal income 
levels of the farmers, and the impact of the long gestation period 
was minimal. The method of planting rubber on lands cleared in i 
^ 'Farmer' is used synonymously with 'farm family' or 'farm-household'. 
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the course of shifting cultivation, particularly in Indonesia 
g 
has been well documented. • The cocoa farmers in Ghana 
established their holdings under somewhat similar conditions. Polly 
Hill (1963)^ described this as follows: 
Newly planted land might first be planted with food crops and 
then, a little later, with cocoa. Tlie cover crops, plantain 
and cocoyam, provided basic carbohydrates for the farmer and 
his dependants and sometimes, also, a saleable surplus. As 
for protein, the forests were then much better stocked with 
game and edible snails than they are today - and, presumably, 
the streams with fish. The earliest-acquired lands were not 
far away from the homeland - where food was grown on much the 
same scale as formerly, the women continuing to be responsible 
for most of the work. Nor is there any evidence that sales of 
palm produce were reduced. So while waiting for their first 
cocoa-plantings to come into bearing, the farmer and his 
family were presented with no unusual maintenance problems. 
Ortiz (1967),^*^ in her discussion of the decision of Indian farmers 
in Colombia to plant coffee does not discuss the impact of the time 
dimension involved. The writer who has drawn more attention to its 
importance is Bauer, in emphasising the difficulties smallholders face 
in rubber replanting (see Chapter 2). 
4.1.4 Supply Response Studies 
Quantitative analysis of the planting (and replanting) responses of 
farmers has been almost solely confined to the estimation of long term 
price elasticities. A very large number of studies carried out have 
covered almost all the major cash crops and regions.^^ The studies on 
® See, for example, Thomas, K.D., 'Shifting Cultivation and Smallholder 
Rubber Production in a South Sumatran Village', The Malayan Economic 
Review, Vol.10, No.l, April 1965. 
^ Polly Hill, Migrant Cocoa Farmers of Southern Ghana, Cambridge, 1963. 
^^ Ortiz, S., 'The Structure of Decision Making among Indians of Colombia' 
in Themes in Economic Anthropology, ed. R. Firth, A.S.A. Monographs 6, 
Tavistock Publications, London, 1967. 
^^ For a comprehensive review of supply response studies see Lim, D., 
•Supply Response of Primary Producers', Universiti Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1975 
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12 rubber have covered Sri Lanka, Malaya and Indonesia (Herath, 1975; 
13 14 Chan, 1962; and Teken, 1970 ). Almost all of these studies have 
confirmed that the planting (acreage) response to prices is positive. 
Though such (long term) supply response studies have been (and are) 
necessary, a number of important considerations curtail their importance 
as guides to the actual decision making process of smallholders. At the 
level of aggregation used in these analyses, the possibility of masking 
different patterns of behaviour among different groups within the 
producers is great. Also: 
Measuring the response to a change in only one of the myriad 
of influences upon smallholder decision making, even if it is 
as important a one as output price, is likely additionally to 
be unrewarding or even misleading. What one seeks to under-
stand is the effect of alterations in various packages of 
influences. Price changes coupled with the increased provision 
of cheap credit may induce responses totally different from 
price changes unaccompanied by credit innovations but 
concurrent with marketing or land reforms. Simple supply 
responses are likely to be greater in the longer term than in 
the short term; but in the longer term their importance is 
likely to be dwarfed by the effects of new technologies, inputs, 
and institutions. 
4.1.5 Farmers' Attitudes and Preferences 
The literature on farmers' attitudes and preferences that influence 
long term decisions is contradictory, and at times superficial. We 
shall look at the discussion of two such related factors in the literature: 
time preference attitudes and the time horizon of farmers. 
1 9 Herath, op. cit.^ (Chapter II). 
^^ Chan, F.C., 'A Preliminary Study of the Supply Response of Malayan 
Rubber Estates between 1948 and 1959', Malayan Economic Review, Vol.7, 
No.2, November 1962, pp.1021-1036. 
^^ Teken, I.B., 'Supply of and Demand for Indonesian Rubber', unpublished 
Ph.D. thesis, Purdue University, 1970. 
^^ Helleiner, G.K., 'Smallholder Decision Making: Tropical African 
Evidence' in Evidence in Development Theory, ed. L.G. Reynolds, 
Economic Growth Center, Yale University, 1975. 
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Everett M. Rogers (1969),^ ^ reviewing the literature on motivation, 
values and attitudes of subsistence farmers, says that -
For whatever the precise reason, deferred gratification 
(postponement of immediate satisfaction in anticipation of 
future rewards) seems uncharacteristic of peasants. Thus, 
in terms of the Aesop fable, subsistence farmers behave 
more like the grasshopper than the ant. 
On the same theme, discussing the Malay peasants. Swift (1963)^^ 
states that in comparison with the Chinese, whose view is 'essentially 
long run', with the Malays, 'the emphasis is more on the maximisation 
of short run satisfaction'. They tend to devote their incomes 'to 
consumption rather than to try and accumulate to invest for future 
income'. Specifically on the replanting of their current rubber trees, 
according to him: 
, . . few peasants will replant so long as they can still 
live on the income from their trees. The prospect of 
economic difficulties for the next five or six years, while 
waiting for the new trees to yield, weighs a lot more 
heavily than the prospect of a greatly increased income at 
the end of this period of waiting, or the prospect of even 
greater difficulty when their trees have become so old that 
they no longer yield. 
Related to similar assertions which occur repeatedly in many writings 
on peasant societies is the characterisation of peasants as being 
basically 'short sighted' in their time horizon. Again quoting Rogers 
(1969),^^ 'not only are his perceptions of time less precise and less 
important to the peasant, but he is also less future oriented'. 
19 
These views are however not held by all. Thus Bauer (1948), 
referring to Malay rubber farmers, flatly rejects the view that they take 
^^ Rogers, E.M., 'Motivations, Values and Attitudes of Subsistence 
Farmers: Toward a Subculture of Peasantry' in Subsistence Agricultm'e 
and Eoonomic Development, ed C.R. Wharton, Aldine Publishing Co., Chicago, 
1969. 
^^ Swift M., 'Malay Peasants' in The Role of Savings and l^ealthin Southern 
Asia and the Vest, ed. R.D. Lambert and B.F. Hoselitz, UNESCO, Paris, 1963. 
Rogers, op. cit., p.122. 
Bauer, oy. cit. 
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a short term view in their economic decisions, including rubber replanting. 
20 
Similarly, Polly Hill (1963), • rejecting this view, says (on cocoa farmers 
in Ghana) that 'cocoa takes a long time, fifteen years or more, to come 
into full bearing and the farmers have never had any difficulty in taking 
an appropriately long view'. 
Though attitudinal differences are likely to exist among peasants 
from different socio-cultural backgrounds, it is nevertheless remarkable 
that peasants from so diverse backgrounds have taken up cash cropping 
through cultivation of perennial crops with long gestation periods. Unless 
one were to argue that the majority of such farmers blindly followed the 
example of some far-sighted innovators in their midst, it is hard to 
reconcile this phenomenon with the view of farmers as having a short time 
horizon and a 'grasshopper' mentality. If we consider the example of the 
Malay rubber farmers referred to by Swift, it is a fact that the last 
fifteen years have seen an enormous expansion in replanting by these same 
farmers. 21 
Discussing this in a more formal manner, Mellor (1969) discusses 
the importance of rates of return to investment and the subjective 
valuation of present income versus future income and asserts that returns 
to investment in traditional agriculture are low. Hence the inducement 
to invest is correspondingly low, particularly as relatively greater 
weight is attached to present income compared to future income. Though 
it is mentioned that 'a high proportion of capital in traditional 
agriculture represents a relatively direct embodiment of family labour' 
20 Hill, op. cit.y p.181. 
^^ Mellor, J.W., 'The Subsistence Farmer in Traditional Economics' in 
Subsistence Agrioulture and Economic Development, ed. C.R. Wharton, Aldine, 
Chicago, 1969. 
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the full implication of this in the context of a labour surplus rural 
sector is not discussed. In analysing the data obtained from our field 
survey (described in Chapter 6) we shall be looking at these aspects in 
detail. It is our contention that the type of error committed in 
disregarding the wage gap (referred to on page 97) in analysis of the 
profitability of farming can in this context lead to the same misleading 
conclusions regarding both the rates of return to investments and to the 
time preference attitudes of the farmers. 
The Decision Making Environment 
4.2.1. Differences among Rubber Smallholders 
The major rubber growing regions of Sri Lanka have a comparatively 
long history of exposure to market forces (see Chapter 2). This has had 
its impact on all aspects of rural life and has effected changes in the 
patterns of consumption and production of all strata in village society. 
Markets have become an established and integral part of village 
economic life; cash plays a major role and even though farmers exhibit 
differences in the degree of commercialisation and the extent and form 
of their dependency on the markets, there is no significant sector in the 
village into which market forces have not intruded. Farmers are familiar 
with the concepts of prices, profits, interest etc., and are aware of 
the fluctuations in prices arising from disequilibria in supply and demand. 
Thus the rubber smallholders idno today confront problems of asset replace-
ment are far more sophisticated in their perception of the profits and 
costs associated with investments involving money expenditure which promise 
future money revenues than farmers at a relatively early stage of 
transition from subsistence to commercial agriculture. 
10 A 
These changes in the villages (and in the villagers) however do not 
mean that all the pre-cash crop era characteristics have disappeared. 
Certain customs, norms, values and attitudes persist together with 
particular agricultural practices. These exert considerable influence 
still, though perhaps less so than a few decades past, on many aspects 
of decision making in the villages. In particular, these influence 
the nature of the rural land and labour markets as well as the 
preferences (and preference orderings) of villagers. 
For the purposes of studying decision making, it is necessary to 
bear in mind that the village consists of a number of distinct social 
strata which exhibit important differences in their income, wealth, 
relationship to land and in their access to capital etc. In effect, 
these groups face different decision making environments even though they 
may physically live in the same village. 
This is of particular importance in studying rubber smallholders' 
decision making since (as will be shown below) they are a very 
heterogeneous group in a numl^er of important respects. In this chapter 
we shall discuss aspects of the social and economic life of villages in 
the rubber growing regions of Sri Lanka that are particularly relevant 
for an understanding of the conditions and constraints under which rubber 
smallholders make their economic decisions. 
4.2.2 Attitudes towards Land 
Land has traditionally been considered not only as the source of 
wealth but also a symbol of wealth. The attitude that land is worth more 
than other forms of wealth persists to this day. Land is stable, concrete 
, . . 22 and permanent, whereas cash does not have the same qualities. 
^^ See (a) Tambiah, S.J., 'Ceylon' in The Role of Savings and Wealth in 
Southern Asia and the West, ed. R.D. Lambert and B.F. Hoselitz, UNESCO, 
Paris, 1963, and (b) Ryan, B., Sinhalese Village, University of Miami Press, 
coral'cables, Florida, 1958, for discussion of the social attitudes relating 
to wealth and status in Sri Lankan villages. 
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This attitude affects the nature of the land market immediately. 
Land is sold almost only when circumstances compel the owner to do so and 
is invariably done with the greatest reluctance. Under such conditions 
the market value of land reflects not only its 'economic' value but also 
its 'social' value. In the author's experience, even though the market 
prices of land are quite high, very few farmers would even contemplate 
selling land so as to invest the proceeds for higher economic gain; thus 
there are many rubber farmers who have'abandoned' their rubber holdings 
(i.e., the trees are not exploited) due to uneconomic returns but would 
not even entertain the idea of selling such land. 
This same attitude to land (which indicates a multi-attributed utility 
function) has also contributed to the process of concentration of land 
ownership that has been proceeding over the last hundred years. That 
the distribution of land ownership is a highly skewed distribution 
is not simply the product of traditional inequalities in land ownership. 
Increased monetisation and commercialisation set in motion developments 
which enhanced the previous inequalities. For many who managed to 
accumulate some cash through either cash cropping or through other 
non-agricultural activities, land was considered the best investment 
irrespective of the actual returns from the land. Thus the late 19th 
century as well as the 20th century saw large scale purchasing of paddy 
and other lands in the villages by groups which were able to do 
so through incomes from other activities. Among such groups were small 
businessmen, plantation workers and white collar workers, teachers and 
money lenders. The inheritance laws contributed to fragmentation of 
23 i-rit-r^  ani=.n nnprnnnmir units often under ioint ownerstiip. holdings into small, uneconomic units often under joint ownership.' 
^^ The Disintegrating Village: Report of a Socio-Economic Survey 
conducted by the University of Ceylon, U.P. Board, Colombo, 1957. 
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Such holdings, particularly in periods of economic difficulties such as 
the economic depression of the 19305 were forced on to the market or 
were otherwise alienated. In the past, rubber smallholdings would have 
been attractive for two additional reasons as well: the relatively high 
returns and the comparative ease with which an absentee landlord could 
have managed the holding using hired labour. Given these conditions, it 
is possible that lands under other crops too may have been converted 
into rubber smallholdings by their new owners. 
With regard to the nature of land use today in the villages, it is 
to be noted that a major distinction is made between 'mada idam' 
(literally muddy lands - usually irrigable valley bottoms) which are used 
for paddy cultivation, and 'goda idam' (high lands), used for cultivation 
of other crops, including rubber. This means that generally there is no 
competition for land between paddy and other crops (including rubber). 
Population pressure has tended to raise the intensity of land use 
as well as to increase the demand for residential land. Thus 
competition for existing rubber land comes mainly from other cash crops 
or subsistence crops considered inferior to paddy (like root crops) and 
from a demand for residential land. (Religious influences effectively 
prevent use of land for the raising of livestock and similar activities . ) 
4 . 2 . 3 The Labour Market in the Rural Areas 
A labour market developed in the rural sector of Sri Lanka during 
the 19th century with the development of the plantations and cash cropping. 
Today, the growing pressure on land caused by a rising population, the 
low productivity and small holding sizes are compelling large sections of 
the village population to seek opportunities for wage labourers to supplement 
their income. 
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Such employment opportunities, in the densely populated wet zone, 
are mainly found in the plantations and cash crop smallholdings or in 
the nearby urban centres. In addition, during the major paddy seasons 
there is a high demand for casual labour on paddy fields. However, the 
high rate of population growth in the context of an economy which has 
experienced only slow rates of growth of GNP in the past two decades has 
now produced open unemployment, especially in the younger age groups, in 
both urban and rural sectors. Tliough the rate of (open) unemployment in 
the rural areas is lower (mainly due to work sharing arrangements) than 
in the urban sectors (14 per cent compared with 17.6 per cent in the latter 
24 
in 1969-70 ), the rural sector could be regarded today with justification 
as a labour-surplus sector. 
This is seen particularly in the levels of underemployment in the 
villages. Wliile this presents conceptual problems of measurement, 
available data show that underemployment levels are particularly high 
during the slack season for paddy. According to figures obtained from 
the Labour Force Survey conducted by the Ministry of Planning and 
Employment in 1968, over 45 per cent of the males in the rural sector 
involved in agriculture worked less than 40 hours a week (this percentage 25 2 6 
varying with the seasonal demand for paddy). Ryan (1958) drew attention 
to the fact that many of the villagers had plenty of 'leisure time' 
particularly in the non-paddy seasons. It is fair to conclude from these 
that, typically, households do contain the potential to increase their 
supply of labour at relatively little cost in the 'slack' seasons. 
O / 
Socio-Economic Survey of Sri Lanka (1969-70), Department of Census 
and Statistics, Colombo, 1973. 
^^ Richards, P.J., Employment and Unemployment in Ceylon, Development 
Centre, OECD, Paris, 19 71. 
9 f\ Ryan, op. oit. , p.40. 
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The type of labour demanded in agricultural activities includes 
both skilled and non-skilled labour. Generally, much of the labour demand 
in paddy cultivat ion is for comparatively low— or unskilled labour as in 
such activities as land clearance, etc. Rubber gapping is a relatively 
skilled task which, however^ is learned (with varying degrees of proficiency) 
within a fairly short period of time. Certain jobs, such as harvesting 
cinnamon, need skilled and trained labour. 
Attitudes to labour reflect some of the traditional values and 
prejudices. Thus, though manual labour for wage payments is looked down 
upon as an inferior form of occupation, yet it is nevertheless accepted 
2 7 
as a part of life for those without sufficient incomes. There is a 
distinct difference in attitude to manual work on one's own holding 
compared to manual labour for payment, and this has its roots in the 
value system of the pre-monetised society. Certain activities, 
particularly non-agricultural ones, are associated with caste groups. 
These include fishing, pottery, etc. An important agricultural activity 
that is the monopoly of a particular caste is cinnamon harvesting. llie 
'Salagama' caste has traditionally done this and today, even in regions 
that do not have people from this caste living in close proximity, it is 
done by no other, particularly as this caste is considered to be 
'inferior' by many other castes, including the Goigama (farmer) caste 
which constitutes the majority of the population in the village sector. 
Tlius to summarise: the rural sector as a whole has substantial 
unemployment and under-employment. The labour market constitutes a number 
of sub-markets and shows the existence of certain distorting influences. 
The demand for labour in general has seasonal fluctuations with peak demand 
during paddy cultivation seasons. 
^^ Ibid. , p. 159. 
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A.2.4 nie Rural Capital Market 
We shall describe the rural capital market in some detail in view of 
its importance in influencing the investment decisions. There are three 
ways in particular where the nature of the capital market directly 
influences such decisions. First, access to investment funds is crucial 
to the definition of the set of feasible investment options available to 
an individual. Second, the terms and conditions under which funds are 
available influence the relevant discount rate as well as preferences for 
particular patterns of income flows. Third, the above terms and 
conditions would affect the costs of falling into debt, etc., and thereby 
the risk attitudes. 
The capital market in rural Sri Lanka consists of both a modem 
organised sector and a non-institutional sector. WViile the importance of the 
organised sector has been increasing in recent years, the unorganised 
(non-institutional) sector is still of major importance. 
In line with the stated policy of improving credit facilities to the 
domestic agricultural sector, the last decade has seen a considerable 
expansion of the activities of credit institutions in the rural areas. 
The extension of the banking network (the institutional sector being 
almost completely dominated by The People's Bank, The Bank of Ceylon and 
their subsidiaries) has been accompanied by some changes in their methods 
of operation aimed at bridging the gap between the normal methods of 
bank operations and the specific conditions that exist in rural societies. 
One such measure which has recorded a substantial degree of success is 
2 8 
the commencement of pawn brokerage activities by Tlie People's Bank. 
9 Q 
Annual Report of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka^ 1975. 
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The provision of investment funds by the Banks to the villagers, 
however, still remains very limited despite attempts to change this 
situation. The only area in which such facilities extended by the Bank 
have been utilised on a significant scale is on paddy cultivation, which 
29 
is a short term crop. For longer term agricultural investments such 
as rubber replanting, cultivation of cotton (which is encouraged officially 
in some of the drier regions), the banks, though they are committed to a 
policy of provision of better credit facilities, in fact provide little or 
no funds at the level of smallholder farmers. Thus for rubber replanting 
a small sum (Rs.500) is approved under relatively convenient terms and 
conditions to those farmers who have been selected as being eligible for 
the replanting subsidy. The rate of interest on this is5"to7per cent and 
is attractive compared with the interest rates prevailing elsewhere. Yet 
it is noticeable that the 'red tape' involved deters many of the 
prospective creditors and little use is actually made of this facility. 
Thus it could be said that as a source of investment capital, particularly 
for long term investments, the institutional sector plays only a very 
limited role. Only the better off farmers and those enjoying substantial 
regular incomes from other activities are sufficiently creditworthy in 
terms of the rules and regulations governing the conduct of the banks and 
other, related, institutional sources of credit. Only they can offer 
acceptable collateral. Since the large majority of villagers do not fall 
into these categories, they are effectively excluded from access to bank 
credit for investment purposes (and even more so for consumption purposes). 
4.2.5 Tlie Non-institutional (Unorganised) Sector 
In general, however, the unorganised sector remains a major source 
of borrowings. Since production and consumption are so closely interwoven 
^^ Ihid. 
I l l 
at the l e v e l of the farm-family , with ceremonial expenses, dowries and 
g i f t s , e t c . , be ing s o c i a l o b l i g a t i o n s that are considered necessary 
expenses , the s t r i c t d i s t i n c t i o n that i s drawn by the banks between 
product ive and non-product ive a c t i v i t i e s has the e f f e c t of pushing the 
v i l l a g e r s i n t o the unorganised se c t o r to meet t h e i r c red i t needs. Since 
the consequence of such borrowings from this s e c t o r at the high rates of 
i n t e r e s t prevalent i s to reduce the capacity of the farmers to pay back 
loans obtained from the banks, de fau l t ing on bank loans i s common. Such 
d e f a u l t i n g then makes such farmers i n e l i g i b l e f o r further bank c r e d i t , 
even f o r a c t i v i t i e s such as paddy farming and helps to perpetuate a 
v i c i o u s c i r c l e . This may w e l l be an important f a c t o r in the high 
30 
percentage of de fau l t s on loans f o r paddy c u l t i v a t i o n . 
Under these c ircumstances, the d iscuss ion by U Tun Wai (1957) of the 
f a c t o r s that make the unorganised s e c t o r of the c a p i t a l market so 
important in the v i l l a g e s of the l e s s developed countries i s broadly 
app l i cab le to the s i t u a t i o n e x i s t i n g in rural areas of Sri Lanka: 
The i n s t i t u t i o n s are usually at a considerable distance from 
the borrowers , while moneylenders are ava i lab le in every v i l l a g e . 
Borrowers obtain t h e i r loans more promptly from n o n - i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
sources . N o n - i n s t i t u t i o n a l sources do not i n s i s t on punctual 
repayment as banks and co - operat ive s o c i e t i e s do. Usually i t i s 
p o s s i b l e to obtain loans f o r such purposes as marriages and 
l i t i g a t i o n only from n o n - i n s t i t u t i o n a l sources . There i s no 
p u b l i c i t y on the amount of money borrowed from n o n - i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
l enders . There are general ly no i n t r i c a t e and complicated rules 
governing the granting of loans by the v i l l a g e moneylenders. 
And n o n - i n s t i t u t i o n a l sources are w i l l i n g to lend money more 
f r e e l y without c o l l a t e r a l and on the borrower 's mere promise to 
repay. The absence of a c o l l a t e r a l requirement i s e s p e c i a l l y 
important, s ince the majority of the p o t e n t i a l borrowers in the 
unorganised money market have very l i t t l e in the way of f i n a n c i a l 
or p h y s i c a l a sse t s . 
roid. 
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Within the unorganised sector there exists two substantially distinct 
sub-markets: (a) a market from which comparatively large sums of 
money (about Rs.500 and over) are available on credit on a long term basis 
and (b) a market which mainly deals with smaller sums of money on a short 
term basis. 
A.2.6 Mortgages and Long Term Credit in the Unorganised Sector^^ 
In the first type of market it is usual to demand collateral, usually 
land for the credit supplied, and mortgage of land is the commonest form 
of credit transaction wlien large sums of money are involved. llie two main 
types of mortgage that exist are: (a) mortgage of land with interest 
regularly paid in cash; and (b) ' usufructory' mortgage where the returns 
from the land go to the creditor in lieu of interest payments in cash. In 
the latter case it is not uncommon for the creditor to allow the debtor to 
continue working on the land as a tenant-farmer until the mortgage is 
redeemed or the land is alienated. 
It is the author's observation that generally the creditor is aware 
of the claim of the debtor to the land that is to be mortgaged and knows 
that this claim is accepted by the other villagers through the debtor's 
use and cultivation of that land for a long period. As a result, an 
absolutely clear title to the land is not demanded, and the creditor is 
usually ready to accept the title that is available. (Owing to the 
inheritance laws, joint ownership of lands is very common in the villages 
and clear titles are a rarity. Since banks demand clear titles to accept 
land as collateral for a loan, most find it impossible to borrow from the 
^^ The following discussion, where not explicitly mentioned, is based 
primari ly on data from Tilakaratna, W.M., Agricultural Credit in a 
Developing Economy - Ceylon, Central Bank of Ceylon, Colombo, 1963, and 
on observations made during the field survey described in Chapter 6. 
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banks.) Wliat is important to the creditor is whether he would be able to 
establish ownership to that land if the mortgage were not redeemed and 
also, in usufructory mortgages, whether he will be able to claim the 
returns from the land without major problems. 
This form of credit transaction is the main form of long term 
32 
borrowing open to the villagers. The rate of interest charged varies 
in different localities, and even in the same locality depending on the 
creditor-debtor relationship (20 to 40 per cent per annum). These rates are 33 
high, as observed during the field survey, even in comparison with the 
rates charged for consumption loans by the banks; however, they are lower 
than the rates charged by money lenders on short term loans. 
The disincentives to entering into such credit arrangements to 
finance long term agricultural investments are obvious. Not only are the 
rates of interest extremely high, they also carry the risk of loss of the 
land thus mortgaged. The returns have to be unusually high or there must 
be other compelling reasons for resort to such borrowings to finance any 
sort of investment. As it is, almost the only example of such borrowings is 
provided by those who do so in order to finance the education of a gifted 
child. Education is seen as a major vehicle for gaining upward mobility 
in society, not only for the person being educated, but through him for 
the entire family. This is supplemented by the traditional view of 
parental responsibilities which emphasises the duty of parents to provide 
their children with all opportunities that they possibly can to further 
themselves in life. 
\ 
^^ Final Report on the Eoonomio Survey of Rural Ceylon 1950-51 and 
Survey of Rural Indebtedness, 1957. 
^^ It is the author's observation that it is difficult to determine the 
actual interest rate charged from a perusal of mortgage documents since 
it is usual to understate the interest being charged to meet legal 
requirements by recording a larger sura than that actually received by the 
debtor as the amount of the loan. 
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Otherwise only when dire necessity compels such borrowings would 
one enter into such a transaction. The villagers are well aware of the 
3 A sorry plight of many who have lost their lands through this process. 
4.2.7 Short Term Credit 
Tlie nature of the short term credit facilities available directly 
influence preferences for particular patterns of income flows. In the 
villages the sources of supply of such short term credit are diverse and 
the costs of credit reflect this diversity. They include professional 
and semi-professional money lenders and pawn brokers, village shopkeepers, 
middlemen, friends and relatives. 
In comparison with many other countries it appears that relatives 
and friends are a more important source of credit in rural Sri Lanka. 
Thus the source of some 44 per cent of all loans has been relatives and 
friends according to the Survey of Rural Indebtedness (1957) which 
35 compares with a figure of 14.2 for India. 
In general, though not always, such loans would be free of interest. 
However,this does not imply that they are costless. Such loans carry 
with them obligations to help the creditors in future need, both 
^^ The paying of the high interest payments is difficult and by reducing 
the normal net income makes the redemption of the mortgage doubly 
difficult. (The usufructory mortgage does this by reducing the normal 
net income directly since the farmer loses the income from the land.) A 
life crisis or similar event will make it impossible to redeem the 
mortgage within the stipulated time. Available evidence suggests that 
the concentration of land ownership in the hands of those who have been 
able to accumulate some cash reserves (traders, white collar workers, 
teachers and professional money lenders) has occurred to a great extent 
through credit operations of this sort. As Tambiah (1963) comments: 
'Thus mortgage continues to be the predominant form in which loans are 
taken, and it is mortgage precisely which contains the possibility of the 
final'takeover of land by the creditor.' (Tambiah, op. ait., p.92). 
35 Tambiah, op. oit., p.90. 
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financially and in other ways. These may include unpaid labour during 
periods of peak farm activities, liousebuilding, ccremonial functions, 
etc. Also such sources cannot be tapped at all times, nor can they be 
tapped too often. 
The village shopkeeper is a source of credit, often through the 
provision of goods on credit. The interest chargcd is hidden, being 
extracted through higher prices. The rate of interest is difficult to 
ascertain and estimates vary from quite low to very high. The same is 
true of the various middlemen, one of whom may be the shopkeeper himself. 
Tills is quite often the case in many rubber growing areas wliere the 
shopkeeper is a rubber dealer who extends credit on goods, to be paid 
back by the proceeds of rubber sales. The risk of default is lowered 
since rubber is a crop whose supply, while depending on the number of 
rainy days, is nevertheless stable (to the extent that it is almost 
certain of escaping complete destruction through weather factors). 
The shopkeeper in general not only ensures that the debtor would sell 
his rubber to him, but also extracts a higher profit through both 
undergrading and underpricing. Substantially the same occurs in the case 
of loans extended by other middlemen, in this case usually cash loans -
the farmer is compelled to sell his crop at below market prices. There 
is disagreement on the extent of such practices; however their 
prevalence is universally admitted. No reliable data is available on 
this for any useful estimates to be made of the hidden interest charged, 
though it seems reasonable to assume that it cannot be very low. 
The more professional moneylenders are found in almost every village. 
They often extend credit on no security other than the verbal promise of 
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36 repayment or on a promissory note. Their operations are characterised 
by rapidity, smoothness and confidentiality; the rates of interest are 
extremely high (in a number of villages during the period of the survey 
of rubber smallholders carried out by the author in 1975 the rate was 
37 15 per cent a month ). It is quite common for the first month's interest 
(interest being paid monthly) to be deducted from the amount of the loan. 
Many such small scale money lenders are women, often ones who have husbands 
in regular salaried employment. Some of these women may also operate a 
'Seettu', a system of co-operative saving where each participant regularly 
(usually montlily) contributes a specified sum of money to a common pool 
38 which is then made available to one person each month. 
The collection of loans and, in the Seettu system, of contributions is 
a task that the moneylenders face with little or no possibility of recourse 
to legal action against defaulters. (The costs of such legal action in any 
case would be likely to far exceed the amount of the loan itself.) He can, 
however, choose his clients with care and reduce the risks, utilising his 
knowledge of the villagers. His resourcefulness, in using persuasion 
^^ Mortgaging of the Rice Ration Book (which allows the owner to obtain 
the weekly ration of free rice and to purchase specified quantities of a 
range of other goods including clothes, sugar, etc.) appears to be 
widespread, though illegal, according to observations made during the 
field survey (1975). 
^^ For certain (smaller) transactions, the rates were higher; thus petty 
traders borrow sums of money up to Rs.25-50 per day to purchase village 
produce and sell in the nearly urban centres at daily rates of interest of 
5-10 per cent. 
^^ If the order of payment is decided by the drawing of lots the operator 
may receive a commission, but where the operator is a money lender it is 
more common to 'auction' the places in the sequence of receipts so that 
the highest bidder gets the first month's collection and so on. The price 
that is paid for the places in the order of payment is collected by the 
operator. People participating in the 'Seetu' may in times of need 
approach the operator to obtain a higher place even after the places had 
been sold as previously and the operator would then negotiate with the 
person entitled to that place for deferment of receipt in return for a sum 
of money. This system, with local variations, is found almost universally 
in rural Sri Lanka and is both a source of credit and a method of saving 
that is both functional and efficient (Field Survey, 1975). 
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with a combination of types of coercion in the form of public abuse, 
intimidation as well as threats of physical assault, determines to a 
large degree the extent of default. According to money lenders interviewed 
by the autlior, the fact that his services may be needed again in the future 
and the fear of loss of social status are all factors that keep down the 
rates of default. Thus the risk of such lending varies not only with the 
individual debtor, but also with the creditor. Writers have argued both 
for and against the view that the high rates of interest charged (both 
explicit and implicit) reflect the cost of lending in such a risky 
environment and that such rates are, to that extent, not only understandable 
but are also justifiable. That, however, still remains a moot point. 
The above description of the type and nature of the capital 'markets' 
shows that the rates of interest at which an individual may borrow differs 
substantially depending on the market that he has chosen, or more 
realistically, is compelled to choose. The same individual may of course 
be utilising the services of all or a number of these for different 
purposes and under different circumstances. However, the general picture 
is one where the richer farmers have greater access to institutional credit 
and therefore face lower interest rates in contrast to the poorer farmers, 
who are compelled to resort to high interest, non-institutional sources. 
For the latter, not only is the availability of loan funds for long term 
uses practically nonexistent, they are also confronted with the need for 
short term credit for 'essential' consumption requirements which can only 
be met by borrowing from non-institutional sources. Therefore, for these 
farmers the feasible set of investments is greatly limited and their 
preferences could be expected to reflect the need for cash to meet their 
short term consumption needs (since the failure to do so results in falling 
into serious financial difficulties). 
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The Structure of the Rubber Smallholdings Sector 
A.3.1 Characteristics of Rubber Smallholdings 
Available data from rural surveys {Final Report on the Economic Survey 
of Rural Ceylon 1950-51-, The Soaio-Eoonomia Survey of Sri Lanka (1969-70)) 
suggest that considerable differences in income are observed among rubber 
cultivators. In view of the differences in the size of holdings even 
within the smallholder sector (see Table 4.2 below) this is not surprising. 
These income differences, however, are not solely due to differences in the 
size of the rubber holdings; many households have other sources of income, 
both agricultural and non-agricultural. 
The importance and composition of these non-rubber incomes in the 
total household income varies among different smallholders. This is one 
aspect of the heterogeneity that exists among them in terms of many of the 
important socio-economic characteristics. Thus very few rubber smallholders 
would describe their occupation as being a rubber cultivator; the more 
likely descriptions would include peasant farmer, casual labourer, teacher, 
clerk, businessman, etc., even though the greater proportion of their 
incomes may be obtained from rubber holdings. 
Quantitative data are not available regarding levels and sources of 
incomes, levels of education, other occupations, etc., of rubber small-
holders. The national survey of rubber smallholdings carried out in 1971-72 
collected data only for the rubber holdings and related operations; no 
income data were collected. Again, no income data were collected in a 
survey of high yielding smallholdings conducted by the Rubber Research 
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Institute of Sri Lanka (RRISL) in 1971, though it collected data on 
ownership of non-rubber lands. While some useful information can be gleaned 
from the Rural Economic Survey (1950-51) and the Socio-Economic Survey 
^^ Barlow, C. et al. , The Economics of Smallholding Rubber: Some Findings 
from Sri Lanka, Proceedings of the International Rubber Conference, RRIM, 
Kuala Lumpur, 1976. 
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(1969-70), problems regarding the definition of rubber cultivator, the 
highly aggregated nature of the published data, etc., lower their useful-
ness for a study of rubber smallholders. After the field survey carried 
out as part of this study in 1975, a series of village surveys conducted 
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by the Rubber Manufacturing Corporation (RMC) in 1976 in three major 
rubber growing districts collected a valuable set of data on rubber 
smallholders, including data on incomes, ownership of other lands, etc. 
(However, only preliminary analysis has been carried out on this data.) 
4.3.2 Patterns of Consuirption 
Before proceeding to discuss the differences within the smallholdings 
sector in terms of holding size and input-output relations, etc., some 
observations on the patterns of consumption among different income groups 
in the rural sector (which includes the rubber smallholders) would be 
useful. 
The distribution of monthly incomes by households in the rural sector 
is shown in Table 4.1. (Thougli the figures refer to the entire rural 
sector, the corresponding figures for different regions which include the 
major rubber growing areas show a basically similar picture and therefore 
are not reproduced here.) 
Table 4.1 also shows the consumption patterns of these income groups. 
As can be seen, the average monthly expenditure exceeds the average 
income in the lowest income group and suggests that net dis-savings are taking 
place in this group, particularly as the expenditure is concentrated on 
^^ Premachandra, W.M. and Houtman, C.B., Some Economic Aspects of 
Smallholders Rubber Froduction in Selected Rubber Growing Areas in Sri 
Lanka, UNDP/FAG, Colombo, March 1976. 
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' e ssent ia ls ' such as food, housing, fuel and l ight , etc. And nearly 45 per 
cent of the rural population earn incomes below Rs . 200 , and fall into this 
group. The proportion spent on these items falls as incomes rise , the 
savings margin increases and the expenditure pattern becomes more 
d ivers i f ied . 
llie survey report does not provide information on the dependency on 
the markets for the major consumer essentials , particularly food. However 
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Tambiah (1963) stated: 
At the same time lie (the peasant) needs cash for his day to day 
consumption needs. An analysis of his consumption needs shows 
that today a peasant is far from self-sufficient even with 
respect to food: wheat, flour, bread, meat and f ish , condiments, 
cooking oil and sugar, are items which he has to buy with cash 
from the shops. In money value these add up to half his 
expenditure on food. Further expenses to be met by cash are 
medical expenses, clothing, education and various luxuries such 
as tobacco. This category of items add up to one third of his 
total consumption expenditure. Thus it would appear that the 
so-called self-sufficient peasant of classical literature has 
today to pay in cash for two-thirds of his consumption needs. 
There is no reason to believe that the situation now has changed in the 
direction of lesser dependency on the market; it is more likely that the 
dependency i s , in fact , greater. 
Given low incomes and the high dependency on the market, the value 
of cash to villagers on such low incomes is generally likely to be high 
and their ability to forgo present cash incomes in favour of future 
returns, as well as their risk bearing capacity, is bound to be low. 
Here it is interesting to note that particularly in the rubber growing 
regions of the Sri Lankan wet zone where cash cropping is the major 
agricultural activity , it would seem that the dependency on the market, 
for both sales of produce and purchase of consumption goods, is greater 
^^ Tambiah, op. ait., p . 8 9 . 
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at lower levels of income. The preference for ownership of sufficient 
paddy lands to meet consumption needs (and some coconuts) already 
referred to in Chapter 2 , persists st i l l and the wealthier farmers are 
more likely to have enougli lands to be independent of the market for 
those goods. Such a view is supported by the results of two surveys of 
A2 
rubber smallholders (see Barlow et at. , 1976 and Premachandra and 
Houtman, 1976^^) . 
4 . 3 . 3 Non-Agricultural Incomes 
As mentioned earlier, the data on the importance of non-agricultural 
incomes among rubber smallholders is scanty, though the fact that non-
peasant ownership has been a feature of this sector from its beginnings 
would suggest that at least in that group the importance of such incomes 
would tend to be high. In the villages surveyed in the RMC survey, 60 per 
cent of the households were found to have such non-agricultural incomes 
which accounted for 40 per cent of the total household incomes in the 
sample. This would indicate that in those households which did have such 
incomes, they would typically account for half or more of their total 
incomes. Also it was found that 70 per cent of the total household 
44 
incomes were derived from sources other than the rubber holdings. 
Obviously both the relative and absolute levels of incomes from rubber 
would affect decisions that involve forgoing the whole or part of it as 
is the case in deciding to replace the present rubber trees. 
42 
Barlow et al. ^ op. c%t. 
43 
Premachandra and Houtman, op. ovt. 
44 
Calculated from Premachandra and Houtman, ihid. 
122 
4 . 3 . 4 Distribution by Holding Size 
Given the sparseness of the data available for classifying rubber 
smallholders into different groups, a classification based on size of 
holding of rubber land would be useful in a study of decision making. ^^ 
However, its inadequacies must always be kept in mind since the holding 
size refers to only one of the assets owned by the household. 
The national distribution of rubber smallholdings by holding size 
is given in Table 4 . 2 . The figures clearly show that: 
(a) the distribution of rubber holdings within the smallholding 
sector is highly skewed with nearly 70 per cent of the 
holdings being less than 2 acres in extent and accounting 
for only 33 per cent of the total smallholding area. 
(b) The number and average size of parcels increases with the 
holding s ize . 
While there seems to be considerable regional variation in the 
average size of holding, the pattern of distribution regionally appears 
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to be very similar to this national pattern. 
Data on a national scale is not available for estimating the degree 
to which holding size of rubber is correlated with ownership of non-
rubber agricultural land. The RRISL survey (see Barlow et al. ^ 1976) 
Due to the absence of any disaggregation by size in the smallholding 
data given in the Administration Reports of the Rubber Controller we shall 
be using mainly data given in the Report on the Sample Survey of the 
Rubber Smallholdings of Sri Lanka (1971-72). Since this survey included 
holdings up to 100 acres in extent, we shall adjust the figures wherever 
necessary (particularly percentages and proportions) and wi l l present 
data only for the <10 acre groups. 
^^ (a) Jayasuriya, S .K .W . and Premachandra, W . M . , 'Preliminary Report on 
the Survey of Rubber Smallholders in the Mawanella Area ' , 
Mawanella Central Processing Factory Project, UNDP-FAO, 1974. 
(b) Premachandra and Houtman, op. ait. , 1976. 
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suggests that they may be positively correlated up to a certain level, 
beyond whicli the tendency appears to be to keep (or convert) other lands 
they have under rubber cultivation (see Table 4 . 3 ) . This may perhaps 
indicate economies of size in management. 
The most common non-rubber land is paddy land and this is in keeping 
with the attitudes towards paddy lands referred to earlier. 
4 . 3 . 5 Labour Use 
It has often been assumed that most smallholdings would be using 
primarily family labour in their farm operations. The smaller average 
size of the smallholding, particularly in comparison with smallholdings in 
Malaya, may have reinforced this view, and policy recommendations have 
been made which have implicitly and sometimes explicitly been based on 
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such an assumption. Since labour is the major input in the exploitation 
of existing trees and is also of substantial importance in new planting 
or replanting, the type of labour that is used in the holdings is of 
crucial importance. 
The high percentage of smallholdings using non-family labour, 
particularly in the >5 acre group (see Table 4 . 4 ) indicates clearly the 
danger of m ^ i n g such an assumption, particularly when it is recognised 
that these bigger holdings would own a more than proportionate area of 
the total smallholding acreage. 
This pattern, with sliglit variations, is found in all the regional 
surveys mentioned above. Thus in the RRISL survey of 1971, it was found 
that in the sample of 289 smallholders with high yielding rubber only 
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95 were using family labour. 
^^ Hansen, S. , An Outline of a Rubber Programme: Replanting and 
Production of Rubber in Ceylon, M n i s t r y of Planning and Economic Affairs, 
Sri Lanka, 19 70. 
48 
Barlow et at. , op. cit. 
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While the use of hired labour by itself is no indication of the 
relative income/wealth position of a smallholder since family s i ze , 
availability of family labour as well as social attitudes can influence 
i t , the incre£ising holding size itself would raise the income level and 
thus it is reasonable to assume that high income earning smallholders 
would tend to use more hired labour. 
Also related to this is the degree of absentee landlordism in the 
smallholding sector. According to the Report on the Sample Survey of 
the Rubber Smallholdings (1971-72), 'the percentage of absentee landlords 
is very higli in rubber cultivation. Only five per cent of the owners are 
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actually resident in the holding ' . However, this appears to give a 
misleading impression regarding the actual situation as the big majority 
of the operators reside in the same village where the holding is situated 
(Table 4 . 5 ) . 
In these circumstances it seems more proper to consider that absentee 
landlordism is not great in the smallholdings sector, though there is a 
tendency for it to go up with holding size . (Tlie proportion of holdings 
using family labour given in Table 4 . 4 tend to support such an 
interpretation.) 
4 . 3 . 6 Conclusion 
The first section of this chapter reviewed some of the literature 
on the economics of family farms and stressed the importance of taking 
account of the particular characteristics of sucli farms which distinguish 
them from the conventional ' firm' of economic literature. 
^^ In the table referred to in the Report, this percentage is that of 
operators and not of owners. 
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The second section discussed the land, labour and capital markets 
in the rural sector of Sri Lanka and described factors contributing to 
market imperfections. In particular the high rates of interest in the 
unorganised capital market, which is the major source of credit for 
many of the farmers, and the implications for borrowings for investment 
purposes were described. The existence of unemployment and under-
employment, particularly seasonal underemployment, in the villages was 
discussed and the implications for the opportunity cost of labour were 
drawn. 
The third section discussed the structure of the rubber smallholdings 
sector and some of the important aspects of consumption patterns, labour 
use, etc. It stressed the inequalities within the smallholdings sector 
and indicated the differences in patterns of consumption, labour use, etc. 
among rubber smallholders. 
The next chapter describes the field survey undertaken to investigate 
the decision making process of rubber smallholders at the micro level. 
The design of the survey, and the type of sample considered desirable took 
into account the characteristics of the decision making environment and 
the structure of the smallholding sector discussed in this chapter. 
T,VBLE 4 , 1 
KAJOR EXPENDITURE GROUPS BY IN'COME GROUP IN THE RURAL SECTOR 
I N C 0 M E G R O U P 
Under 
(44. 
Rs.200* 
4%) 
Rs.200 
(37. 
- 399 
9%) 
Rs.400 
(12; 
- 599 
'0 
Rs.600 - 799 
(3.7%) 
Rs.800 -
(1.1%) 
999 Rs.lOOO S over 
(.91) TOTAL 
Major Expenditure Groups Average 
Expenditure 
Average 
Expenditure 
Ave ra ge 
Expenditure 
Average 
Expenditure 
Ave rage 
Expenditure 
Average 
Expenditure 
Average 
Expenditure 
Rs. c. % Rs. c. % Rs. c. % Rs. c. % Rs. c. % Rs, . c. % Rs. c. % 
1. Food and drink 109.17 63.6 177.99 57.4 254.31 52.0 302.45 45.2 357.12 36.1 439. ,83 37.1 165.59 55.4 
2. Liquor and tobacco 13. 10 7.6 22.70 7.3 33.91 6.9 37.72 5.2 35.59 3.6 40.97 3.5 20.54 6.9 
3. Housing 11. 34 6.6 21.25 6.8 41.02 8.4 49.56 7.4 90.66 9.2 89. . 30 7.5 21.66 7.2 
4. Fuel and light 7.74 4.5 11.29 3.6 15.29 3.2 18. 12 2.7 20.28 2.1 25. .09 2.1 .10.68 3.6 
5. Clothing, household, textiles, foot-
wear and other personal effects 9.74 5.7 24.48 7.9 43.19 8.8 71.76 10.7 85.87 8.7 95, .85 8.1 23.27 7.8 
6. Non-durable household goods 3.98 2.3 8.20 2.7 14.80 3.0 22.85 3.4 37.73 3.8 11*. .53 6.3 8.61 2.9 
7. Personal care and health expenses 4.90 2.9 9.38 3.0 14. 30 2.9 18.63 2.8 26.34 2.7 31.31 2.7 8.71 2.9 
8. Transport and communication 4.20 2.5 9.48 3.1 19.15 3.9 45.36 6.8 98. 38 9.9 135, .54 11.4 11.78 3.9 
9. Recreation, education and cultural 
affairs 2.39 1.4 8.20 2.7 18.04 3.7 34.17 5.1 44. 38 4.5 85, . 30 7.2 8.88 3.0 
10. Consumer durables _ 1.86 1.1 5.98 1.9 16. 11 3.3 31.31 4.7 25.00 2.5 125, .75 10.6 7.63 2.6 
11. Miscellaneous 3.15 1.8 11.16 3.6 19.13 3.9 39.84 6.0 167.53 16.9 41, .23 3.5 11.62 3.9 
T O T A L 171.56 100.0 310.13 100.0 489.26 100.0 668.81 100.0 988.98 100.0 1,184, .70 100.0 298.96 100.0 
Average monthly inconic 140.67 276.31 475.72 677.95 900.58 1,324, .40 
* The figures within the brackets indicate the percentage of households in each income group within the 
Source: Compiled from data from The Soaio-Eaonomia Survey of Sri Lanka (1969-70), Department of 
rural sector. 
Census and Statistics, 
Republic of Sri Lanka. 
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TABLE 4 . 2 
SMALLHOLDINGS CLASSIFIED BY SIZE 
Acreage 
group 
<2 
2-5 
5-10 
Percentage 
of holdings 
68.3 
25.5 
6.2 
Percentage 
of extent 
33.2 
40.9 
23.5 
Average size 
of h o l d i n g 
0 . 8 3 
2.84 
6.68 
A v e r a g e size 
of p a r c e l 
0 . 6 8 
1.47 
2 . 34 
Source: k Report on the Sample Survey of the Rubber Smallholdings of Sri Lanka (1B71-72). 
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TABLE 4 . 3 
AREA PER HOLDING OF MAIN CROPS BY AREA OF MATURE RUBBER 
(hectares) 
The number 
Mature rubber. hectares per holding 
Main crop 
of holdings 
growing 
the crop 
Under 
0 . 4 
( 6 2 ) a 
0 4-
0 . 8 
(131) 
0 .8-
1 .2 
(47) 
.2-
1 .6 
(21) 
1.6-
2 . 0 
(17 ) 
2 . 0 
or more 
(11 ) 
A l l 
classes 
(2 89) 
Mature rubber 2 89 0 . 2 6 0 . 5 0 0 . 8 9 1 . 29 1 . 69 2 . 4 2 0 . 71 
Inmiature rubber 229 0 . 0 5 0 . 1 4 0 . 2 2 0 . 2 8 0 . 3 5 0 . 0 6 0 . 1 6 
Paddy 173 0 . 2 6 0 . 35 0 . 5 7 1 . 26 0 . 6 3 0 . 6 5 0 . 4 6 
Coconut 34 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 5 0 . 0 4 0 . 2 2 0 . 0 9 0 . 0 5 
Tea 6 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 02 0 . 3 6 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 3 
Abandoned 23 0 . 0 8 0 . 0 3 - 0 . 0 9 0 . 0 4 - -
Total - 0 . 6 8 1 . 06 1 . 73 2 . 9 8 3 . 29 3 . 2 4 1 . 4 1 
Note: a. Figures in brackets are total numbers of holdings in each area class ( including those without 
areas of some crops) . 
Source: Barlow, C. , Peries , O . S . , Dissanayaka, A . B . , Chandrasiri, G .R . , and Carrad, B . , The Economics of 
Smallholding Rubber: Some Findings from Sri Lanka, Proceedings of the International Rubber 
Conference, RRIM, Kuala Lumpur, 19 76. 
* The degree of diversif ication in land ownership in the smaller size group tends to be overstressed in the 
table since only hal f the farmers in the <.4 ha group actually had any other land. On the other hand, there 
is a clear tendency for the larger sized rubber holders to have most of their land under rubber. (The large 
average figure of .35 acres of tea in the 1 .6-2 .0 group was due to the inclusion of a part icular smallholder 
who had a very large tea holding - really a tea farmer with a small rubber h o l d i n g . ) 
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TABLE 4 .4 
TYPE OF LABOUR USED IN RUBBER CULTIVATION 
Non-family Family labour and Acreage eroup Family labour ^ , ^ . ^ ^ , ^ ^ ^ ^ labour non- family labour 
<2 87.7 12 .3 
2-5 62.8 33.7 3.5 
5-10 21 .8 64.0 14.2 
(Figures r e f e r to the percentage of ho ld ings in each acreage group. ) 
Source: ^ Report on the Sample Survey of the Rubber Smallholdings of 
Sri Lanka (1971-72). 
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TABLE 4.5 
SITUATION OF HOLDING BY ACREAGE GROUPS 
Acreage group 
Situation of holding 
In the s ame 
where operator 
village 
resides Outside the village 
<2 
% 
95 
% 
5 
2-5 91.7 8.3 
5-10 84.8 15.2 
Source: A Report on the Sample Survey of the Rubber Smallholdings of 
Sri Lanka (1971-72). 
U) o 
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aiM'TER 5 
THE FIELD SURVEY 
5.1 Objectives of the Survey and tlie Sample Selection Procedure 
A field survey was carried out among a sample of rubber smallholders 
of Sri Lanka over the six months period between February and July 19 76. 
Its objective was to collect data on the decision making environment 
and the decision making process of rubber smallholders, with particular 
reference to the long term investment decisions. 
Since it was hypothesised that smallholders would be likely to 
exhibit differences in their decision making, depending on differences in 
resource endowments and other factors, it was intended to choose a sample 
that would include a cross-section of farmers selected according to such 
factors as income, holding size, educational level and occupation. 
Fanners presently confronted by the problem of replacement of current 
rubber trees were to be chosen; therefore it was necessary that the 
farmers to be included in the sample owned holdings with old and/or low 
yielding rubber trees. Also it was desirable to select a spatially 
scattered sample so that decision making under a number of different sets 
of alternative investment choices facing farmers could be studied. 
A sophisticated sample selection procedure could not be adopted in 
the absence of a suitable sampling frame. The biases and inaccuracies of 
the register of rubber smallholdings kept at the Rubber Control Department 
has been mentioned earlier. In any case, the register has information only 
on the size of holding and hence was clearly inadequate for the task of 
selecting the type of sample desired. 
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In the circumstances, an ad hoc procedure had to be adopted; it 
could be best described as a purposive, multi-stage sampling procedure. 
The stages of this sample selection procedure are shown in Figure 5.1. 
5.2 Location of the Survey 
At the first stage a number of arcaa were sclcctcd from the Colombo, 
Kalutara and Ratnapura districts, three of the four major rubber growing 
districts of Sri Lanka (see Map - Figure 5.2). 
All three districts are situated in the region known as the 'wet zone' 
of the island. It has an annual rainfall in excess of 100", which is 
distributed unevenly over the year. January, February, August and 
September are comparatively dry months, while the South West monsoon 
brings very heavy rains from May to July. However, areas belonging to 
these districts show substantial differences in altitude, type of terrain, 
crops cultivated, etc. 
The areas that were chosen from these districts were selected so that 
the type of crops, in addition to rubber, that could be cultivated by a 
farmer would be substantially different. This meant that farmers 
contemplating their courses of action would face different sets of 
alternatives. Thus in the areas chosen in the Ratnapura district, tea is 
the main competing crop, while in the Homagama area of Colombo district 
coconut and annual crops (vegetables, etc.) would be regarded as 
alternatives to rubber. The Govinna/Bulathsinhala area of the Kalutara 
district has farmers growing tea, cinnamon and coconut in addition to 
rubber. 
All the selected areas were served with adequate processing, marketing 
and extension facilities for rubber. 
FIGURE 5.1 
SAMPLE SELECTION PROCEDURE 
Population - Rubber smallholders of Sri Lanka 
1) Areas selected on the 
basis of crops usually 
grown. 
2) Rubber smallholders 
having old/low 
yielding rubber 
Area (1) Area (2) Area (3) 
Rubber 
replanters 
non 
replanters 
3) Classified by 
general income/ 
wealth Well Medium Poor 
off 
4) Classified by 
education, 
occupation, 
etc. 
5) Final sample selected from the groups classified at stage (4) to include approximately 
equal proportions of replanters and non-replanters and to have a cross section of 
different types of farmers in each group. 
U) u> 
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5.3 Selection of the Smallholders to be Interviewed 
Once the areas were selected, the local rubber extension officers 
(RIs) were contacted to locate holdings with old and/or low yielding 
rubber. This was the second stage of the selection procedure. 
Due to the nature of their work, the extension officers know many 
of the rubber smallholders personally, and it was possible to obtain 
information on the characteristics of many of the owners of these holdings 
such as general level of income, education, occupation, etc. In 
particular, they had a list of rubber smallholders who had applied for 
the rubber replanting subsidy recently, as the Rubber Control Department 
contacts the local extension officer to inspect and report on such 
holdings. 
In selecting the farmers to be interviewed, an attempt was made to 
include approximately equal proportions of rubber replanters and non-
replanters. However, since the decision of all the farmers was not known 
in advance, this was not possible. A list was drawn up of those farmers who 
had already applied for the replanting subsidy and of those who had not 
done so, assuming that most of the farmers in the latter group would not 
have decided to replant with rubber. The final sample was then selected 
from these two groups in each area, using the information available on 
the other characteristics of the farmers so as to include a cross-
section of different types of smallholders. Since some of the farmers who 
had not applied for the replanting subsidy at the time nevertheless 
indicated their intention to replant with rubber when interviewed, the 
final sample included a majority of rubber replanters (Table 5.1). 
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FIGURE 5 . 2 
l.OCATION OF THE SURVEY 
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TABLE 5.1 
THE RUBBER REPLANTING DECISION OF THE FARMERS 
IN THE SAMPLE 
Replanters Non-replanters Total 
9 3 72 165 
5.4 Information Recorded during the Interviews 
Items on which information was recorded for each household included: 
1. Areas, crops and yields of all land (rubber as well as 
non-rubber) owned by members of the household; 
2. Size and composition of hoiisehold; 
3. _Occupation(s), educational level, age and sex of 
'decision maker' of the household; 
4. Amount and sources of incomes earned by members of the 
household; 
5. Type of labour used in farm operations; 
6. Decision on replacement of current rubber trees and 
choice of replacement crop (if relevant); 
7. Detailed reasons for the decisions and choices; 
8. Methods of financing farm investments; 
9. Expected incomes from each of the possible alternative 
courses of action; 
10. Attitudes to risk; 
11. Subjective discount rates. 
TABLE 5 . 2 
DISTRIBUTION OF FARMERS IN THE SAMPLE BY HOLDING 
SIZE OF RUBBER* AND THE REPLANTING DECISION 
Rubber 
replanting 
decision 0 - 1 
Size of rubber holdings (in acres) 
1-2 2-5 75 
Total 
Replanting 
Non replanting 
18 
24 
16 
20 
36 
24 
23 
4 
93 
72 
Total 42 36 60 27 165 
* Holding size of rubber is the total of mature, immature and abandoned 
rubber owned by members of household. 
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TABLE 5.3 
DISTRIBUTION OF FARMERS IN THE SAMPLE BY ANNUAL 
(REGULAR) INCOME* AND REPLANTING DECISION 
Rubber 
rep lant ing 
dec is ion 
Annual regular income ( in rupees) 
To ta l 
<2500 2500-5000 5000-10000 >10000 
Replanting 35 24 24 10 93 
Not rep lant ing 32 14 17 9 72 
To ta l 67 38 41 19 165 
* Annual regular income i s def ined as the t o t a l income members of the 
household expect to r ece i ve from s tab le and 'assured ' sources of 
income during the year . 
U) 
00 
139 
Information was a l s o recorded f o r a s e r i e s of other aspects of the 
smal lho lders ' d e c i s i o n making environment (see Appendix A ) . Tables 5 .2 
and 5 . 3 show the d i s t r i b u t i o n s of farmers in the sample grouped by 
ho ld ing s i z e of rubber , and by the annual ( regu lar ) income. 
The interv iews were conducted using a formal quest ionnaire to record 
in format ion ; at the same t ime, much information came up in the course of 
the i n t e r v i e w , in casual conversat ions or from other sources (such as 
the extens ion o f f i c e r ) whidi was re levant to the dec i s i on making aspects 
of the smal lho lder and th is was a l so recorded. The techniques used to 
ascer ta in the s u b j e c t i v e discount rates and the a t t i tudes to r i sk w i l l be 
descr ibed below. The quest ionnaire and these interview techniques were 
f i e l d t e s ted p r i o r t o the main survey and where necessary modi f ied . 
Reference to w r i t t e n records was made whenever p o s s i b l e to v e r i f y 
information given o r a l l y . When i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s were de tec ted , fur ther 
quest ions were asked. 
Every e f f o r t was made to convince the farmers who were interviewed 
as to the purposes to which the information would be put. When the 
smal lholder was w e l l known to the extension o f f i c e r and was on good terms 
with him, he (the extension o f f i c e r ) made the preliminary in t roduc t i ons . 
Where th is was not the case , attempts were made to arrange f o r a personal 
i n t r o d u c t i o n through a f r i e n d or r e l a t i v e o f the smal lholder . In most of 
the cases th is was s u c c e s s f u l l y done. A l l smallholders f i n a l l y approached 
were w i l l i n g t o become respondents (though some of them found d i f f i c u l t i e s 
in answering p a r t i c u l a r quest ions - as descr ibed l a t e r ) . Each interview 
took about four t o f i v e hours on average, though in certa in cases 
cons iderably more t ine and more than one v i s i t became necessary . 
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5.5 Household Decision Making 
In exploring the question'of decision making In the household we 
were conscious of the fact that the nominal head of household may not be 
the key decision maker and that more than one may contribute to decisions. 
Ryan (1957)^dlscussing household decision making in rural families 
commented, 'Although decls ions are the prerogative of the husband, 
important matters are usually discussed with the wife and her voice may 
be an influential one'. This could be particularly important in major 
financial decisions since 'in many homes it is the wife who holds the 
2 
family purse'. During the survey, we often encountered similar 
situations. During the Interview, in response to the question on the key 
decision maker in the household, it was common for household members to 
state that the nominal head of the family (who as generally a male) was the 
decision maker. However, from observations made during the interview, and 
in Informal discussions with members of the household (many of whom were 
often present during the interviews and participated in discussions), it was 
clear that this was not always correct. Sometimes the wife, or some other 
family member (like a grown-up son) obviously exercised great influence. In 
such cases, the beliefs and preferences of such persons were also recorded. taking care, however, to ensure that this did not result in 'loss of face' 
to the nominal household head. 
Thus, ideally, the household decision should be considered and 
studied as an instance of group decision making. However, the conceptual 
problems encountered in analysing group decision making, involving as it 
does, problems of aggregating preferences, etc., are quite formidable.^ 
^ Ryan, op. cit. , p.35. 
2 Ibid. , p. 42 . 
^ See, for example, Raiffa, H., Decision Analysis, Addison-Wesley, Reading, 
1968. 
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In the present study, we therefore make the simplifying assumption that 
a particular individual in the household acts as the key decision maker 
and that the decisions taken are in accordance with his beliefs and 
preferences. In the analysis of the data (see next Chapter) we 
proceeded on the basis of this assumption, and chose the key decision maker 
for each household on the basis of the judgment made in the course of 
the interview as to who exerted the greatest influence in the decision 
making process of the household. 
5.6 Subjective Discount Rates (under conditions of certainty) 
Tlie procedure adopted for obtaining the subjective discount rates of 
the farmer (under conditions of certainty) was as follows: 
The farmer was asked whether he would forgo a sum of money, 
approximately equal to his monthly income, for a larger sum of money that 
would be available to him, with absolute certainty, in a year's time. 
To eliminate the uncertainty factor, the future sum of money was 
stipulated as being deposited in his name and held for him at the Bank. 
This sum was then varied upwards and downwards until the farmer found it 
very difficult to choose one over the other. This was considered as 
expressing indifference between the two, and the two sums were then used 
to calculate the implied discount rate. 
5.7 Attitudes to risk 
Most of the recent research into risk attitudes of farmers has been 
within the framework of expected utility theory and has attempted to 
obtain utility functions (of the Bernoullian type) expressing risk 
1 A 2 
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attitudes (Halter and Beringer, 1960 ; Officer and Halter , 1968 ; 
O 'Mara, 19 71 ;^ Francisco and Aiiderson, 1972 ;^ L in , Dean and Moore, 
1974®) . 
llie method used in the survey to obtain sucli utility functions was 
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based on the determination of the certainty equivalent of an equally 
likely risky prospect ( i . e . , the probability of each of tlie two outcomes 
is I ) . Francisco and Anderson used this method successfully in a study 
of tlie risk attitudes of Australian farmers. Its main attraction is the 
relative simplicity of the questioning procedure and the consequent 
economies in time. However, it suffers from the weakness that it could 
lead to biases when the person is strongly averse to gambling per se 
(Anderson, Dillon and Hardaker^*^) . Methods which overcome this weakness 
however, do so with relatively more conplicated questioning procedures; 
such a method, for instance, was used by Lin , Dean and Moore (1974) in 
a study of s i x United States farmers. This involved the determination of 
preferences between acts with equally likely but risky outcomes. 
^ Halter , A .N . and Beringer, C. 'Cardinal Utility Functions and 
Managerial Behaviour ' , Journal of Farm Economics, Vol. 42 , 1960. 
^ O f f icer , R .R . and Halter , A . N . , 'Util ity Analysis in a Practical 
S e t t i n g ' , American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol . 50 , No . 2 , 
May 1968, pp.257-277. 
^ O 'Mara, G . T . , 'Decision Theoretic View of the Micro-economics of 
Technique D i f f u s i o n ' . Unpublished Ph .D . thesis, Stanford University, 
1971. 
^ Franc^isco, E .M. and Anderson, J . R . , 'Chance and Choice West of the 
D a r l i n g ' , Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics, V o l . 1 6 , No . 2 , 
August 1972, 
® Lin , W . , Dean, G .W. and Moore, C . V . , 'An Empirical Test of Utility vs. 
Profit Max iMsat ion in Agricultural Production ' , Ajmrican Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, Vol. 5 6 , 19 74. 
^ A certainty equivalent is that amount which makes the person 
indifferent between it and the risky prospect. 
10 
Anderson, J . R . , D i l lon , J . L . and Hardaker, J . B . , op. cit. 
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Tlie range within which the r i s k a t t i tudes were to be ascerta ined 
in the present study was se t f o r each farmer as that of (ga ining) twice 
the regular annual income o f the farmer or ( l o s i n g ) th is ( e n t i r e ) 
annual income. 
Then the fanner was confronted with a h y p o t h e t i c a l dec i s i on problem • 
as far as p o s s i b l e se t in a r e a l - l i f e , a g r i c u l t u r a l context - which had 
equal ly l i k e l y outcomes: gaining twice the annual income (say ' a ' ) or 
l o s i n g an amount equal to the annual income (say ' b ' , where b = - a / 2 ) . 
By ques t i on ing the farmer the ce r ta in ty equivalent f o r th is case was then 
determined. Thus, f o r example, one farmer was confronted with this 
h y p o t h e t i c a l d e c i s i o n problem: 
A p a r t i c u l a r d isease i s spreading rapid ly and i s expected 
t o reach h i s area soon. While h i s crop (an annual crop) 
i s now maturing w e l l , at the speed the disease i s spreading 
he has a 50/50 chance that he would be able to harvest 
b e f o r e the d isease struck h i s crop . I f i t does s t r i k e the 
crop t h i s w i l l destroy the e n t i r e crop and would resu l t in 
such damages as to make the net l oss equal (approximately) 
to h i s annual income. On the other hand, as subs tant ia l 
damage has already occurred to the crops of other farmers, 
i f he does manage to harvest the crop then he would be able 
to s e l l at much higher p r i c e s so that he could have a net 
gain (approximately) equal to twice the normal annual income. 
In th is s i t u a t i o n a person approaches him and o f f e r s to pay 
cash now f o r the crop and buy i t from him. What w i l l be the 
amount o f f e r e d at which he would f ind himsel f i n d i f f e r e n t 
between s e l l i n g or not s e l l i n g ? 
In p r a c t i c e d i f f e r e n t pr i ces were ' o f f e r e d ' to him and these were 
var ied upwards or downwards as necessary u n t i l i t was p o s s i b l e to l o c a t e 
a ' p r i c e ' at which the farmer found i t qu i te d i f f i c u l t to decide on h i s 
p r e f e r e n c e . This p r i c e was then recorded as the cer ta inty equivalent f o r 
t h i s case (see Figure 5 . 3 ) . 
Once t h i s was obtained a new problem, with equal ly l i k e l y outcomes, 
was se t up with th i s c e r ta in ty equivalent ( s a y , O i ) as one of the outcomes 
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and one of the previously mentioned extremes (a or b) as the other. 
I f ' a ' , for Instance, was se lec ted f i r s t , then the certainty equivalent 
f o r the risky prospect which had equally l ike ly outcomes of ' a ' and ' o i ' , 
say, 02, was determined as above. This was repeated using a and 02, and 
oi and 02 to give two more certainty equivalents (03 and 01+) • Then a 
s imi lar procedure was followed beginning with oi and b unt i l a number of 
such certainty equivalents (say, 05, 05 and 07) were determined for 
d i f f e r e n t risky prospects . Usually s i x such values were determined in 
addition to the f i r s t . These then can be used to construct a u t i l i t y 
function once arbitrary u t i l i t y values are assigned to a and b (see next 
Chapter). During the Interview, check questions were asked to ascertain 
whether the answers were consistent with each other. Thus the certainty 
equivalent of a risky prospect with equally l ike ly outcomes of 02 and 05 
should be the same as oi (or be quite c l o s e ; see Figure 5 . 3 ) . In the 
next chapter we sha l l describe how these certainty equivalents were used 
to obtain Bemoul l ian type u t i l i t y functions expressing the farmer's risk 
at t i tudes . 
FIGURE 5.3 
QUESTIONING PROCEDURE FOR OBTAINING CERTAINTY EQUIVALENTS 
Q(1 ) 
Q(2 
Q (3 a , 02 
b, o 
O] - o 2 
Check question: Qj-^ ( 0 2 , 0 5 ) should give o, 
5.8 Income Expectations 
It was originally expected to obtain sufficiently detailed data on 
income expectations to be able to specify quite closely the shape of their 
distributions. However, in the course of the preliminary field testing 
of the questionnaire and interview methods it was observed that farmers 
found it very difficult to answer the questions put to them for this 
purpose, when the time periods were any more than one or two. Since much 
of the information related to long lived perennial crops, it was felt 
that attempts to proceed in this direction would not only be extremely 
time consuming, but could also produce responses that could be quite 
misleading. At the same time, it was also observed that most farmers had 
some idea of the most likely, as well as the best and worst incomes that 
could be expected from particular crops in a given time period. It 
appeared likely that they would, in fact, operate with these conceptions 
in their actual decision making.^^ During the main survey, only these 
three values were asked for each time period for any particular crop. 
For perennials, such expectations were elicited for a 30-year period. 
In practice the farmers split up the 30-year period into a number of 
time periods which were often longer than one year; they then specified 
the three values for each of those periods. 
5.9 Problems and Limitations of the Survey 
The major problems encountered during the survey related to the 
eliciting of subjective attitudes, preferences and expectations. Most 
difficulties were found in the questions aimed at determining certainty 
equivalents for the assessment of risk attitudes. Since the questions 
posed were hypothetical, a considerable degree of concentration as well 
as ability for abstract thought and introspection were required. This 
proved to be too much for some farmers, and of the total of 165 farmers, 
54 farmers were unable to respond satisfactorily. Only 13 farmers, however, 
^^ A similar observation was made by S. Ortiz (1967) in a study of 
decision making among the Indian farmers of Colombia. 
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were unable to satisfactorily answer the questions put to ascertain the 
subjective discount rate. (No 's ignif icant relationship between income 
or educational level and the ability to answer these questions was found.) 
The possible implications for managerial ability of the capacity to 
answer such questions should be investigated further. 
Tlie problems normally associated with oral interviews are well known. 
In particular , due to the nature of the questioning which subjected the 
interviewee to considerable pressure, the possibility of interviewer bias 
in this survey was substantial even though a conscious effort was made at 
all stages to minimise this . 
The sample selection procedure, as mentioned previously, was one 
that was imposed by the circumstances since no suitable sampling frame 
for some form of random sampling was available. Its nature precluded the 
possibil ity of using sample parameters for estimating population 
parameters. In particular , the proportion of higher size and income farms 
in the sample most probably overstated their actual proportions in the 
population. 
Also , except in the case of those who had already applied for 
subsidies for replanting there was no way of checking whether their stated 
intentions regarding future courses of action were genuine, though there 
are no obvious reasons for doubting them. This , however, is an ever-
present problem in a study of this type. Even i f a follow-up survey is 
done later , it is always possible that any divergences observed may have 
been the result of changes in attitudes, expectations or other aspects of 
the decision making environment, including their objective functions since 
the time of the earlier survey. 
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CHAPTER 6 
DATA FROM FIELD SURVEY: 
CHARACTERISTICS AND RESPONSES OF SMALLHOLDERS 
I 
General Characteristics of the Smallholdings in the Sample 
6 . 1 . 1 Ownership 
The majority of the smallholdings in the sample were owned by a 
single person; joint ownership, except with another family member, was 
rare (see Table 6 . 1 ) . No income related difference could be observed 
here , though it was noted that there was not a single case of joint 
ownership in the highest Income groups. 
TABLE 6 . 1 
OWNERSHIP 
Type of ownership No. of holdings 
Single owner 132 
Joint owner with 
other family members 26 
Joint owner with 
non-fami ly members 7 
TOTAL 165 
Source: Field Survey, 1975. 
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6 . 1 . 2 Management 
The owner himself , or a member of the household, did the day to day 
management of the rubber holding (Table 7 . 2 ) . Again, no income related 
differences of any significance were found. There was not a single case 
of a paid employee being in charge of the daily management of the holding 
even in the higher income groups. The rubber smallholdings in the sample 
can therefore be considered as family enterprises in this sense. 
TABLE 6.2 
MANAGEMENT OF HOLDING 
Management done by: No. of holdings 
Paid employee -
Family member 41 
Other -
Owner 124 
TOTAL 165 
Source; Field Survey, 19 75. 
6 . 1 . 3 Decision Making 
The problems associated with ascertaining the decision maker in the 
household were discussed in the previous chapter. In all cases where there 
was joint ownership with non-family members, there was consultation with 
the other owners before any important decision (such as replanting) was 
taken. In practice this led to either the avoidance of such decisions or 
their postponement. As described later, four (out of the seven holdings 
where such joint ownership existed) planned to abandon their holding; 
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of the other three, one planned to sell it, another opted to tap on while 
the third planned to divide it and build a house for his son on his portion 
of the land. 
In the cases of single ownersliip, when asked whether the owner 
would decide by himself whether to replant or not (and other important 
problems), 26 per cent said that they would consult other members of the 
family. However, in most cases, it was also stated that the nominal head 
of the household, who was generally also the owner, would make the final 
decision. As described in the previous chapter, the key decision maker 
was not always this person and on the basis of the observations and judg-
ments made in the course of the interview the decision maker was identified 
as shown in Table 6.3.^ 
TABLE 6.3 
THE DECISION MAKER IN THE HOUSEHOLD 
Decision maker in 
the household No. of holdings 
Owner 122 (3) 
Husband of owner 9 (1) 
Wife of owner 8 (1) 
Other family member 19 (2) 
TOTAL 158 (7) 
Source: Field Survey, 1975. 
* The figures in brackets refer to 
the smallholders who had joint 
ownership (of the holding with old 
rubber) with non-family members. 
^ In the following sections in discussions of decision making, when 
referring to the smallholder or farmer, the actual decision maker is meant, 
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6 . 1 . 4 Area of Rubber owned by the Household 
As seen in Table 6 . 4 , the area of rubber lands owned varied 
substantially among the smallholders in the sample. There is observed 
a strong positive relationship between the area of rubber lands owned 
and the level of income. 
TABLE 6 . 4 
AREA OF RUBBER LANDS OWNED BY SMALLHOLDERS 
IN DIFFERENT INCOME GROUPS 
Income 
group 
(Rs/yr) 
Area of rubber (in acres) 
<1 1 - 2 2-3 >5 
Total 
<2500 23 17 24 3 67 
2500-5000 9 9 16 4 38 
5000-10000 7 8 14 12 41 
>10000 3 2 6 8 19 
TOTAL 42 36 60 27 165 
Source: Field Survey, 19 75. 
The total area of rubber in each farm was often held in more than 
one parcel (Table 6 . 5 ) and a majority of farms in the sample thus had 
more than one parcel. Twelve of these smallholdings had only abandoned 
rubber and did not have any immature or mature rubber, though in seven 
of these the trees were occasionally tapped (with three tapped fairly 
frequently, according to the farmer), when prices were favourable enough 
to warrant the necessary expenditure of effort . 
151 
TABLE 6. 5 
THE NUMBER OF PARCELS OF RUBBER LAND IN EACH SMALLHOLDING 
Size of holding No. of parcels 
Total (in acres) 1 2 3 >3 
<1 34 8 0 3 42 
1-2 19 14 3 0 36 
2-5 17 27 9 7 60 
>5 2 14 7 4 27 
TOTAL 72 63 19 11 165 
Source: Field Survey, 19 75. 
The above table gives some indication of the small size of the 
average parcel in the rubber smallholdings. 
6.1.5 Non-rubber Land 
In addition to their rubber holdings, many of the smallholders owned 
some non-rubber land, most commonly paddy fields and coconut gardens 
(which in most instances were really mixed gardens with coconut trees). 
As anticipated, the extent of such non-rubber lands was closely correlated 
with the level of income of the smallholder (see Table 6.6). Among the 
lowest income farmers, such lands were almost always below 2 acres, and 
most of them were less than one acre. 
Most farmers had some of their non-rubber lands under a perennial 
crop (Table 6.7) which, as mentioned above, was generally coconut. Almost 
all of the high income farmers had such lands while many of the lower 
income farmers did not. Amongst the latter who did, their non-rubber 
lands often consisted of a small paddy field Csometimes jointly owned) 
and/or a tiny home garden. 
TABLE 6.6 
OWNERSHIP OF NON-RUBBER LAND 
Income 
Group 
(Rs/yr) 
Area of non-rubber land (in acres) 
Total 
0 0-1 1-2 2-5 >5 
<2500 2 35 23 7 0 67 
2500-5000 2 8 16 11 1 38 
5000-10000 2 7 15 14 3 41 
>10000 2 0 3 10 4 19 
TOTAL 8 50 57 42 8 165 
Source: Field Survey, 19 75. 
Ln ro 
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TABLE 6.7 
OWNERSHIP OF NON-RUBBER LAND WITH A PERENNIAL CROP 
Income 
group 
(Rs/yr) 
Ownership 
Yes No 
Total 
<2500 46 21 67 
2500-5000 28 10 38 
5000-10000 34 7 41 
>10000 17 2 19 
TOTAL 125 40 165 
Source: Field Survey, 19 75. 
6.1.6 Sources of Household Incoine 
All farmers had other sources of income in addition to their rubber 
holdings. These included incomes from their non-rubber lands and other 
agricultural pursuits as well as incomes from off-farm occupations. Off-
farm occupations ranged from casual labourer to teacher, businessman and 
white collar worker. 
The importance of income from rubber in total household income varied 
among the smallholders in the sample. While most of the low income farmers 
obtained a high percentage of their total (regular) income from rubber, 
this was less evident among the higher income farmers. Among the sixty 
households having regular annual incomes of over Rs.5000, 41 obtained less 
than 25 per cent of their incomes from rubber (Table 6.8). This indicates 
the greater diversity of income sources available to the better-off farmers; 
it is also a consequence of the fact that many people with regular incomes 
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from various sources have invested some of their savings in rubber lands 
(see Chapter 6). 
TABLE 6.8 
PERCENTAGE OF INCOME FROM RUBBER IN TOTAL REGULAR INCOI'IE 
Income 
group 
(Rs/yr) 
<25% 25-50% 50-75% 75-100% Total 
<2500 20 5 16 17 58 
2500-5000 18 5 7 8 38 
5000-10000 31 5 4 1 41 
>10000 10 8 1 0 19 
TOTAL 79 23 28 26 * 156 
Source: Field Survey, 19 75. 
* 9 missing observations. 
The proportion of rubber incomes in total household income is a 
measure of the dependency of the household on rubber for their daily 
needs. A better off farmer is generally capable of a greater degree of 
sacrifice of present incomes than a low income farmer; therefore such a 
higli income farmer could, given the lower importance of rubber incomes 
in his total income, be capable of forgoing a much greater level of 
current income from rubber lands compared with a poorer farmer whose 
dependency on rubber is far greater. 
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6.1.7 Frequency of Rubber Sales 
The latex from the rubber trees, once coagulated and processed into 
smoked sheets can be stored for comparatively long periods without 
significant deterioration in quality if kept free from dampness. Thus, 
in a technical sense, a rubber smallholder is freely able to determine 
the length of time he would keep his rubber before selling it. This would 
enable him to decide his frequency of rubber sales in an economically 
optimal manner without a serious technological constraint. 
As can be expected under such circumstances, the frequency of rubber 
sales showed quite a wide variation among the smallholders in the sample; 
ranging from daily to monthly sales (Table 6.9). In certain instances 
farmers stated that they may sell at even longer intervals, preferring to 
accumulate and store the rubber until the price was favourable. A clear 
inverse relationship between the frequency of rubber sales and the level 
of income of the household was observed, i.e. , the frequency declined as 
incomes rose. At lower income levels rubber is sold more frequently as 
its proceeds are used to purchase day-to-day subsistence goods whereas at 
hi^er incomes this is no longer the case. Once freed from the need for 
ready cash to finance daily consumption, farmers are better able to time 
their sales so as to gain advantage from market price movements. This 
would suggest that the price elasticity of the quantity sold on the market 
would be higher among the better off farmers. 
6.1.8 Ownership of Processing Facilities 
All farmers possessed the basic utensils necessary for rubber 
production: tapping knives, buckets for collection of latex and 
coagulating pans, though the quality, particularly of the coagulating pans 
varied substantially. 
TABLE 6.9 
FREQUENCY OF RUBBER SALES 
Frequency of sales 
Income 
group 
( Rs/yr) More than once per week Weekly Fortnightly Mon thly 
When prices 
are 
favourable 
Total 
<2500 14 13 12 17 0 56 
2500-5000 4 6 12 13 2 37 
5000-10000 3 1 11 18 6 39 
>10000 0 1 3 9 6 19 
TOTAL 21 21 38 57 14 151 
Source: Field Survey, 19 75. 
X 2 = 38.71956 with 12 DF (significant at .05 level). 
No. of missing observations = 14 (including fanners not having 
any rubber under tapping) , 
I—' Ln C3^  
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Only a minority possessed rollers (used to press the coagulated 
rubber into thin sheets suitable for smoking; see Table 7.10). The 
others, however, had access to rollers belonging generally to the better-
off farmers, who charged a few cents (3 to 5 per sheet) for their use; thus the 
farmers who owned such rollers not only got their sheets rolled at almost 
no cost, but were also able to obtain an additional income from hiring 
the rolling facilities. 
TABLE 6.10 
OWNERSHIP OF ROLLERS 
Income 
group 
(Rs/yr) 
Yes No Total 
<2500 1 66 67 
2500-5000 3 35 38 
5000-10000 15 26 41 
>10000 14 5 19 
TOTAL 33 132 165 
Source: Field Survey, 19 75. 
A similar picture was found regarding the ownership of smokehouses. 
Except for three smallholders supplying latex to group processing centres 
(to be converted there into smoked sheets) , all others produced smoked 
sheets but only a small minority had properly constructed smokehouses 
(where some of them smoked other smallholders' sheets for a charge). 
Ownership of suck smokehouses was concentrated in the higher income groups 
even more markedly than with rollers. Many of the poorer farmers used the 
kitchen for smoking their sheets. 
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The ownership of processing facilities probably influences to some 
degree the quality of rubber produced. It was observed that while the 
majority of the smallholders produced smoked sheets graded at RSS 3 and 
below, a high proportion (though not all) of those owning processing 
facilities produced higher quality sheets. (Smoked sheets are graded 
by quality into various grades of Ribbed Smoked Sheets (RSS).) This may 
be due both to the better quality of the rubber so produced as well as 
to the greater bargaining strength of the better-off farmers with 
processing facilities in relation to the rubber dealers, enabling them 
to get their rubber graded more carefully and favourably. It was a 
common complaint among most smallholders, particularly the low income 
farmer, that their rubber was consistently undergraded by the dealers 
(which could at times lead to around a 20 per cent loss in sales revenue). 
6.1.9 Type of Labour used in Farm Operations 
The main operations in rubber smallholdings are the tapping of the 
trees, collection of the latex and subsequently rolling of the coagulated 
latex to prepare for smoking. These three main operations need not be 
done by the same person, and only tapping needs skilled labour. However, 
tapping and collection were generally done by the same person when a 
hired labourer was engaged. The coagulated latex was often taken to the 
rollers by school children after school (paid a few cents per sheet if 
not a member of the household). The main cost item is tapping (and 
collection). Crop sharing arrangements were not uncommon (see Table 6.11), 
though use of family labour or hired labour was more common. Mostly 
family labour was used in the lower income farms and hired labour in the 
higher income farms. 
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TABLE 6.11 
TYPE OF LABOUR USED IN RUBBER HOLDING 
Income 
group 
(Rs/yr) 
Type of labour 
Total 
Family Share Hired 
<2500 46 5 7 58 
2500-5000 23 7 9 39 
5000-10000 8 14 18 40 
>10000 2 3 14 19 
TOTAL 79 29 48 3k 156 
Source: Field Survey, 19 75. 
* Nine farms did not have holdings under 
tapping during the time of the survey. 
II 
Rubber Replanting 
6.2.1 Decision on Replanting 
As described in Chapter 5, the sample selection procedure ensured 
that (rubber) replanters as well as non-replanters from a cross-section 
of income groups were represented in the sample. Those who decided not 
to replant with rubber (at any rate not to replant immediately) opted for 
different courses of action. The two most common decisions among such 
non-replanters were (a) to continue tapping of the present trees for a 
further period of time and (b) to replace the present rubber trees with a 
different crop (see Table 6.12). 
TABLE 6.12 
DECISION ON FUTURE COURSE OF ACTION 
Income 
group 
(Rs/yr) 
Replant 
with 
rubber 
Continue 
tapping 
Abandon 
land 
Plant 
a 
d i f f e r e n t 
crop 
Se l l 
land Other Total 
<2500 35 14 3 15 0 0 67 
2500-5000 24 4 1 8 1 0 38 
5000-10000 23 4 0 11 2 1 41 
>10000 11 1 0 7 0 0 19 
TOTAL 93 23 4 41 3 1 165 
Source: Field Survey, 19 75. 
C N o 
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6.2.2 Rubber Replanters 
In this section we shall examine the responses of the rubber replanters 
to the interview questions. 
The first question was: 'Why did you decide to replant with rubber?' 
Expectations of high yields from replanted rubber, and a steady future 
income were the most common answers (some farmers indicating that both of 
these influenced their decision), while a substantial proportion also 
mentioned that replanted rubber would benefit their children in the future 
(see Table 6.13). The floor price was mentioned as a factor by only one 
smallholder (who also gave other reasons). Expectation of high rubber 
prices in the future too was not seen as an,important reason for their 
decision by the big majority of the farmers. Also rubber replanting was 
not done to augment land values according to the smallholders. While the 
availability of the subsidy was not given as an important factor by the 
majority, this was explored further through more questions (as will be 
discussed below). 
6.2.3 Preference for rubber 
To explore further the reasons for the decision to replant with 
rubber, the smallholders were asked why they chose rubber in preference to 
other crops. 
The fact that rubber yields a continuous income was given as one 
reason for this preference by a majority of farmers in all income groups 
(Table 6.14). Another important reason for preferring rubber was that 
rubber would provide a 'stable' income (i.e., a reliable income). It is 
interesting that 'rubber would give a higher income than any other crops' 
was considered as a factor for preferring to replant with rubber, by a 
substantially smaller number of smallholders; proportionately less than 
TABLE 6 . 13 
REASONS FOR DECISION TO REPLANT WITH RUBBER 
Income 
group 
( R s / y r ) 
T o t a l 
number 
r e p l a n t i n g 
in 
income 
group 
Expect 
high 
f u t u r e 
p r i c e s 
Expect 
high 
y i e l d s 
from 
r e p l a n t e d 
t r e e s 
Steady 
f u t u r e 
income 
Land 
va lue 
w i l l 
r i s e 
Chi ldren 
w i l l 
b e n e f i t 
in 
f u t u r e 
High 
f l o o r 
p r i c e 
Easy t o 
ma inta in 
and 
p r o t e c t 
Can 
Other 
r e a s o n a b l e 
s u b s i d y 
<2500 35 3 23 17 0 10 1 3 4 2 
2500-5000 24 0 15 17 0 8 0 6 2 0 
5000-10000 23 1 14 15 1 11 0 5 0 2 
>10000 11 1 5 5 0 4 0 1 0 2 
TOTAL 93 5 57 54 1 33 1 15 6 6 
Source : F i e l d Survey, 19 75 • 
(Row t o t a l s in some c a s e s exceed t o t a l number in income group due t o some farmers g i v i n g more than one 
r e a s o n . ) 
ON 
K ) 
TABLE 6 .14 
REASONS FOR PREFERENCE FOR RUBBER 
Income 
group 
(Rs /yr ) 
Tota l 
number 
in 
income 
group 
Stable 
income 
Continuous 
income 
Higher 
in c ome 
Higher 
land 
value 
Used t o 
rubber 
Easier 
to 
maintai n 
and 
p r o t e c t 
Other 
<2500 35 21 24 10 1 12 6 . 4 
2500-5000 24 15 17 12 1 14 5 0 
5000-10000 23 15 13 9 1 7 7 2 
>10000 11 5 7 6 1 3 2 1 
TOTAL 93 56 61 37 4 36 20 7 
Source: Fie ld Survey, 19 75. 
(Row t o t a l s exceed t o t a l number in income group as some farmers gave more than one reason . ) 
a^  u> 
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30 per cent of the farmers in the lowest income group gave this reason 
compared with over 50 per cent of farmers in the highest income group. 
The familiarity with rubber was another reason for opting to replant 
with rubber, according to a substantial nuiri^ er of smallholders. This was 
given as one reason by a majority of smallholders in the Rs.2500-5000 per 
year income group, compared with about one-third of the farmers in the 
other income groups. Also important, for a minority (20 out of 93) was 
the ease of protecting and maintaining rubber. 
6.2.4 Rubber Replanting Subsidy 
Though most smallholders did not mention the availability of a 
replanting subsidy as one of the reasons for replanting with rubber (see 
Table 6.13), a substantial proportion said they would not replant (23 out 
of 93) if no subsidy was available, and a majority of the smallholders 
said that they would be uncertain in such an event (Table 6.15). However 
most of the smallholders in the highest income group stated that they 
would replant even without it. 
TABLE 6.15 
DECISION ON REPLANTING WITH RUBBER IF REPLANTING 
SUBSIDY WAS NOT AVAILABLE (AMONG THOSE WHO HAD 
DECIDED TO REPLANT UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS) 
Income 
group 
(Rs/yr) 
Will replant Will not replant Un ce rt ain Total 
<2500 11 6 18 35 
2500-5000 5 6 13 24 
5000-10000 7 8 8 23 
>10000 7 3 1 11 
TOTAL 30 23 40 93 
Source: Field Survey, 19 75. 
165 
Tliese responses indicate the extent to which the rubber replanting 
subsidy is taken for granted when farmers consider wliether or not to 
replant with rubber. For the majority of the farmers it was difficult to 
give a definite answer to this question because it was necessary to 
envisage a completely new situation where the costs of replanting were 
much greater. This uncertainty also reflected the deep consideration that 
farmers give to the problem of replanting; it was not easy for them to 
weigh all the costs and benefits associated with replanting rubber under 
a different set of circumstances. 
Table 6.15 shows that a substantial proportion of the farmers even 
in the three lower income groups intended to replant even in the absence of 
the replanting subsidy. However, on more questioning it was revealed that 
all of these farmers in the two lowest income groups and four of the 
farmers in the next group in fact planned to replant using lower cost 
planting material and with much lower expenditure on land preparation, 
maintenance, fertilisation, etc. In contrast, the high income farmers 
who planned to replant said that they would replant with the best varieties 
available; to do otherwise, as one farmer put it, would be 'a wastage of 
the land'. According to the lower income farmers, it was impossible for 
them to incur the levels of expenditure necessary to replant in the same 
way as it would be done if the subsidy was available. 
6.2.5 Replanting Expenses 
On the replanting subsidy, two further questions were asked from 
those intending to replant with rubber: 
(a) 'Would the subsidy be sufficient to meet all replanting 
expenses ?' 
(b) 'If not, how would you finance the balance?' 
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On the first question, the farmers were almost equally divided on 
the sufficiency of the subsidy. There was, however, a clear relationship 
between the answers and the type of labour expected to be used in the 
replanting work (see Table 6.16). In general, farmers using family 
labour considered that the subsidy would be sufficient, while those using 
hired labour tended to think that it would not. Since the type of labour 
used on the operations was closely correlated with the income levels, this 
meant in effect that while low income farmers felt that the subsidy was 
sufficient, the high income farmers felt otherwise. (This was not true 
in all cases, as the type of labour used depended not solely on the income 
level; however, this was generally the case.) 
TABLE 6.16 
IS THE REPLANTING SUBSIDY SUFFICIENT 
TO COVER REPLANTING EXPENSES? 
Type of labour Yes No Uncertain Total 
Only family 6 1 0 7 
Mainly family 18 4 0 22 
Mainly hired 15 11 2 28 
Only hired 12 24 0 36 
Total 51 AO 2 93 
Source: Field Survey, 19 75. 
These responses indicate that the high income farmers incurred 
higher costs because they hired labour, while the low income farmers 
incurred lower costs because they used unpaid family labour. The 
replanting subsidy was sufficient to cover the cash costs for the latter, 
though it was insufficient for the former. 
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As seen in Table 6 . 1 7 , only seven fanners stated that they would 
be using only family labour. Tlius, typically, even the low income 
farmers considered it necessary to hire labour to a limited extent. Such 
labour was said to be particularly necessary for felling the trees and 
clearing the land. There was only a marginal difference in the estimated 
average costs of the 'only family' and 'mainly family' groups. This was 
also the case between the 'mainly hired' and 'only hired' groups. 
However, between the two former groups on the one hand and the two latter 
2 
on the other, the difference was considerable. 
TABLE 6 . 17 
AVERAGE REPLANTING EXPENSES PER ACRE 
Type of labour Replanting 
used in expenses 
replanting work (Rs/acre) 
Only f ami ly 1641 
Mainly family 1789 
Mainly hired 3024 
Only hired 3136 
Source: Field Survey, 19 75. 
^ There was also considerable variation in the estimated costs within 
each group; thus within the 'only family labour' group, the estimates 
ranged from Rs.650/acre to Rs.2400/acre. A ' t ' test showed that the 
means of the first two groups and the latter two groups were different at 
.01 level of significance. 
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Most of the fanners who said that the replanting subsidy would be 
insufficient to cover replanting expenses stated that they would be 
meeting the balance of the expenses from their current income (Table 6.18) 
Four of these farmers were in the lowest income group (<Rs.2500/year). 
Only two farmers considered that they would use some credit; on further 
questioning even these made it clear that they would borrow some money 
only in the first year of replanting and would be repaying it within a 
short period of time 'somehow'. This near absence of resort to credit to 
finance replanting is indicative of the nature of the credit facilities 
available (see Chapter 4). 
TABLE 6.18 
METHOD OF FINANCING DIFFERENCE BETWEEN REPLANTING 
SUBSIDY AND ACTUAL REPLANTING EXPENSES 
Income 
group 
(Rs/yr) 
Savings Credit Current Income 
Savings 
and 
current 
income 
Total 
<2500 0 1 A 0 5 
2500-5000 3 1 9 1 14 
5000-10000 2 0 10 0 12 
>10000 3 0 6 0 9 
TOTAL 8 2 29 1 40 
Source: Field Survey, 19 75. 
It is also noteworthy that only eight farmers, of whom five were 
on >Rs.5000/year incomes, considered savings as a possible source of 
finance. While this may be due to the low level of savings in the lower 
income groups, in the case of farmers in the higher income groups, it is 
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probable that they would feel no need to tise their savings as current 
incomes would be sufficient to meet the balance. In the latter case 
(i.e. , higher income fanners) it may also reflect the attitude among many 
Sinhala villagers that savings are to be used for purposes other than 
productive investments (dowries for daughters, pilgrimages, etc.) . 
6.2.6 Intercropping During Period of Immaturity of Rubber Plants 
Intercropping during the first few years of rubber replanting had 
been discouraged by the Rubber Research Institute of Sri Lanka and 
consequently the Rubber Control Department had decreed that such inter-
cropping would make farmers ineligible to receive the rubber replanting 
subsidy. This policy remained unchanged from the inception of the Rubber 
Replanting Subsidy Scheme in 1953 until early 19 73 when a Government 
campaign was mounted to promote food production. However, it was well 
known that almost all smallholders intercropped to a limited extent with 
seasonal crops when the rubber plants were young. The local extension 
officers, charged with inspecting holdings were generally quite flexible in 
interpreting the regulations. 
When questioned during the interviews, nearly all smallholders were 
aware that the Government restrictions on intercropping had been lifted. 
Most of the smallholders, including many of the higher income farmers said 
that they would intercrop for some time (Table 6.19). 
Those who were not planning to intercrop were proportionately greatest 
in the middle income groups (Table 6.19). The reason given for their 
reluctance to intercrop was that protection of the crops from theft would 
be very difficult; if the crops were to be saved a continuous vigil would 
have to be kept up in the pre-harvesting period. For the lowest income 
group, the additional income made such a vigil worthwhile. Of the five low 
0 
Ryan, op. oit. , p.173. 
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income farmers who did not plan to intercrop, two said that the holding 
was too far away from home to be able to protect an intercrop, llie other 
three had no one in the hoiosehold to do the work. Some of the high income 
farmers had watchers already employed to look after their lands, while 
some planned to allow a villager to intercrop on a share-cropping basis. 
Among the middle income farmers, those who did not usually employ family 
labour had the largest proportion of non-intercroppers. They did not 
normally employ watchers to look after their properties and considered 
that it would be uneconomical to hire one to protect the intercrops. 
TABLE 6.19 
INTERCROPPING DURING IMMATURE PERIOD OF RUBBER 
Income 
group 
(Rs/yr) 
Yes No Total 
<2500 28 5 33 
2500-5000 14 10 24 
5000-10000 16 8 24 
>10000 8 2 10 
TOTAL 66 25 
* 91 
Source: Field Survey, 19 75. 
* Two farmers were uncertain. 
The general view among all smallholders was that intercropping, on 
a substantial scale, was feasible only during the first three years after 
planting rubber. Yields from such intercropping would be highest in the 
first year and would subsequently diminish. While farmers did acknowledge 
that such intercropping could have some retarding influence on the young 
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rubber plants through competition for soil nutrients, this was not felt 
to be serious. Many of the smallholders, particularly the higher income 
farmers, said that they did not expect very high cash incomes from such 
intercropping (the highest income expected by a farmer was Rs.650 from 
an acre in the first year, while the average was closer to Rs.300/acre/ 
year). However, intercropping was expected to contribute substantially 
to the consumption requirements of the households as most of the inter-
crops envisaged were yams, vegetables and similar food crops. Particularly 
around the period of the field survey, there was a widespread shortage of 
rice and flour as well as a price rise in these items, in the wake of a 
government decision to raise prices of some subsidised food items, which 
had reinforced the general inflationary price rises of yams, vegetables, 
etc. Thus intercropping was felt to be quite an attractive proposition, 
and explains why so many smallholders desired to intercrop without much 
regard for possible retardation of growth of the rubber trees. 
Ill 
Non-rubber Replanters 
6.3.1 Problems of Ownership 
It was seen in Table 6.12 that the majority of those who were not 
planning to replant with rubber intended to replant with a different crop 
or to continue to tap the existing trees for a further period. Four 
farmers planned to abandon (or had already abandoned) their holdings; 
three others intended to sell their holdings. In all four of the former 
cases, and in two of the latter, ownership problems arising out of joint 
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ovmership of the holding were responsible for these decisions.^ The 
other farmer who was selling his holding was doing so for two reasons: 
(a) the distance from his home to the holding miles), and (b) the 
owner himself was an invalid and there was no adult male in the family 
capable of looking after his holding. In the following sections we shall 
be mainly concentrating on the other smallholders. 
6.3.2 Decision to Continue Tapping 
It is clear from Table 6.20 that the level of income is very 
important in explaining the decision to tap on; while 14 out of 29 (leaving 
aside the three who were abandoning their land due to ownership problems) 
in the lowest income group decided to continue tapping the present trees, 
only one out of eleven farmers in the highest income group decided to do 
so. As could be anticipated, the strong need for current income was given 
as the most important reason for this decision by thirteen out of these 
fourteen farmers in the lowest income group (Table 6.20). The one farmer 
in the highest income group gave this reason in addition to 'the present 
prices are good'. A life crisis or the expectation of having to spend a 
large sum of money in the near future on something may induce even high 
income farmers to value the low incomes from old/low yielding rubber. 
Generally the incomes expected from such tapping were quite low 
(Table 6.21). This was not surprising since the holdings were selected 
on the basis of information available to the extension officer on the 
level of yields and the age of trees. Advanced age and/or intensive 
tapping had reduced the yields to quite low levels. Most of the farmers 
^ Joint ownership of even quite small holdings is not uncommon owing to 
the inheritance laws of the country (see Chapter 4) . 
TABLE 6.20 
REASONS FOR DECISION TO CONTINUE TAPPING THE EXISTING TREES 
Income 
group 
(Rs/yr) 
Total number 
of farmers 
in each 
group 
Present 
yields 
are 
high 
Present 
prices 
are 
good 
Needs 
present 
income 
badly 
Cannot 
get 
subsidy 
Ownership 
prob lems 
(Jointly 
owned) 
owners 
do not 
want to 
replant 
Other 
<25000 14 3 1 13 1 2 2 1 
2500-5000 4 0 0 3 2 0 0 1 
5000-10000 4 2 0 1 1 1 1 3 
>10000 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 23 5 2 18 4 3 3 5 
Source: Field Survey, 19 75. 
(Row totals sometimes exceed total number in income group as some farmers gave more than one re as on. 
U) 
TABLE 6.21 
EXPECTED (MEAN) ANNUAL INCOMES FROM CONTINUING TO TAP PRESENT RUBBER TREES' 
Income 
group 
(Rs/yr) <250 
Income (Rs/yr) 
250-500 500-750 750-1000 
Total 
<2500 4 3 6 1 14 
2500-5000 0 2 2 0 4 
5000-10000 1 0 1 2 4 
>10000 0 0 0 1 1 
TOTAL 5 5 9 4 23 
Source: Field Survey, 19 75. 
•k Incomes refers to income from entire holding not per acre. 
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who were planning to tap on, did not expect that it would be economical 
for them to do so for more than two or three years at most. Five farmers 
were expecting to get no more than Rs.250 per year from such tapping; 
of these, four were in tlie lowest income group. The plot of rubber was 
the only stable source of income for them as none of them had any one in 
their households who had another regular source of income. Tliey depended 
on casual labour in the village, particularly in the paddy seasons to 
supplement their income from rubber. Some of the farmers had already 
commenced slaughter tapping which they hoped to continue for two years; 
others intended to do so in the next year or so. 
These smallholders were asked for their probable courses of action 
once yields from the present trees fell to uneconomical levels. Nineteen 
(out of the 2 3) farmers stated that they would prefer to replant with 
rubber if this was feasible. The single farmer from the >Rs • 10000/year 
income group who was tapping on was not sure what he might do; he was, he 
said, 'rather pessimistic' about future rubber prices and that was partly 
why he did not want to cut down his trees just now. He would 'wait and 
see' what the future prospects for rubber were before deciding on anything. 
As he came from a non-tea growing area, there was no alternative high 
income cash crop for rubber. The importance of the level of current income, 
and the consequent ability to forgo the income from the present trees, 
however low it may be, was illustrated by the remark made by one low 
income farmer (a casual labourer) who said that he would replant immediately 
if he managed to get a 'permanent' job even as a labourer. These low income 
farmers were also asked if they would be able to get a comparable income 
from intercropping, after replanting with rubber. While some agreed that 
it might be possible, they pointed out that (a) such incomes would be quite 
variable and uncertain, and (b) there would be a delay of at least five or 
six months until such crops could be harvested. 
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6.3.3 Reasons for Shifting from Rubber 
Most of the farmers who h^d decided to shift from rubber and to plant 
a different crop did so on income grounds (Table 6,22); thus in all income 
groups a majority said that they expected a higher income from planting a 
different crop. In particular, of the 7 smallholders in the highest 
income group, 6 gave this as the main, and indeed in many cases as the 
only reason for their decision. 
Of the two other commonly given reasons, expectation of low yields 
from replanted rubber (due to unsuitability of land) complemented the 
above. Thus one of the farmers in the highest income group wanted to 
convert his rubber holding into a paddy field as it was situated in a low 
lying area, adjacent to paddy fields and was continuously waterlogged. 
The majority of those shifting from rubber, at least partly due to the 
desire to grcn>7 food crops, belonged to the lowest income group. This was 
not considered to be of much importance by farmers in any of the other 
income groups. 
The long immature period of rubber was considered a reason for 
shifting mainly by some of the lowest income farmers. As mentioned in the 
previous section, the importance of current incomes to the lowest income 
farmers is again reflected in this. 
Very few gave instability of rubber prices or pessimism regarding 
future rubber prices as reasons for shifting from rubber. The latter was 
the reason given by only one of the higliest income farmers for his 
decision. However, the influence of prices and price expectations were 
not unimportant in actual fact. It was the expectation of higher incomes 
from other crops that was important, i.e., the relatively unfavourable 
price of rubber to the price of other crops. Also the desire of some of 
the lawest inconB farmers to attempt to cultivate some food crops reflects, 
at least partly, the low price of rubber in relation to subsistence foods. 
TABLE 6.22 
REASONS FOR SHIFTING FROM RUBBER 
Income 
group 
(Rs/yr) 
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8 
11 
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4 
1 
1 
0 
4 
3 
5 
3 
9 
5 
5 
6 
7 
2 
2 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
6 
2 
1 
3 
TOTAL 41 5 6 15 27 12 1 0 1 1 2 2 12 
(Row totals sometimes exceed total number in income group as some farmers gave more than one reason.) 
Source: Field Survey, 1975. 
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As was noted in Chapter 2 , there was a deterioration in this ratio in 
recent years, particularly in comparison with the early years of this 
century. During the first decade of this century, for example, one 
pound of rubber could be sold on the market at a price which could at 
times purchase more than 30-40 lb of rice. In 19 75 , it was necessary 
to se l l 2-3 lb of rubber to purchase 1 lb of rice in the open market.^ 
From Table 6 . 2 2 , it appears that the level of the replanting 
subsidy and other subsidy related problems are not of much significance 
in influencing farmers' decisions. However, it would be incorrect to 
draw such a conclusion too readily. As previously mentioned, the existence 
of the replanting subsidy is considered to be so much an invariant part of 
the decision making environment that the farmers may not immediately refer 
to it as a factor in their calculations. Also, subsidies are now granted 
for replanting with other crops as wel l , and tea is a case in point. 
A similar case is the apparent unimportance of rising input prices 
for rubber production. Though many farmers complained about the rise in 
these prices during the survey, only two of kl attributed their decision, 
even partly, to this . Yet the consequences of such price rises on the 
net ' prof i ts ' from rubber for all producer groups would have led them to 
believe that other crops were relatively more attractive. In other words, 
though the farmers did not reply affirmatively to the questions on these in 
isolation , it may well be an important factor in influencing their views 
on the relative returns of rubber and the other crops. 
^ The price of rubber and rice (per lb) were around Rs . 1 . 20 and Rs . 3 . 00 
(for the top grade) during the time of the survey. 
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6 . 3 . 4 Choice of Crop 
Tliose farmers who were shifting into a new crop mainly on higlier 
income grounds chose a variety of different crops (see Table 6 . 2 3 ) . The 
particular crop selected depended most importantly on the region and the 
income level of the farmer. Notably, however, except for the (previously 
mentioned) farmer who decided to convert his rubber land to paddy, all 
others opted to plant another perennial crop. The significance of this 
in a l l income groups and classes of producers w i l l be discussed later , 
particularly in the context of risk and uncertainty in the decision 
making environment. 
None of the highest income farmers, and very few of the others, opted 
for coconuts in preference to rubber. It is only in the lowest income 
group that three decided to plant coconut, and another to plant king 
coconut. Of these three, two also stated that they would like to be able 
to grow subsistence crops. Coconut, of course, is a subsistence crop as 
well as a cash crop in Sri Lanka. Also it is widely grown in mixed crop 
home gardens since its foliage does not cut off sunlight to the same 
extent as rubber trees. Thus intensive intercropping can be carried out 
under the coconut trees, as can be observed in almost all of the home 
gardens in the 'wet zone ' . In previous chapters we described the desire 
of many villagers to possess sufficient paddy, and preferably also coconut, 
to meet household consumption requirements. Almost all high income 
farmers have sufficient coconut lands for this purpose. All these factors 
may explain , at least in part , why some farmers in the lowest income 
group preferred coconuts to rubber, given the deterioration of the terms 
TABLE 6-23 
CHOICE OF CROP FOR REPLANTING BY FARMERS SHIFTING FROM 
RUBBER ON HIGHER INCOME GROUNDS 
Income C R O P 
group 
(Rs/yr) Coconut Tea Cinnamon Paddy King Coconut 
Total 
<2500 3 4 1 0 1 9 
2500-5000 1 4 0 0 0 5 
5000-10000 1 5 0 0 0 6 
>10000 0 4 2 1 0 7 
TOTAL 5 16 3 1 1 27 
Source: Field Survey, 19 75. 
00 o 
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of trade of rubber (earlier referred t o ) . ^ 
One of the farmers in the highest income group who had opted to plant 
cinnamon said that though he thought that he would 'possibly ' get a higher 
income from it than from rubber ( ' i f the prices are r i g h t ' ) , this was not 
his main reason for deciding to shift to cinnamon. He preferred his income 
as a substantial lump sum rather than ' a couple of hundred rupees every 
month from rubber ' . With the former, he could do 'something of value' 
such as making part payment on a hand tractor or to construct a l ittle 
building . This attitude contrasted sharply with the reasons given by 
many of the lower income farmers for not choosing cinnamon: 'with rubber, 
i f it does not rain , we can always get a few rupees to buy something to 
eat ; but with cinnamon (a) i f the price is low during harvesting time it 
can be a disaster and (b) in any case we w i l l spend that money in a short 
time and then there w i l l be nothing thereafter for months and we w i l l end 
up in d e b t ' , i . e . , the farmer needs to have other income sources to provide 
cash to meet his daily needs. 
6 . 3 . 5 Response of Farmers in Tea Growing Areas 
The majority of farmers were shifting to tea in all income groups. 
However, this option was available only to farmers from certain areas as 
^ This preference for coconut was more remarkable because none of these 
farmers were planning to replant with the high yielding/quick maturing 
new coconut variet ies . All farmers were aware that these varieties 
existed but were quite emphatic that it was almost impossible to actually 
obtain them for planting due to problems of transport from the Coconut 
Research Institute (CRI) at Lunuwila (near Colombo). This was confirmed 
by an of f icer of the CRI in a personal communication, who said that unless 
the farmers were capable of transporting the plants from the Institute 
i t s e l f , it was generally known that the ordinary plants are substituted 
in transit , and the farmers often get no high yielding plants at a l l . 
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tea cultivati on was feasible only in such areas for agro—climatic reasons 
as well as the need for access to nearby tea factories. 
Of 32 farmers who decided to replace existing rubber trees, in the 
tea grOT^ing areas, the majority (17) opted to replant with tea (Table 6 . 2 4 ) . 
Clearly also there is greater attraction among farmers to tea as income 
levels rise. Thus the proportion of those replanting with tea rose from 
40 per cent in the lowest income group to 71 per cent in the highest income 
group. 
This positive association between income and the proportion of tea 
growers was related to two factors. One was the acceptance by all farmers 
that potentially tea was the crop likely to yield highest incomes. The 
other was that it was also more demanding in terms of cultivation and 
maintenance and ' r isky ' in a number of other ways as well . As one lo^ '? 
income farmer said , coinparing tea and rubber: 'even i f I am unable to look 
after rubber trees for a few months or even a year, nothing w i l l happen 
to them; I can tap them and get latex at any time. But i f something like 
that happens with tea, nearly everything will be lost and I w i l l have to 
spend a lot to get the tea bushes back in good condition' . Also, tea needs 
a substantially higher labour input and i f , for some reason, the farmer is 
unable to supply the necessary labour input at the proper time, then the 
results could be quite injurious to the growth of the tea plants, as he 
would not be able to afford to hire labour. 
Some of the high income farmers who, while admitting that tea probably 
would give higher incomes, yet opted to replant with rubber, gave different 
reasons for their decision. According to one, who already owned processing 
facilities for rubber as well as substantial mature and immature rubber 
holdings, it was more 'convenient' for him to have all his holdings under 
rubber. The additional effort needed to plant one of his holdings with a 
TABLE 6.24 
INTENDED COURSE OF ACTION OF FARMERS FROM TEA GROWING AREAS 
Income Replanting with: 
Other action Total group 
(Rs/yr) Rubber Tea Other 
<2500 4 4 2 7 17 
2500-5000 3 4 1 5 13 
5000-10000 3 4 0 2 9 
>10000 2 5 0 0 7 
TOTAL 12 17 3 13 46 
Source: Field Survey, 19 75. 
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new crop and to maintain i t V7as considered by him to be not worth the 
higher incomes so obta inab le .^ 
6 . 3 . 6 S i i i f t ing away from Rubber on Non-incomG Grounds 
The fourteen farmers who were s h i f t i n g away from rubber on grounds 
other than higlier income showed an almost universal preference f o r 
coconuts . Some of i t s a t t rac t i ons to v i l l a g e r s were mentioned prev ious ly . 
Despite the long gestat ion per iod of up to 8-10 years , coconut has other 
features to which farmers attach importance, p a r t i c u l a r l y when they choose 
to plant a crop in c l o se proximity to the i r houses. Coconut trees allow 
more l i g h t and the houses thereby look more ' p l easant ' and are less damp 
as w e l l . Thus many who were planning to bu i ld houses in the e x i s t i n g 
rubber ho ld ing f o r themselves or , as was more frequently the case , f o r 
the i r c h i l d r e n , pre fer red to plant coconut instead of rubber, i f the p lo t 
of land was not large enough to have coconut trees near the house and 
rubber away from i t . 
No farmer decided to plant subsistence crops f o r consumption only . 
The s i n g l e farmer v7ho planned to plant vegetables and other seasonal crops 
on a s i g n i f i c a n t s ca l e (as w e l l as coconut) said that he expected to s e l l 
a subs tant ia l propor t i on . While many of the farms had some o f f - f a r m cash 
incomes, the f a c t that no farmer opted to plant crops f o r consumption only 
shows the market or cash or ientat ion of the smallholders whose wants and 
pre ferences now include goods that have to be bought, n e c e s s i t a t i n g the 
production of other goods (or s e r v i c e s ) to be so ld in the market to obtain 
cash. 
^ This may ind i ca te that at high l e v e l s of income, the work- le isure 
pre ferences are such that l e i s u r e C 'convenience ' ) i s highly valued, at 
l eas t by some farmers. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE PROCESS OF DECISION MAKING: AN ANALYSIS 
7 . 1 . 1 Subjective Discount Rates under Conditions of Certainty 
The procedure adopted for ascertaining the subjective discount rates 
of the farmers (under conditions of certainty) during the f ield survey was 
described in Chapter 5 . 
I t bas ical ly involved finding the sum of money income which, i f 
available with certainty in one year ' s time, would be just suff icient for 
a farmer to be indifferent between that and a specified sum of money 
available for present consumption. Thus i f the two sums were y^ and y^ 
respectively , the implied subjective discount rate i w i l l be given in 
percentage terms by, 
i = X 100 
^o 
It is generally postulated that current consumption is preferred to 
future consumption, i . e . , there is positive time preference ( ' impatience ' -
see Fisher , 1 9 3 0 ^ ) . This has been considered one of the reasons for the 
2 3 
existence of positive interest rates (Bohm-Bawerk, 1891; Fisher , 1930 ) . 
^ F isher , I , The Theory of Interest, McMillan and Co . , London, 1930. 
^ Bohn^Bawerk, E . V . , The Positive Theory of Capital, Tr. W. Smart, 
McMillan and C o . , London, 1891. 
3 
F isher , op. cvt. 
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The degree of such time preference would depend on the expectations 
regarding present and future incomes and consumption expenditures. Other 
things remaining constant, an increase in expected income in the future 
period would tend to raise the premium on current funds and vice versa. 
Socio-cultural attitudes in particular communities could influence such 
4 
time preference. As expectations of future incomes typically vary with 
age, time preference attitudes, too, may vary with age. 
The subjective discount rate, as elicited, reflects the time 
preference attitudes for consumption held by the farmers at the time of 
the survey. The subjective discount rates obtained ranged from 8 per 
cent to more than 150 per cent (see Appendix C). To investigate the 
relationships between this and the level of income, age and sex of the 
farmers, multiple regression techniques were used, specifying a linear 
relationship between the subjective discount rate (as the dependent 
variable) and the above three variables as explanatory variables. Only 
the coefficient of the level of income was seen to be statistically 
significant (and was negative), and the results are therefore not 
reported. The simple correlation coefficient between the subjective 
discount rate and the level of income was -.51^ (see also Figure 7.1). 
This negative relationship found between the subjective discount 
rate and the level of income is in accordance with a priori expectations. 
Though the present level of income alone does not determine the degree of 
time preference, in general it could be assumed that there would tend to 
be a close relationship between present income and expected future income 
in particular this would have been so because the time interval referred 
^ Thus in Malaya, Chinese supposedly possess lower time preference 
compared with Malays: Swift, M., op. cit. 
^ Non-linear functional forms were tried with subjective discount rate as 
a function of the level of income. However, the results did not 
significantly improve. 
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7 . 1 . 2 Attitudes to Risk 
The previous Chapter described how a number of questions were put to 
the smallholders in the form of hypothetical decision problems so that 
certainty equivalents for a series of risky prospects were ascertained.^ 
(These are given in Appendix C . ) 
lliese certainty equivalents (see sub-section 6 . 7 , Chapter 6) were 
then used to derive (Bernoullian type) 'utility ' functions. The method 
adopted for doing this was to assign arbitrary utility values to the two 
extreme values (a and b) - usually 100 and 0 - and to use the expected 
utility rule (see Chapter 3) to obtain the utility of each of the certainty 
equivalents. For example, if U(O^) was the utility of 0^ (the certainty 
equivalent of the risky prospect with equally likely outcomes of a and 
b ) , then 
U(O^) = p(a) . U(a) + p(b) . U(b) 
where p(a) and p(b) refer to the probability of a and b respectively 
and are equal to 
U(O^) = ^ . 100 + ^ . 0 
= 50 
Similarly the utility of (see Figure 5 . 3 , Chapter 5) is given by, 
U(02) = ^U(a) + ^U(O^) 
= 1 . 100 + I . 50 
= 75 
^ The decision problems posed did not involve risky prospects with outcomes 
in different time periods. For a rigorous and sophisticated decision 
analysis that would explicitly incorporate certain parameters of the 
elicited utility function, inter-temporal risk attitudes should be obtained. 
An attempt to do so would have very greatly increased the complexities of 
the questions put to the farmers (and for a large number of time periods 
would have posed virtually insurmountable problems). The adopted procedure 
is deemed to be sufficient for the purpose of grouping farmers into 
different categories by their attitude towards risk. 
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(a) risk averters, 
(b) risk neutrdls, 
(c) risk preferrers. 
Usually 'risk aversion' is used to denote risk aversion for money 
gains. (Typically it has been noted that persons exhibit risk aversion 
for money gains and risk preference for money losses.) Depending on the 
shape of the curves in the 'gains' region of the graph, the farmers were 
classified into the three groups: when the curve looked 'almost' linear, 
the particular farmer was put into group (b), as a risk neutral person; 
depending on the concavity or convexity of the curve (to the X-axis), the 
farmer was placed in group (b) or group (c). 
Most of the farmers - the majority in all income groups - were 
placed in group (a) as risk averters (see Table 7.1). 
TABLE 7.1 
CLASSIFICATION OF FARMERS BY ATTITUDE TO 
RISK AND LEVEL OF INCOME 
Income 
Group 
(Rs/yr) 
Risk 
averters 
Risk 
neutral 
Risk 
preferrers Total 
<2500 33 4 3 40 
2500-5000 21 5 1 27 
5000-10000 24 4 1 28 
>10000 10 5 1 16 
TOTAL 88 18 6 112 
Source; Field Surveyi 1975. 
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Proportionately, risk averters are lowest in the highest income group 
and could be considered as suggestive of the relationship coraraonly 
postulated between risk aversion and wealth/income level. However, the 
proportions in the other three income groups are not significantly different 
from each other; it is of course conceivable that the degree of risk 
aversion may decrease with wealth and that the method of grouping obscures 
these differences. 
It is particularly interesting to note that three farmers in the 
lowest income group showed risk preference; in two of these cases the risk 
preference was quite pronounced. It is perhaps due to the fact that at 
very low incomes, certain farmers may be prepared to accept 'unfair 
gambles' in their activities in the hope of obtaining a better income. 
7.1.3 Income Expectations 
As seen in previous sections, the crops that were seriously considered 
by the farmers for planting in their rubber holdings were almost always 
perennials. Such crops typically have long economic life spans, which in 
the case of tea and coconut for instance, are over 50 years. Quite often 
these expected life spans were well beyond the life expectations of many 
farmers. 
Methods for eliciting subjective probability distributions of yields, 
prices, etc., have been used by a number of research workers with a fair 
g 
degree of success (see Anderson, Dillon and Hardaker, 1976). 
However, such work has been confined to single time periods. The nature 
of perennial crops, which typically have a phase of rising yields after the 
initial immature period, followed by a slowly changing or stagnant phase 
and a final declining phase, makes it necessary for any economic analysis 
to have information on the expectations of yields, costs and prices for 
each time period. 
8 Anderson, J.R., Dillon, J.L. and Hardaker, J.B., op. cit. 
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However, as mentioned in Chapter 7, it was observed during the 
preliminary interviews prior to the field survey that attempts to obtain 
the probability distrlbutlona of the expectations for each year, over 
thirty years, was not only an extremely time consuming task but, and 
more importantly, was likely to yield data that would be Inaccurate and 
misleading. Thus in the field survey, three levels of expected net Incomes 
were ascertained from the farmers for the time periods into which they 
divided the 30 years (see Section 5.8). 
These three levels were (a) the most likely, (b) the highest and (c) 
the lowest expected net incomes in each period. In practice, farmers did 
not always specify different levels for each year; while different levels 
were given for certain years (particularly for the more familiar crops), 
generally the expectations obtained referred to longer periods. For 
example, one farmer gave these three levels for each year for rubber during 
the period of immaturity and for four years after beginning of tapping 
when he expected the 'most likely' revenues to go up steadily. From then 
on, he gave the same three levels for a period of ten years during which 
he expected the rubber trees to have reached peak yields. For a further 
five years, he expected yields to decline and then to stabilise at quite 
low levels; net revenues at the three levels were specified for each year 
during the declining phase while for the last five years only one value 
for each of the three levels were given. This same farmer, however, was 
not familiar with tea to the same extent as rubber; his expectations 
reflected this and the same levels were given for longer time periods -
only for the first five years (3 - immature, 2 - yielding) did he specify 
net income levels for each year. His net revenue expectations for rubber 
and tea over 30 years are shown in Figures 7.3(a) and (b). 
For the more familiar crops, most farmers held the view that the 
variability in the net income would come mostly from price fluctuations. 
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llcjwever, for LIKJ Lrss l.iiiiLliar crc>i>s, uii ct.'t 1. a i n l.y i c'j'.afdi Lhe prubaUie 
y i e l d l e v e l s was c o n s i d e r e d the more iiiiporlant f a c t o r in i n f l u e n c i u p , t h e i r 
net income e x p e c t a t i o n s . 
A.S e x p e c t a t i o n s were e l i c i t e d for net inccnues, farmers were asked 
what they meruit by net inconies. W h i l e those u s i n g h i r e d labour s a i d that 
i t r e f e r r e d to incoiiics net of a l l costs includinj j l a b o u r c o s t s , the farmers 
u s i n g family labour s a i d that it was inconiLJS net of purchased (or p a i d ) 
i n p u t s ; in the l a t t e r case they d id not deduct any va lue for t h e i r own 
labour i n p u t . 
Tliou|',h a l l farnn'ts were a c u t e l y con.'-;c i OILS of tlie current i n f l a t i o n , 
and i t s e f f e c t on t h e i r ' p r o f i t ' margins from r u b b e r , i t d id not appear 
to a f f e c t t h e i r future e x p e c t a t i o n s . Thus farmers who e x p e c t e d the 
current ( 19 75) rubber p r i c e s to c o n t i n u e , c o n s i d e r e d (when q u e s t i o n e d ) 
tliat they would o b t a i n the same net revenue f i f t e e n years from now, given 
the same y i e l d s ; th is impl ied of course that input costs would remain 
c o n s t a n t . I 'erhaps the farmers e x p e c t e d i n f l a t i o n to s u b s i d e s o o n , 
thouf^li they would not ex i ^ l ic i t ly agree that the current i n f l a t i o n was 
only short term. 
I'he degree of f a m i l i a r i t y with the croi^ and the n a t u r e of the 
s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y d is t rib ut ioiT impl ied by the h i g h , low and most 
l i k e l y net incomes appears to be r e l a t e d . If we assume that the three 
e x p e c t e d l e v e l s could be c o n s i d e r e d as the meaji and the two extreme v a l u e s 
of a t r i a n g u l a r d is t r ib ut i o n , then for rubber - wliich a l l farmers had 
e x p e r i e n c e w i t h - it n e a r l y always e x h i b i t e d p o s i t i v e s k e w n e s s . On the 
other h a n d , for t e a , when farmers had no p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e , the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n was often n e g a t i v e l y skewed ( s e c F i g u r e 7 . 4 ) . ( Th is was 
more so in ex i ) ectat ions about l e s s e r known c r o p s . ) 
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p r e f e r e n c e t o r p o s i L i v e l y skewed d i s L r i b u L i o n s . 
'J'be o b s e r v a L i o n s d u r i n g t h e f i e l d s u r v e v r e i n f o r c e d Llie a u L h o r ' s 
e x p e r i e n c e tha t ; r u b b e r s m a l l h o l d e r s f ; c n e r a L ] y show a h i pji depa 'ce of 
av . ' a r cnes s of t h e m a r k e t t r e n d s i n r u i i b c r . The imiiacL of t h e o i l p r i c e 
r i s e on t h e f i i t u r e [ p r o s p e c t s f o r ru!)hi. 'r , t h e ncj'.eU i a t i ons t h e n >inden;ay 
l o r a r u b b e r [ i r o d u e e r : . ' e a r t i ' l , e t c . , w e r e v;c 1 1 i:nown t o mc^st l a r i n e r s 
i r r e s i u ' c L i ve of Lhe int'oiv.e )_',roups. Compa r a t i vivl y s | ) e a k i n r , t h e n a t u r e of 
t h e p r o b l e m s of t h e w o r l d t e a m a r k e t w e r e r e l a t i v e l y unkncwn; e v e n t h o s e 
Hi rch l e i f e r , ci . cit. , p . 2 8 2 . 
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farmers planning to switch to tea showed a lesser awareness of its market 
prospects thougli there was a general feeling that the tea prices -
enjoying a boom at the time - would continue at high levels. 
Regarding higli yields from the recently bred rubber clones, many 
farmers expressed the view that they (the clones) would not perform 
significantly better than the more familiar high yielding varieties such 
as PB 86. The failure of certain clones recommended by the RRISL during 
the past decade appeared to be well known to many farmers; however, in 
the tea growing areas all farmers accepted that the vegetatively 
propagated (VP) tea would - provided it was properly cultivated and 
maintained - give far greater yields than the previously cultivated tea 
varieties. 
The reasons given for not even considering planting annual (seasonal) 
crops were many; however many farmers pointed out that due to climatic 
factors as well as due to pests and diseases, it was possible for the 
farmer to lose the entire crop and suffer a net loss, i.e., the lowest 
expected income could be negative. This aspect was further stressed in 
discussing the increase in petty thefts. With a perennial, it is almost 
inpossible to suffer a net loss - and this was reflected in the fact 
that (except for a single farmer who gave 'a substantial loss' as the 
lowest net income from cinnamon) all farmers had positive net incomes as 
the lowest expected incomes from perennials. 
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In this secUiou we shall apply the model developed in Chapter 3 for 
the replanting decision faced by a rubber smallholder to the survey data. 
First we shall consider its performance in predicting the farmers' 
decisions without considering the risks and uncertainties of the decision 
making environment. Then we shall proceed to see the effects of explicitly 
recognising the absence of certainty in the decision environment. Finally, 
all the results will be reviewed and the implications of the analysis will 
be drawn. 
7.2.1 Use of the Decision Model 
As described ab ove, the expected net incomes were ascertained for 
each time period at three levels: the highest, lowest and the most likely. 
The latter for any given time period could be treated as the expected 
value of the subjective probability distribution of the net incomes for that 
period, assuming that the farmer will treat this as the level of net income 
that can be expected in the absence of uncertainty. (For a more 
sophisticated analysis this can be considered as the mode of a triangular 
distribution with the highest and lowest values as its extreme values.) 
The choice of the proper discount rate to be used for discounting 
future revenues is an important problem in the absence of perfect capital 
markets (where the lending and borrowing rates would be approximately 
equal). The rural capital market is riddled with distortions and an 
array of Interest rates exists. Under such conditions the optimal 
production and consumption decisions cannot be separated from each other. 
Under these circumstances, the use of the subjective discount rate 
reflecting the time preference for consumption at different periods was 
considered generally appropriate, particularly as the methods of financing 
long term investments involve very little contact with the capital market 
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where the borrowing rates are extremely Uu^ On the other hand, for 
those high income farmers who can be considered to be net lenders, the 
safe lending rate would be the appropriate rate, and the rate of interest 
paid for long term deposits in the Banks was used in those instances where 
the subjective discount rate was lower than this Bank rate Csee Chapter 3 
for discussion of relevant discount rate under conditions of divergence 
between lending and borrowing rates). 
As different crops had different economic life spans, the income 
streams for a period of thirty years was considered in each case,^° and 
using the formulas given in Chapter 3, the net present value of each 
income stream (and the annuities) were calculated. 
In calculating these, the problem of ho^ f^ family labour should be 
valued came up. As mentioned earlier, farmers using family labour did 
not impute a value to their labour when giving their expected net incomes. 
In the analysis, family labour was imputed values at three rates: 100 per 
cent of the wage for casual labour (during the slack season for paddy), 
50 per cent of this wage rate and zero. It was observed that while the 
differences in the results obtained by imputing the latter two values were 
not great, in^uting 100 per cent of the wage rate resulted in negative 
net present values for most of the investments. The crucial importance 
of this aspect will be taken up later in the last section in reviewing the 
results. In the following discussions, the results based on valuing family 
labour at 50 per cent of the market wage rate qrtt used. 
With any reasonable rate of discount, the differences between 
considering a thirty-year time horizon or an infinite sequence of 
identical replacements is negligible. 
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7 . 2 . 2 Dec i s ion Rules f o r P r o f i t Maximisation and the Actual Decis ion 
The p r o f i t maximising dec i s i on rules f o r a smallholder in h i s cho ice 
of rep lant ing crop and the optimal replacement time ( f o r removing the 
present t rees and replant ing) were given in Chapter 3 . To r e c a p i t u l a t e 
b r i e f l y : 
(a) rep lant ing should be done using the crop which has the 
income stream g iv ing the highest net present value , and 
(b) replacement should be done when the expected net revenue 
from the e x i s t i n g trees (when they are in the phase of 
d e c l i n i n g y ie lds^^) f a l l s below the highest annuity 
expected from replant ing . 
The net present values of the 'most l i k e l y ' net income streams of 
replanted rubber and the other competing crops considered by the farmer 
were ca l cu la ted and these were then ranked in order . The actual choice 
of the farmer on the replanting crop and the predic ted crop (on the 
bas is of t h i s ranking) was then compared (Table 7 . 2 ) . 
The p r o f i t maximising dec is ion rule performs b e t t e r in pred i c t ing 
the ac tua l dec i s i ons of the smallholders in the higher income groups, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y in the highest income group. As the 'most l i k e l y ' net 
incomes were used we could a l so interpret th is as ind i ca t ing that the 
r i c h e r farmers come c l o s e r to behaving as ( r i sk neutra l ) expected p r o f i t 
maximisers. (See e a r l i e r d iscuss ion on r i sk at t i tudes of farmers in the 
d i f f e r e n t income groups. ) In comparison, the model performs quite poorly 
in p r e d i c t i n g the dec i s i ons of the lower income farmers. 
^^ This i s the necessary second order condit ion f o r the optimum. 
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TABLE 7.2 
CHOICE OF CROP:• COMPARISON OF PREDICTED 
AND ACTUAL CHOICES^^ 
Income 
group 
(Rs/yr) 
Correct Incorrect Total 
<2500 26 (55%)* 21 47 
2500-5000 16 (52%) 15 31 
5000-10000 21 (65%) 11 32 
>10000 15 (79%) 4 19 
TOTAL 78 (60%) 51 129 
Source: Field Survey, 1975. 
* Percentage of correct predictions in each 
income group given within brackets. 
Note: Family labour was valued at 50 per cent of 
the market wage rate. Results from valuing 
family labour at a zero rate were only 
marginally different (the number of correct 
predictions in the lower income groups were 
slightly lower). 
^^ The following were excluded from this and the next three tables: 
(a) those abandoning or not replanting mainly due to 
problems of ownership; 
(b) those basing their decisions on explicitly non-
income grounds, and 
(c) fourteen farmers for whom some of the necessary 
information (on expectations, subjective discount 
rates, etc.) were not available. 
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However, no such clear income-related difference in the predictive 
power of the profit maximising-decision rule on the replacement time 
can be discerned. The actual decision was correctly predicted on the 
average, in 80 per cent of the cases. In fact in the lowest income group 
it was even marginally better (Table 7.3) and suggests that risk is not 
important in this case. 
TABLE 7.3 
DECISION ON REPLACEMENT: COMPARISON OF PREDICTED 
AND ACTUAL DECISIONS 
Income 
group 
(Rs/yr) 
Correct Incorrect Total 
<2500 39 (83%)* 8 47 
2500-5000 24 (77%) 7 31 
5000-10000 25 (78%) 7 32 
>10000 15 (79%) 4 19 
TOTAL 103 (80%) 26 129 
Source: Field Survey, 19 75. 
* Percentage of correct predictions in each 
income group given within brackets. 
Note: Family labour was valued at 50 per cent of the 
market wage rate. Results were only marginally 
different when it was valued at zero rate. 
These contrasting results, apparently indicating contradictory 
conclusions for the smallholders' behaviour will be discussed later, 
after exploring the impact of risk on decision making in the next section, 
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7.2.3 Risk and Choice of Crop 
When farmers are not risk-neutral (i.e., their utility functions, 
of the Bemoullian type, are not linear), then their optimal economic 
decisions are affected not only by the likely outcomes, but also by the 
degree and nature of their variability. The literature on risk and its 
impact on peasant decision making has grown substantially during the past 
decade; in the present study we attempt to explore the impact of such 
risk on the farmers' long term investment decisions in relatively simple 
fashion. In this section, we shall look at how considerations of risk 
lead to deviations from the profit maximising rule in the actual decisions 
of the smallholders. 
In assessing the riskiness of the crops considered for planting 
from the point of view of the smallholder, we shall use the degree of 
variability suggested by the high, low and most likely net incomes for 
each year. Earlier it was mentioned that the subjective probability 
distributions of the net incomes exhibited some degree of skewness. 
When these are discounted to give three different net present values, the 
suggested probability distribution of the net present values also 
exhibits (generally) a similar skewness. 
Under such conditions, it is more likely that farmers (particularly 
the more risk averse farmers), would be more concerned about the 
downward deviation from the most likely value than about the general 
13 
variability of income. Lipton's (1968) concept that farmers operate 
on a survival algorithm designed to prevent incomes from falling below a 
critical minimum would suggest such a view. The recent theoretical 
^^ Lipton, M., 'The Theory of the Optimising Peasant', The Journal of 
Develo-pment Studies, Vol.4, No. 3, April 1968. 
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studies on risk analysis (Porter, 1974^^ and Fishbum, 1977^^) tend 
to support the view that a utility maximising person in a risky 
environment would be more concerned with the downward variability from 
average (mean) or a specified target income. On the basis of eii5)irical 
research conducted among the Indian farmers of Colombia, Ortiz (1967)^^ 
stated that -
He [the farmer] expects a certain range of variation and makes 
his original decision in terms of what he thinks vaguely is 
most likely to be his revenue and on what he thinks may be his 
lowest revenue. These were the two estimates farmers discussed 
among themselves. 
We shall use the level of the lowest net present value as a measure 
of the risk associated with a particular crop. Thus, if a crop A has 
a lowest net present value which lies below the lowest net present 
value of a crop B, then one will say that crop A is more risky than 
crop B. 
Table 7.4 examines the particular crops that farmers actually chose, 
classified by their 'most likely' net present value (hereafter referred 
to as MNPV) and their riskiness. 
From the following table, it is clear that where farmers chose a 
crop with a lower MNPV, it has been generally a less risky crop. This 
suggests a trade off between (mean) expected value and the riskiness of 
the crop and conforms to the type of behaviour expected from risk averters 
under conditions of uncertainty. While the majority of farmers in each 
^^ Porter, R.B., 'An Empirical Comparison of SD and E-V Portfolio Choice' 
American Economia Review, Vol.64. 
^ Fishbum, P.C., 'Mean-Risk Analysis with Risk Associated with Below-
Target Returns', American Economic Review ^ Vol.67, No.2, March 19 77. 
16 Ortiz, S., op. cit., p.216 
TABLE 7.4 
CROP CHOSEN BY THE FARMERS , CLASSIFIED BY 
COMPARED WITH 
THE 'MOST LIKELY' 
COMPETING CROPS 
NPV AND ITS RISKINESS 
Income 
group 
(Rs/yr) 
Higher NPV 
Higher risk 
Higher NPV 
Lower risk 
Lower NPV 
Lower risk 
Lower NPV 
Higher risk Total 
<2500 7 (2) 19 (1) 17 4 47 
2500-5000 4 12 11 4 (1) 31 
5000-10000 5 (1) 16 9 2 32 
>10000 7 (1) 8 4 0 19 
TOTAL 23 55 41 10 129 
Source: Field Survey, 19 75. 
Note: (i) Family labour was valued at 50 per cent of market wage rate. 
(ii) 'Riskiness' was compared with crop with closest NPV. 
(iii) Figures in brackets refer to the risk preferrers (grouped 
on the basis of the shape of the elicited utility functions) 
K) o 
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income group opted for crops with a higlier MNPV and lower risk, it must 
not be forgotten that not all farmers had a choice between a higli MNPV, 
low risk crop and ^ low I'D^ IPV, low risk crop; quite often the choice was 
between a higli MNPV, higli risk crop and a low MNPV, low risk crop. In 
the former case, for all rational farmers the high MNPV, low risk crop 
would be preferable. However, in the latter case there is significant 
room for a trade off between riskiness and the most likely income level. 
Most of the 55 farmers who chose a high MNPV, low risk crop were choosing 
to replant with rubber in the non-tea growing areas, while many of those 
choosing higli MNPV, high risk, were opting for tea. Those choosing lower 
MNPV, low risk crops were, in many cases, choosing rubber in preference 
to tea. 
It is noted that ten farmers chose crops with lower MNPV and higher 
risk. While this may be rational for risk preferring farmers, it is 
plainly irrational for risk averters. Only one risk preferring farmer 
was found in this group. One explanation is that these farmers may have 
important objectives not directly related to incomes. On the other hand, 
it is also possible that the rather crude and simple measure of riskiness 
may have overstated the riskiness of the crop as perceived by the farmer. 
Thus from these results we may conclude that many farmers actively 
consider risk in their decision making (in choosing a crop) and act as 
risk averters. This supports the inferences regarding farmers' risk 
attitudes drawn on the basis of the elicited utility functions. Tliis would 
suggest that the use of information derived from such elicited utility 
functions would be justified in more detailed studies of the impact of risk 
on farmers' decisions, particularly if the time periods involved in the 
decision problem are not very long. (If the time periods are long, then 
information from these functions can be used only under restrictive assumptions 
regarding the nature of farmers' preferences.) 
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1 . l . h Risk and the Replacement Date 
In Chapter 3 i t was shown that m d e r r i sk the optimal replacement 
date would deviate from the p r o f i t maximising replacement date depending 
on the r i s k a t t i tudes of the dec i s i on maker; a r isk averter would further 
delay the replacement date while a r i sk p r e f e r r e r would br ing i t f orvard . 
In Table 7 .5 we look more c l o s e l y at the replacement dec i s i on . 
(The annuity (A) was ca l cu lated from the MNPV.) In the case where NR > A, 
the c o r r e c t p r o f i t maximising dec i s i on i s to keep the e x i s t i n g trees and 
where NR < A, I t i s to replace them. While i t i s impossible to say 
whether i t i s optimal or not f o r a r i sk averter not to replace when 
NR < A without greater information on the sub j e c t i ve probab i l i ty d i s t r i -
bution of the expected net incomes and h i s degree of r isk avers ion, i t i s 
l i k e l y that at least f or some of the r isk averters i t may be optimal to 
delay replacement. (S imi lar ly replac ing when NR > A could be optimal 
f o r a r i s k p r e f e r r e r only - however, this i s not necessar i l y so but i t 
would a l so depend on the above f a c t o r s . ) 
Interpret ing Table 7.5 on the bas is of the above d i s cuss ion , some of 
the f i f t e e n farmers re fus ing to replace even though NR< A may be act ing 
optimally as could be the r i sk pre fe r r ing farmer deciding to replant even 
though NR > A. However, given the fac t that the p r o f i t maximising rule 
was capable of c o r r e c t l y pred i c t ing 80 per cent of the cases , e x p l i c i t 
cons iderat ions of r i sk in the dec i s ion model could have, at b e s t , only 
made a marginal improvement. 
TABLE 7.5 
ACTUAL REPLACEMENT DECISION AND THE PROFIT MAXIMISING DECISION RULE 
Income 
group 
(Rs/yr) 
NR > A NR < A 
Total 
Replace Keep Replace Keep 
<2500 3 6 33 (3) 5 47 
2500-5000 2 3 21 (1) 5 31 
5000-10000 3 1 24 (1) A 32 
>10000 3 (1) 0 15 1 19 
TOTAL 11 10 9 3 15 129 
Source: Field Survey, 19 75. 
Note; (a) Family labour was valued at 50 per cent of 
the market wage rate. 
(b) Figures within brackets refer to risk preferrers, 
NJ o 
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Since in the analysis of the choice of crop it was concluded that 
risk plays an important role in the farmers' decision making, it w i l l be 
useful at this point to discuss why risk considerations are apparently 
quite unimportant in the replacement decision. 
At least part of the explanation may lie in the method of 
exploitation of the rubber trees and the shape of the resulting yield 
pattern over time, which in turn would (together with price) largely 
determine the net income pattern. 
Rubber yields remain comparatively high when tapping is being done 
on the first or second renewal bark, once the virgin bark has been tapped 
to exhaustion. However, with most of the widely planted clonal varieties , 
once the second renewal bark is also exhausted, yields plunge down 
sharply, and can be raised (for a short period of time) only by highly 
intensive 'slaughter tapping' which is normally done in anticipation of 
replacement. The shape of the net revenue function (based on the 
assumption of a constant price) for rubber, under a fairly intensive 
system of tapping (which may be close to 'typical ' smallholder conditions), 
is shown in Figure 7 . 5 . ^ ^ 
When the subjective probability distribution is superimposed on the 
figure (as shown in the right edge of the figure) , T^, T^^ and T ^ would 
18 
show the optimal replacement time for a (risk-neutral) profit maximiser, 
a risk averter and a risk preferrer (the actual positions of T and T rd. rp 
would depend on their degree of risk aversion or preference; see Chapter 3) 
^^ Figure from: Jayasuriya, S . K . W . , The Dynamic Replacement Problem in 
the Rubber Industry of Sri Lanka, Development Studies Centre, Australian 
National University, 19 76. 
^^ More correctly he would decide to slaughter tap in anticipation of 
replacement. 
FMGURE 7 . 5 
E F F E C T OF R I S K A T T I T U D E S ON 
R U B B E R R E P L A C E M E N T T I M E 
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However, owing to the steepness of the slope of the net revenue curve, 
even a substantial variation in the risk attitude (or a quite high 
variability in the subjective probability distribution of annuities) 
would not lead to a significant difference between the three replacement 
19 
dates which would lie close together. 
From a different point of view, this can be interpreted as implying 
that the optimal replacement date is very insensitive to quite significant 
changes in the discount rate (or other factors affecting the annuity). 
Under these conditions the risk attitude of a person does not 
significantly alter the optimal replacement date from that of a risk neutral 
profit maximiser. The replacement date is , to a large extent, determined 
by the technique of exploitation (tapping). It is only when the 
expectations of future returns are very low, or (more likely in the present 
instance) where the discount rates are very high, that replacement may be 
delayed beyond this time. Whether very low yields could yield a positive 
net revenue would depend on the rubber price prevailing and the type of 
labour used, and it is more likely that farmers using family labour may 
be able to obtain such acceptable incomes. Thus it is not accidental 
that those farmers deciding to tap on were mostly from the lowest income 
groups and were using family labour. It was generally only where 
ownership problems, etc . , existed that the decision to continue tapping 
was made in other cases. 
^^ Results that can be interpreted in similar fashion were obtained in 
a Monte-Carlo simulation of a rubber replacement model using Malaysian 
data (see Etherington, D.M. and Jayasuriya, S .K .W . , 1976). 
212 
7.2.5 Sub-jective Valuation of Labour 
It was previously mentioned that those smallholders who used 
predominantly family labour in their farm operations and replanting work 
usually tended to be low income farmers, and consequently also to have high 
subjective discount rates for money incomes. When the market wage rate 
(even the lower wage rate prevailing in the non-paddy seasons) was imputed 
to family labour, this raised the costs in the early years substantially 
even though the replanting subsidy covered most of the actual cash expenses. 
At the same time, the high subjective discount rates lowered the net present 
value of the future income stream from the replanted crop. In a large 
number of such cases, the result was negative net present values for the 
(most likely) income streams from the crop actually chosen for replanting. 
Tables 7.6(a), (b) and (c) illustrate this for a farmer who had chosen 
' to replant with high yielding rubber, and shows how the value imputed to 
family labour is crucial in determining the net present value and the 
optimal replacement time. In this example, the replanting subsidy is 
considered sufficient to cover the cash component of the replanting expenses. 
The present income from the existing trees is Rs.250/year (without any 
deductions for the cost of family labour used in tapping). 
If the family labour input is valued at the market wage rate, then as 
shown in Table 7.6(c), it would be irrational for the farmer to replant 
with rubber. And since the cost of tapping labour per year (200 days at a 
wage of Rs.3.25 per day) is Rs.650, even tapping the existing trees would 
entail a net loss of Rs.400 per year. Obviously rubber is a highly 
unattractive crop for him. 
When the cost of family labour is imputed at 50 per cent of the market 
wage rate, continuing to tap the present trees would result in a net loss 
of Rs.75 per year as tapping costs would be Rs.325 per year. As he can 
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obtain Rs.59 from replanted rubber as an annual annuity, it will be correct 
for him to replant now with rubber (provided of course that replanting with 
the other possible crops does not give higher annuities). The same is 
true when family labour is valued at zero; replanting gives an annual 
annuity of Rs.322 which is greater than the revenue obtainable from tapping 
the present trees (Rs.250). 
TABLE 7.6(a) 
ESTIMATED LABOUR INPUT (PER ACRE, IN MAN DAYS) 
FOR REPLANTING AND MAINTENANCE OF RUBBER UNTIL 
COMMENCEI-IENT OF TAPPING 
Year Labour 
(in man days) 
1 ICQ 
2 35 
3 20 
A 20 
5 20 
Source; Field Survey, 1975. 
It is not possible to establish the subjective valuation of family 
labour of any individual farmer without information about the farmers' 
income-leisure preferences (and also possible differences between 
attitudes to work on own farm and outside the farm). Particularly where 
market imperfections exist (and there exist differences in attitude between 
hiring one's labour and working on one's own farm) the market wage rate 
is a poor guide to the 'cost' of family labour as subjectively perceived. 
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The importance of direct information on this, for the analysis of 
individual farmer's investment decisions, became clear as the analysis 
proceeded. It was not possible to again interview the farmers and 
attempt to obtain direct estimates of their subjective valuation of 
family labour due to time and financial constraints; in principle, 
however, it seems likely that questioning procedures similar to those 
used in the elicitation of time preference and risk attitudes can be 
adapted to obtain such estimates through investigation of income-
leisure preferences. 
In addition to the relative endowments of capital and labour on each 
farm, other considerations such as 'social status' are likely to influence 
these attitudes. In the absence of actual information on individual 
farmers' subjective valuation of labour we are constrained to discuss 
this in only general terms and to explore the implications of such 
discussion in the light of observed behaviour. 
214 
TABLE 7.6(b) 
ESTIMATED (MOST LIKELY) NET REVENUES (NR) -
WITH FAMILY LABOUR VALUED AT DIFFERENT RATES 
Year NR(1) NR(2) NR(3) 
1 -650 -325 
2 -227 -113 
3 -130 -65 
4 -130 -65 
5 -130 -65 
6 400 -250 75 
7 600 -50 275 
8 800 150 475 
9 1000 350 675 
10 1500 • 850 1175 
20 
• 
1500 850 
• 
1175 
21 1000 350 675 
22 800 150 475 
23 600 -50 275 
24 1500 850 1175 
25 800 150 475 
27 150 -500 -175 
28 • • 
• 
29 • • • 
30 130 -500 -175 
Calculations based on: 
NR(1) - family labour valued at zero. 
- " " " " market wage rate. 
NR(3) - " " " " market wage rate. 
Daily wage rate for a labourer = Rs.6.50/day. 
Daily wage rate for a rubber tapper = Rs.3.25/day/acre. 
Number of tapping days per year = 200 days. 
(g) Replanting subsidy covers all cash expenses on replanting, 
(h) No intercropping. 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
(f) 
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TABLE 7.6(c) 
LEVEL OF (HIGHEST) EXPECTED ANNUITY 
OF REPLACEMENT DECISION 
Family 
labour 
valued 
at: 
Highest 
annuity 
(Rs/yr) 
Tapping 
existing 
trees* 
(Rs/yr) 
Replacement 
decision 
0 322 250 Replace now 
Market wage -205 -400 Do not 
replace 
50% of market 
wage 59 -75 Replace now 
* Assuming Rs.250/year/acre net revenue (without deducting cost of 
family labour) from present trees. 
First we will look at the different methods used in replanting with 
the high yielding varieties of rubber by farmers receiving the replanting 
subsidy. As certain inputs have to be purchased in the market (planting 
material, fencing material, fertilisers, etc.), it is mainly in type of 
labour used that differences emerge. We have seen earlier (see Table 
6.1:0 that, typically, high income farmers tend to use more hired labour 
while low income farmers use family labour. We can interpret this in 
terms of the subjective valuation of family labour using a familiar 
diagram from production economics. (See Figure 7.6.) 
In the figure, RR is the locus of different combinations of family 
labour and cash expenditure (which will be used to hire labour) that will 
be necessary to replant and maintain one acre of high yielding rubber. 
The slopes of A B and A,B. represent different subjective valuations of ^ 0 0 1 1 
family labour by the farmer in money terms; the steeper slope of A^B^ 
shows that the farmer in this case values his family labour more highly 
in money terms than the farmer whose subjective valuation is given by the 
slope of The optimum combinations for the two farmers are given by 
l - l i c [ ) o i n l . s ( ) | I . i i i i ' L ' n l y o l K K w i l l i A U . i i u i A 1 1 , w i i i c l i a n ' X a n d X CI o I 1 o I 
r e s p c c t . L v e i y . T h i s s h o w s LhaL l l i r f a r n i c r " v.-L t h a h i j ' j u ' r s u b j o c l i v e 
v a h i a L i o n o f r a i n i l y l a b o u r v ises a I o w l t aiiioMnt. o l f a m i l v l a b o u r Lhan 
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labour. This is linked also to the fact that there would be social 
pressure on the better-off farmer to use hired labour on his own holding, 
as engaging in manual labour on most activities (except, perhaps, paddy) 
by such a farmer would be interpreted as a sign that he is a 'miser'. 
The manner in which the income-leisure preferences of the farmer 
influence the optimal investment decision in an intertemporal context can 
be explored using a simple two period model, where we assume that the 
investment involves only family labour. 
Consider a farmer having an intertemporal utility function U = U 
(y^j Zj^ ) where y^, y^ and z^, z^ represent the income and leisure 
in the first and second time periods (with income standing as a proxy for 
20 
consumption). Let the farmer have productive opportunities for the 
transformation of his leisure in the first period into income in the next 
period such that y = ^^^ where and are the labour inputs in 21 the first and second periods respectively. We will assume that the income 
in the first period is a constant y for the sake of simplicity. L and L, o o 1 
are the total leisure time available in the two periods. 
Then the optimising problem can be set up as a problem of constrained 
maximisation of the utility function U, subject to the following constraints; 
z = L - 1 o o o 
= h -
y^ = V 
20 
We shall assume that this utility function has the usual properties 
of quasi concavity and twice differentiability. 
21 This production function is assumed to show diminishing marginal 
productivity and to be differentiable. 
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higher Lh.in Lhat of Lhe second farmer. I'oinLs A and 13, showing Llie poinLs 
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satisfy Lhe condition 1 given above lor the Lwo farmers. And the farmers 
reach Lhe highesL attainable indifference curves at these points. 
lhe first farmer will give up leisure (su[)ply labour) in the first 
period equal to second fanner will give up Leisure (supply 
labour) equal Lo I'.l. ('I'L ). 'Ihus a fanner under conditions where Lhe 1 J 1 o 
ciipacity to use labour to gain present incomes is restricted or where the 
rates of return to such labour in the present period are low may find 
himself in a situation where he would be prepared Lo sacrifice a large 
amount of leisure now in order to obtain incomes in the fuLur(_'. Condi Lions 
of un- and underemployment would cfmceivably produce such situations, 
[)ai t icu 1 arly if future inc(.nnes from t'Lher sources Lhan this investment are 
expected to be lev;. This may also be the case when an industrious farmer 
hopes to aLLaJn a high income Icivel in Lhe fuLure: (provided productive 
investment opporLuniL1es of this type exist) hls'presenL leisure/fuLure 
Income' preferences Lend to make him supply relaLively large amounts of 
labour for such invesLmtnUs compared with a 'lazy' fanner in the same 
pos i t i on. 
At this point it may be useful to consider the other problem 
raised by the time preference attitudes of the farmers. 
Research workers who have attempted to elicit directly the rates 
of time preference among farmers in less developed countries have found 
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22 these rates to be very high. So O'Mara , using a similar technique 
to the one employed in the present study., found a median rate of 50 per 
cent in a sample of Mexican farmers. And as previously mentioned 
(Section 7.1.1), the rates found in this study were also comparatively 
high. 
Such high rates of time preference seem, at first glance, to imply 
the exclusion of the possibility of farmers undertaking long term 
investments. In fact, some writers have asserted that this is the case; 
these low income farmers are unable to take the 'long term view' and 
23 
therefore cannot be induced to undertake long term investments. 
Yet millions of small farmers in less developed countries do 
undertake such investments through the planting and replanting of 
perennial tree crops. This raises the question: do the high rates of 
time preference obtained using various elicitation techniques actually 
express the farmers' time preference attitudes? 
Some researchers appear to answer this question in the negative; thus 
2 A 
O'Mara in his analysis of farmers' decisions uses a lower, arbitrary, 
uniform rate of 15 per cent. In justification he advances two arguments: 
(a) the uncertainty factor might have biased the rate upwards and (b) 
farmers do not make full use of institutional credit available at much 
lower interest rates. 
In this study an attempt has been made to exclude the factor of 
uncertainty from influencing the implied time preference rate (Section 5.6) 
However it is possible that some bias may still have been introduced; 
again the relatively simple questioning procedure may have introduced 
^^ O'Mara (1971), op.cit. 
^^ Rogers, E.M. (1969), op.cit, 
^^ O'Mara (1971), op.cit. 
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25 some bias. Yet, even if an allowance is made for a degree of upward 
bias in the rates obtained, it is not possible to ignore the fact that 
they are still remarkably high. And there is evidence that farmers do 
borrow money at very high rates of interest; the low degree in the use 
of institutional credit, nominally available at lower interest rates 
can be attributed to many factors other than a mere 'reluctance' to 
borrow (see Section 4.2). 
Here the problem arises as to whether it is appropriate to use the 
subjective discount rate, derived from a comparison of preferences 
between points of time separated by only a single year, in discounting 
income flows generated over decades. 
There is no a priori reason to believe that the appropriate 
subjective discount rate is invariant over different time periods; 
there exist considerable grounds for believing that this is, in 
fact, not the case. The rate of time preference is affected not only 
by the level of present income, but also by the expected income, the 
expected level of essential (subsistence) expenditure, the possible 
variability of income in each period, and so on. These are unlikely to 
be identical over a long period of time. At present, able-bodied 
farmers can expect that their capacity to obtain incomes later in life is 
likely to decrease and also, perhaps, be less certain. In such cases the 
relevant subjective discount rate is likely to be lower than that implied 
from time preference attitudes derived from the comparison of the incomes 
of two successive years. (This would also be the case when future 
essential expenses are expected to rise.) 
^^ Thus it is conceivable that the rate of time preference for the family 
(as an institution of a certain type) may well be lower than the (elicited) 
rate for a single individual. 
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Secondly, much of the analytical work which gives rise to an 
apparent paradox between the high time preference rates of farmers and 
their undertaking of long term investments has implicitly assumed that 
the farmers' utility functions have only a single attribute - (money) 
incomes. This, particularly under conditions of market imperfection, can 
be misleading. Thus, from the simple two period model discussed earlier 
we can show that including leisure in the utility function introduces 
another element into the comparison of present and future situations; 
the rate of time preference (for incomes) is not necessarily equal to 
the marginal rate of substitution between present leisure and future 
26 income. 
This has an important implication, particularly under conditions of 
un- and underemployment: the existence of high time preference for present 
(versus future) consumption among farmers does not necessarily preclude the 
possibility of them undertaking long term investments. In the literature 
dealing with the attitudes of low income farmers of the less developed 
countries and the implications of these for investments, it has been widely 
asserted that only investments yielding extremely high rates of return would 
be attractive to the farmers. As such investment opportunities are rare, 
if not non-existent, the chances of farmers undertaking long term 
investments are indeed slim, according to this line of argument. 
Let a farmer's marginal rates of substitution among present income 
(y ), future income (y^) and present leisure (1^) be denoted by 
and r / . Then, y 1 1 ^O o o 
R, = R . R. 
lo ^o 
y, yi Yi 
R is the rate of time preference (for incomes). Clearly R ^ R 
^o y, o 
because of the term unless the latter is unity. 
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However, the high rates of time preference in fact relate to 
consumption or to cash incomes where such cash incomes can be considered 
as a proxy for consumption, i . e . , it is a monetary calculation with all 
its limitations in the context of a family farm. Given their attitudes 
(and the fact that cash is the most scarce commodity), it is understandable 
that such farmers would be reluctant to invest large amounts of cash in 
long term investments. However, i f suitable opportunities exist , the 
chances that farmers would undertake long term investments that mainly 
involve expenditure of family labour would be greater, particularly where 
un- and underemployment (even seasonally) creates conditions where the 
value of leisure could be considered by the farmers as being relatively 
low. 
As previously mentioned, the demand for labour in rubber growing 
villages tends to have seasonal peaks owing to the seasonal demand for 
labour on paddy f ields . The manner in which those smallholders using 
family labour on farm operations attempted to reconcile their desire for 
incomes both now and in the future by allocating their labour in order to 
find optimum satisfaction under these conditions shows that their actual 
behaviour conforms to the above pattern. 
A l l the farmers were unanimous that they 'w i l l not have time' to 
engage in replanting work during the paddy seasons; this was the period 
when work was most plentifully available and wage rates were highest. On 
the other hand, in the slack season little work was available; many of the 
farmers were also reluctant to do the type of manual labour that could be 
generally done in these periods. Working in paddy lands, even though paid 
in money wages (though sometimes, in k ind ) , is not considered a menial task 
whereas this is not always the case with other manual work. The returns in 
terms of the present income available during the paddy season were high 
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enough to warrant near total withdrawal of labour from other occupations, 
by all farmers. 
The attitude towards work during the slack season also reflected the 
desire for present incomesj those farmers who were prepared to work as 
hired labourers stated that as far as possible they would attempt to 
minimise the loss of possible opportunities for work as hired labourers 
by doing the replanting work on 'free' days. No farmer having regular of^ 
farm employment contemplated working on his holding (except for a day or 
two if absolutely essential), if such work meant that he would lose pay. 
However, these farmers acknowledged that they would try to work on holidays, 
etc., whereby they could work on replantings without loss of current income. 
This desire that work on long term investment projects should not 
greatly interfere with current incomes was given as one reason why many 
smallholders rejected tea. Unlike rubber where the work could be 
arranged in a flexible manner so as to minimise conflicts with paddy 
cultivation, other outside occupations, etc., according to the farmers, 
tea demands continuous attention and the inability to give that may affect 
the growth and yields severely. 
We can say then that the ideal long term investments for peasant 
farmers living under conditions of un- and/or under employment 
(particu larly seasonal underemployment) would be those that would allow 
the farmer to supply family labour during the slack agricultural season, 
and where the timing of labour inputs can be comparatively flexible. The 
attraction of rubber for many smallholders in Sri Lanka lies in its 
satisfying these requirements. 
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7.2.6 Replanting Subsidy 
This also brings out the Important role of the replanting subsidy. 
Without the replanting subsidy, the net present values of both tea and 
rubber In the case of almost all the farmers (except some In the highest 
income group) became negative. In the case of the lower Income farmers, 
Its most Important effect Is that It eliminates or lowers the cash costs 
and thus reduces the problem of replanting to one of Investment of family 
labour. For higher Income farmers. It reduces the cash costs of 
establishment sufficiently so that the annuities generated are positive 
and sufficiently high to warrant replanting (as the discount rates were 
generally lower among these farmers). 
The Investment opportunities open to the farmer are, in general, 
discrete. Where the necessary funds to undertake a particular Investment 
cannot be obtained under acceptable conditions, such investments will not 
be undertaken. Replanting with rubber, tea, etc., can be considered such an 
investment, and the Importance of the replanting subsidies derives from 
these conditions. If the rubber replanting subsidy was absent, such 
replanting would not have been undertaken by many low and medium income 
farmers. On the other hand, when it was available, many farmers, 
including even some low income farmers, planned to spend a part of their 
current Income on replanting work to meet the total cash costs of such 
replanting (Table 0.18). Many of the farmers using family labour were 
prepared to invest a considerable amount of unpaid family labour; however 
such farmers could not have undertaken replanting if the subsidy was not 
available. This means that the replanting subsidy in effect draws out 
resources - capital and labour - that may otherwise have been utilised for 
unproductive activities. 
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Tlie replanting subsidy therefore plays the ro le of inducing savings 
and investments from groups of farmers. Tlie net benef i ts of the 
replanting subsidy includes this mobil isation of funds and labour that 
may otherwise have remained untapped, l l i is i s an aspect that should not 
be ignored in any assessment of the economics of the replanting subsidies . 
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CHAPTER 8 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In many less developed countries of the world, smallholder fainners 
are engaged in the cultivation of perennial cash crops. As such crops 
experience declining yields with advancing age, these farmers periodically 
face the problem of asset renewal, which can be generally considered as a 
long term investment problem. This study of the rubber smallholders of 
Sri Lanka was concerned with the nature of the decision problem and the 
structure of the decision-making process facing such a group of farmers. 
8.1 Historical Development of Smallholder Rubber 
In the course of the study, the historical development of cash 
cropping and the smallholder sector of the rubber industry was investi-
gated with the objective of establishing the nature of the decision 
problem and the decision-making environment at different stages. The Sri 
Lankan smallholder of today typically possesses a sophisticated 
appreciation of the factors that have to be considered in deciding to 
invest in a cash crop and in particular is familiar with the workings of 
the market with its ups and downs, as a result of this long historical 
exposure to the market beginning with the development of cash cropping in 
the 19th century. 
The development of such cash cropping, beginning with the smallholder 
coffee industry and the subsequent establishment of coconut and rubber 
smallholdings, in many ways closely paralleled developments in many other 
parts of the world. The initial impetus to the establishment of rubber 
smallholdings came, quite involuntarily, from the large plantations in 
the first years of this century, and in the first two decades the 
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smallholdings sector expanded rapidly through a process of extending the 
cultivated area. In this period, the conditions favouring such an 
expansion were many; establishment costs were low while the expected 
returns were very high, and suitable land was in good supply. 
The growth of these rubber smallholdings was stimulated by, and in 
turn contributed to, the increasing monetisation and commercialisation of 
the rural economy in this period. Owing to the conditions prevailing at 
the time, the gestation lag involved in planting rubber did not assume 
any great importance. In the circumstances, the large scale movement of 
peasants and small scale investors into rubber cultivation was a 'rational' 
response to the market opportunities that opened up before them. 
8.2 Problem of Replanting 
However, conditions had changed substantially from those at the time 
of initial plantings, when the rubber smallholders for the first time 
confronted the problem of large scale asset renewal in the aftermath of 
the Second World War. The terms of trade for rubber in relation to 
subsistence goods had deteriorated. As the land frontier had been almost 
closed for extension of the land area under rubber, new plantings were 
no longer a viable proposition on any significant scale. Demographic 
changes, in particular a sharp reduction in death rates was accelerating 
the rate of population growth and increasing the pressure on land. 
However, the appearance of high yielding clonal varieties with the promise 
of unprecedentedly high yield levels and the optimism generated about 
future rubber prices in the wake of the 1950-51 price boom created the 
conditions where the Rubber Replanting Subsidy Scheme initiated by the 
Government in 1953 scored some spectacular initial successes in inducing a 
large proportion of rubber producers, including smallholders, to replant. 
I l l 
B.3 'IWo Types oi" Rubber SmallholdGrH 
Both field observations and the results of the analysis suggest 
that the nature and structure of decision making among smallholders were 
strongly influenced by their level of income. Within the four income 
groups into which the smallholders in the sample were grouped, the most 
striking differences emerged between those in the highest (>RalO,000 per 
year) and the lowest (<Rs2,500 per year) groups. 
As indicated in Chapter 5, the distribution of smallholders by 
income in the sample does not correspond to the actual distribution 
within the population; the proportion of lower income farmers is much 
greater. In view of the pronounced differences between farmers at the 
two extremes of the income scale, it is useful to concentrate on those two 
groups and to draw out the implications of their behaviour for policy 
formulation. 
The typical low income (poor) smallholder owns a small area of rubber 
(<2 acres), little or no non-rubber land and lives at or near a 
subsistence income level. His off-farm income sources are meagre and 
consequently his dependence on rubber income is high. He typically relies 
on family labour in his farm operations. 
In contrast, the typical higher income smallholder owns considerably 
more rubber as well as non-rubber lands. Among the latter, he is likely 
to have paddy (and also coconut) lands that meet his consumption needs. 
His non-rubber and off-farm incomes are substantial and the dependency on 
rubber income is relatively low. As he also tends to cwn more than one 
plot of rubber, when the replanting problem is considered this means that 
he is able to forgo the income from a single plot of rubber fairly 
comfortably.^ He mainly uses hired labour in his farm operations. His 
higher income level allows him to be, generally, a net saver and also to 
enjoy better access to institutional sources of credit. 
^ The question of replanting all or even most of the plots of rubber 
at the same time does not normally arise because generally the trees 
in different plots are of different ages. 
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The existence of two groups with such dissimilar characteristics 
within the rubber sniallholder sector is not a recent phenomenon. As the 
historical investigation revealed, from the earliest period rubber 
smallholdings were established by two distinct groups; these were the 
peasants who were moving into cash cropping and the small scale 
investors who had cash savings that they wished to invest in cash crop 
smallholdings. This is, however, not to imply that the two groups 
existing today had different historical origins and are the descendants 
of the above two groups; while the evidence is scanty, it is likely that 
changes in ownership, and the fortunes of different smallholders over the 
period would have taken place. But the important point is that at all 
stages of its history, the smallholder sector has contained two such 
groups with distinct differences between them. 
8.4 Nature of Investment 
The analysis of survey data reveals how these intergroup differences 
are expressed in the input mix of the investments, as well as in other 
aspects of decision making. With the exception of the management input, 
nearly all other inputs of the better-off farmer, including labour, are 
purchased in the market, whereas the main input of the poor farmer is 
unpaid family labour. In other words, while replanting is a money (cash) 
investment for the better-off farmer, it is essentially a 'labour 
investment' for the low income farmer. 
This is a most important difference. In essence, the investment 
decision of the better-off farmers does not differ from that usually 
discussed in the literature on investment decisions. When money income 
can be reasonably assumed to be a homogeneous consumption good which can 
stand as a proxy for all consumption, the investment decision reduces to 
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one of optimum intertemporal allocation of such incomes in conformity 
with one's time preference (for consumption) attitudes in the context of 
the given constraints including the available investment opportunities. 
Where all consumption goods can be freely traded in the market, this 
approach does not pose any major problems. However, the fact that the 
major input of the low income farmers is their own family labour creates 
difficulties for this approach in analysing the investment decisions of 
such farmers. While it is true that a market for labour exists in the 
rural areas, since family labour used on the home farm is an untraded 
good, no 'objective' method of measurement of its value exists. While 
imputing a 'shadow price' to such labour may be useful for analysis from 
a social point of view, there is no necessary or established connection 
between this and the farmer's own valuation of it. It is thus not 
applicable to the problem of understanding the actual decision-making 
2 
process of the farmer himself. As Chayanov pointed out in discussing the 
subjective equilibrium of family farms, the relevant valuation here is the 
subjective valuation of the farmer himself. And this would vary among the 
farmers depending on a host of factors such as the type of work, level of 
income, family size, etc. 
As the analysis of the survey data with the asset replacement 
model showed, when the market price of labour is imputed to family labour 
many of the economic decisions of such farmers appear to be quite 
irrational, but when such labour is valued at other, low prices, such 
decisions appear quite rational. 
^ Chayanov, A.V., op. oit. 
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8.5 Intertemporal Analysis of Investment on a Family Farm 
In the course of the analysis it was found that the long term 
investment decision of these low income farmers was better analysed by 
postulating an intertemporal utility maximising model where the utility 
function contained, in addition to money income, family labour (or 
leisure) as a component. This makes the approach an extension of that 
used by Nakajima (1969), Fisk (1964) and Sen (1966)^ who analysed the 
single period decision problems of family farms, with much weight being 
given to the family labour-leisure calculation. On the basis of a simple 
two-period model it was shown that the observed behaviour of such farmers 
could be readily explained with such an approach. In particular, this 
offers a solution to the apparent paradox of low income farmers with high 
time preference for present consumption being nevertheless motivated to 
undertake long term investment decisions. 
Consumption comprises two components; that arising from cash incomes 
and that from 'leisure' use, or more properly, all the activities included 
under this catch-all category. That is, the investment decision involves 
not only the question of present consumption from present cash incomes 
versus future consumption from future cash incomes (arising from 
investment of a part of present cash income); it is also a question of 
whether and to what extent present consumption in the form of leisure hours 
might be sacrificed as an investment to enable an increment of future cash 
income to be obtained. 
^ (a) Nakajima, C., op. cit. 
(b) Fisk, E.K., op. cit. 
(c) Sen, A.K., op. ait. 
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This suggests an alternative structure of decision-making available, 
by necessity perhaps, to the poorer smallholders. This, as the survey 
showed, is by no means complete - this group does have cash costs in 
replanting. But it is an important contribution of the replanting 
subsidy that, by covering all or most of this cash component, it does 
give the smallholder in this group greater freedom to allocate his present 
leisure to replanting, as he typically appears to have done. We would 
lean towards the hypothesis that in this sense the replanting subsidy has 
contributed towards a more equal performance of this relatively 
disadvantaged group (in comparison with the better-off smallholders). 
Clearly, poorer smallholders will prefer to minimise their cash involvement 
in replanting because of their pressing current commitments. The subsidy 
assists in this process, and family labour gives a flexibility to this 
group which has not been appropriately recognised. 
Thus the two groups of farmers, even when they arrive at the same 
decision, do so on the basis of a different decision process. While the 
decision may be the same under the present set of circumstances, we would 
strongly suggest that without the subsidy, this underlying difference 
could result in divergent decisions by the two groups. Future changes may 
well result in such divergences. Thus, for example, if inflation drives 
up the cost of those inputs that have to be necessarily purchased in the 
market with cash and if the replanting subsidy does not increase to the 
same extent, then the impact on the low income farmers' ability/willingness 
to replant could be severe. While the rate of return from the investment 
would be lower for high income farmers as well, given the stronger time 
preference for present cash incomes held by the low income farmers, it is 
probable that (depending on the level of increase of the cash expenses) 
the low income farmers would opt out of replanting even while the high 
income farmers find it still profitable to replant. On the other hand. 
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an improvement in the level of subsidy or the long term credit facilities 
available to farmers may well stimulate replanting to a greater extent 
among the lower income fanners (assuming that an improvement in credit 
facilities would make such credit available even to these farmers). It 
would presumably change the position of the better-off farmers only 
marginally, since they would already have sufficient funds and/or access 
to such credit facilities. 
The nature of the decision problem that farmers using family labour 
face also illustrates the dangers of oversimplified discussions and 
generalisations about the rates of return on long term investments in the 
agricultural sector of less developed countries. In most discussions 
4 
such returns have been regarded as being very low. However^ other studies, 
particularly in perennial cash crop agriculture, have shown that the 
expected rates of return on such investments can be quite substantial.'^ 
Where farmers are likely to use much family labour, it is important that 
such discussions are accompanied by analysis of the sensitivity of returns 
to different valuations of family labour and preferably also by an 
explanation of farmers' own evaluations of their prospects and costings, 
if potentially misleading conclusions are to be avoided. 
^ Thus Mellor states that . . there is a tendency for the more carefully 
drawn studies to show surprisingly low returns to investment by individual 
farmers within the context of subsistence farmers in a traditional economy 
(Shultz 1964)'; and 'such forms of capital [i.e., those which represent 
a relatively direct embodiment of family labour] are likely to have their 
returns driven to the low level normal for labour within a traditional 
subsistence agriculture'. (Mellor, J.W., op. ait., p.218). 
5 . g Q Land Development Schemes in Peninsular Malaysia: A Study 
of Benefits'lnd Costs, ANU Ph.D. thesis, published by the Rubber Research 
^^^^III^I^r^rMlii^, Kuala Lumpur, 1976. 
233 
8.6 Objectives of the Farmers 
When considering investment in cash crops, the survey results indicate 
that farmers' objectives appear to be dominated by monetary returns and 
other economic factors. While the nature of the decision process differed 
among farmers, the decisions were generally taken on the basis of economic 
calculations of costs and returns. 
However, this does not mean that in the farmers' decision-making 
process non-economic factors were absent or were unimportant. The influence 
of factors such as social status and custom were revealed, for example, in 
the richer farmers' attitude towards using family labour, and also in their 
attitude towards paddy (and coconut lands). Perhaps the relative absence 
or lower significance of such influences on the lower income farmers' 
decisions may be due to the fact that at subsistence levels of income, 
the purely economic objectives take precedence. And this may be related to 
the fact that attitudes towards cash crops differ from those towards paddy, 
the staple food and traditionally the central concern of village agriculture. 
8.7 Risk Attitudes 
From the shapes of the elicited utility functions (expressing the 
utility of money gains and losses), it was observed that the majority of 
farmers in all income groups were risk averters.^ However, in the choice 
of crop, the analysis, using a simple measure of riskiness associated with 
a crop, showed that the importance of risk in the actual decisions tends 
to be greater among the low income farmers.^ Thus, while it was observed 
^ Strictly speaking, these express attitudes to risk in a single period 
setting. 
^ Time did not allow us to test rigorously the hypothesis of decreasing 
risk aversion with increasing wealth, though this could have been done by 
finding the (algebraic) functional form of the elicited utility functions 
and then calculating the degree of risk aversion using the Pratt 
coefficient. 
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that many poor farmers chose crops which had a lower risk and lower 'most 
likely' expected returns in preference to crops with higher risk and 
higher expected returns, this was much less so among the high income 
farmers. The behaviour of the latter tended to approach the (expected) 
profit maximising type of behaviour, i.e., risk played a less significant 
role. Wliile lower risk aversion among them may have been one reason, it 
may also be that the scale of risk was lower in their case as well, i.e., 
given the same crop, high income farmers faced income distributions with 
a lower degree of downward variability. Thus they not only had a greater 
risk bearing capacity, they also faced lower risks. 
In this connection, respondents pointed out that lower income farmers 
had to rely mainly on family labour for maintenance, harvesting and 
similar farm operations, and problems of illness, family affairs, etc., 
would have a big impact on the revenue levels as they may not be able to 
afford hired labour in such cases to carry out the necessary tasks. The 
richer farmers had no such problems in obtaining labour. The better-off 
farmers were similarly in a more advantageous position in relation to the 
obtaining of other inputs, such as fertiliser at the desired time and in 
general were able to exert greater control over variability in returns. 
The degree of familiarity with a crop was clearly important to 
farmers as a factor influencing their perception of the 'riskiness' 
attached to it. Thus, lack of familiarity involved a lack of knowledge 
of skills and this, in turn, involved the possibility of bad management 
practices. This increased the riskiness of such crops. 
There was a near universal preference expressed for replanting with 
perennials. In the context of observed risk aversion, this is particularly 
interesting. In general, sequential decision processes are considered to 
be intrinsically less risky than once-and-for-all decisions which commit 
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resources to a particular activity for extended periods of time. 
Replanting with a perennial, with a life span of a few decades, is 
obviously one of the latter type decisions. 
g 
However, it was clear that most farmers considered perennials to be 
'safe' crops compared with annuals, and this view was freely and frequently 
expressed during the survey. Since price volatility is common to both 
perennials and annuals contemplated by the farmers, this suggests that 
lower yield variability from perennials would account for this attitude. 
A perennial, once established, is generally sturdy enough to withstand any 
but the worst climatic upheavals, whereas the annuals are at the mercy of 
weather throughout their life time. A drought or rain can prevent planting 
or harvesting completely in the latter case. Of the perennials considered 
by the farmers, all except tea possessed the quality of being capable of 
storage for extended periods of time without significant deterioration. 
This again was not the case with many of the annuals available for planting. 
Other factors, too, increased the risks attached to annuals; planting and 
harvesting have to be done at specified times and inability to do so, for 
reasons such as illness, family crises, etc., could possibly have very 
serious consequences. While the yields from these perennials are relatively 
less dependent on adequate fertilisation at specific times, the annuals, in 
comparison, are dependent on such things to a greater extent. Weaknesses 
in distribution channels for fertiliser, pesticides, etc., frequently make 
it difficult for the farmer to obtain these inputs at the desired time (or 
may force him to buy them on the black market at inflated prices), and 
introduces an additional element of risk into cultivation of the annuals. 
® Perennials here refer only to those crops actually contemplated for 
planting by the farmers in the sample. These were mainly rubber, tea, 
coconut and cinnamon. Annuals were mostly vegetables and root crops. 
236 
In addition, perennials such as rubber and tea also yield continuous 
incomes over the year, a further desirable characteristic particularly to 
the poor farmers. 
While risk appeared to be quite important in determining the choice 
of crop, it was less so in influencing the replacement time. One possible 
reason, in addition to the weaknesses in the measure of riskiness used in 
the analysis, may be the steep decline in rubber yields after the second 
renewal bark is tapped to exhaustion. 
If the yields (and net revenues) were to decline more slowly, the 
differences between the optimal replacement date for a risk-neutral person 
and that for a risk averter (or preferrer) would be more pronounced. 
Therefore, if fanners expected significant variability in expected future 
revenues (due to world price fluctuations, etc.), it would be expected that 
the replacement dates of farmers planting crops such as oil palm and tea 
(where yields decline more slowly) would exhibit substantial differences 
(even though they may hold similar expectations) owing to differences in 
risk attitudes. 
8.8 Role of Replanting Subsidies 
As previously mentioned, the role of the replanting subsidies differs 
between the two major groups of smallholders, though in each case it acts 
as a positive incentive to replanting. For the better-off farmers it makes 
replanting more attractive by reducing costs while for the poor farmers it 
removes an almost binding constraint, the shortage of cash itself, and 
makes it feasible and attractive. 
It is important to note that for all smallholders the replanting 
subsidy covers only a part of the total cost of replanting; almost 
invariably the smallholder has to incur an additional cost whether monetary. 
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unpaid family labour or a combinati on o f the two. In each case the 
rep lant ing subsidy serves to mobi l i se add i t i ona l resources , funds and/or 
labour , f o r product ive investment. Due to the nature of the investment 
o p p o r t u n i t i e s , in i t s absence these resources may we l l have remained i d l e 
or been consumed unproduct ive ly . I t there fore d i r e c t l y promotes add i t i ona l 
c a p i t a l formation in the countrys ide . 
Assuming that rep lant ing with high y i e l d i n g v a r i e t i e s i s s o c i a l l y 
d e s i r a b l e , the importance of the replant ing subsidy as a p o l i c y instrument 
f o r achiev ing that target should be s t r e s s e d . For the lower income rubber 
smalUiolders in p a r t i c u l a r , i t has been shown to be almost indispensable 
f o r rep lant ing . The responses of the smallholders showed that even though 
the subsidy i s s u f f i c i e n t to cover replant ing c o s t s , the need f o r present 
cash incomes i s so great f o r many low income farmers that they are unable 
t o f o rgo even the very low incomes from the e x i s t i n g t rees . Considering 
the overvaluat ion of the currency and the export taxes on rubber, tea , e t c . , 
i t may be a use fu l e x e r c i s e to explore whether prov is ion of low in te res t 
f inance to compensate such farmers f o r loss of earnings from the e x i s t i n g 
low y i e l d i n g trees i s s o c i a l l y b e n e f i c i a l . This would be par t i cu lar ly 
important i f changes in the present set of c ircumstances, such as those 
introduced by i n f l a t i o n , r e s u l t in pushing substant ia l numbers of the low 
incone farmers to the non-rep Ianting group. 
I d e a l l y , the rubber replacement dec i s i on should be analysed in the 
context of the whole decision-making process of the farm household, with 
a l l i t s short and long term a l l o c a t i v e d e c i s i o n s , and should be studied 
as such and not in i s o l a t i o n . While an attempt was made to include more 
important aspects of t h i s o v e r a l l decision-making s tructure of the farmers 
in the study through the incorporat ion of such fac tors as l e v e l , nature 
and sources of household incoms, abstract ing and concentrating on one 
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part i cu lar dec i s i on , however important i t may be , necessari ly imposes 
certain theore t i ca l and conceptual l imitat ions on the study. 
At the l eve l of empirical research, the sample survey included only 
a small group of the rubber smallholders in the country. While the 
smallness of the sample was inev i tab le , given the nature of the study and 
the time and other constraints , generalisations based on such a sample can 
be treated only as suggestive hypotheses that have to be tested and 
v e r i f i e d through further research. In part i cu lar , more rigorous studies 
need to be done to invest igate further aspects of decision-making and the 
nature of preferences and att i tudes . As mentioned in the description of 
the survey, while we were conscious of the p o s s i b i l i t y of serious 
interviewer bias and care was taken to minimise th i s , i t cannot be wholly 
excluded. 
Some important aspects were examined in re lat ive ly simple fashion; 
in part i cu lar the intertemporal r isk attitudes of the farmers and the 
inf luence of r isk and uncertainty in long term investment decisions as 
wel l as farmers' subject ive valuation of labour need more in-depth 
empirical and analyt ical study. 
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APPENDIX A 
QUESTIONNAIRE USED IN FIELD SURVEY 
V i l l a g e : Name: 
Gama Sevaka Div: Date: 
R . I . Div: 
1. OWNERSHIP 
(a) Single owner 
(b) Joint owner — with, other family meiriljers 
(c ) Joint owner 
(d) 
(e) 
2. MANAGEMENT 
Day to day management i s done by: 
(a) Owner 
(b) Paid employee 
(c ) Family member 
(d) 
3. INVESTMENT DECISION 
Decisions on replanting and other 
important investments are made by: 
I f s ing le owner, 
3 .1 (a) Owner ind iv idual ly 
(b) Owner, in consultation with other 
members of family 
I f j o i n t l y owner, 
3.2 (a) By one person ( spec i f y ) 
(b) J o i n t l y , but i n i t i a t i v e taken normally 
by a s ing le person ( spec i f y ) 
( c ) J o i n t l y , with partners having more or less equal say 
(d) 
4. LAND 
A . l Rubber 
Mature 
Immature 
Abandoned 
4.2 Non-Rubber 
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Area Age Cut Frequency Clone ^ibs/day^ 
Crop Area Remarks 
4 . 2 . 1 For coconut, cocoa or tea land: 
(a) Age of trees 
(b) I f trees are o ld , have you decided 
to replant? Yes No 
(c ) I f no, to 4 . 2 . 1 ( b ) , why' 
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5. RUBBER PRODUCTION 
5.1 Tapping 
5.1.1 
Payment 
Owner 
Share 
Hired 
Owner includes member of family household.) 
5.1.2 If owner is engaged in tapping, how many hours 
a day would you spend on tapping? hours 
5.2 Processing 
5.2.1 Ownership of processing facilities: 
Trays 
Curing shed 
Smooth roller 
Grooved roller 
Smokehouse 
5.2.2 Cost of processing: 
What would be your average cost for: 
(1) Coagulant Specify whether cts/lb or 
cts/sheet. 
(2) Rolling 
(3) Smoking 
5.3 Sales 
5.3.1 Rubber is sold mainly as: 
Latex 
USS 
RSS 
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5 . 3 . 2 I f RSS is produced, what proportion would normally be: 
RSS I 
RSS I I 
RSS I I I 
Lower grades 
5 . 3 . 3 Frequency of sales: 
More than once 
per week 
Weekly 
Fortnightly 
Monthly 
6 . REPLANTING 
6 . 1 Have you decided to replant? Yes No 
I f no to 6 . 1 , 
6 . 2 . 1 What do you plan to do? 
(a) Tap for some more time 
(b) Abandon 
(c) Uproot and plant other crops 
(d) Sell (or otherwise dispose 
of) land 
(e) 
I f (a) to 6 . 2 . 1 , 
6 . 2 . 2 . 1 Why do you propose to tap for a longer time? 
(Rank in order i f more than one reason) 
Yields are s t i l l high 
Present prices are good 
Needs present income 
from rubber badly 
Cannot obtain subsidy 
to replant 
( I f jointly owned) Other 
owners do not want to replant 
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6 . 2 . 2 . 2 Wliat is level of income you expect from such tapping? 
Year Income 
I f (b) to 6 . 2 . 1 , 
6 . 2 . 3 Why abandon land? 
Land not suited for anything 
( infert i le , subject to floods, etc . ) 
Problems of ownership 
Cannot obtain subsidy 
Subsidy is too low 
I f (c) to 6 . 2 . 1 
6 . 2 . 4 Why would you shift from rubber: 
(a) Expect prices to fall 
(b) Cannot afford to wait 6-7 years for incone 
, . Expect low yields from rubber 
(land not suitable) 
, Expect higher income from 
other cash crop(s) 
, , Needs land to grow food 
(subsistence) crops 
(f ) Subsidy cannot be obtained for rubber 
(g) Subsidy is too low 
(h) Delays in obtaining subsidy 
( i ) Uncertain price (fluctuations) 
Input prices (labour, processing 
^^^ inputs) going up 
(k) Value of rubber lands is going down 
(1) 
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I f (a) to 6 . 2 . 4 , 
6 . 2 . 4 . 1 Would you change your opinion i f the f l o o r 
pr i ce was higher? 
Yes No 
I f yes to 6 . 2 . 4 . 1 , 
6 . 2 . 4 . 2 Wliat would you think would be a reasonably 
high f l o o r pr i ce? 
I f (b) t o 6 . 2 . 4 , 
6 . 2 . 4 . 3 Have you thought of intercropping 
during immature period? Yes No 
6 . 2 . 4 . 4 Are you aware that the government permits 
intercropping during the immature period? 
Yes No 
6 . 2 . 4 . 5 I f you can intercrop what crops would you 
have in mind? 
6 . 2 . 4 . 6 Wliat would be the income you would expect 
i f you do intercrop? 
Year Income 
If (d) to 6 . 2 . 4 , 
6 . 2 . 4 . 7 What crop(s ) do you have in mind? 
If a perennial , 
6 2 4 8 Would you get a subsidy to plant th i s : 
' ' ' Yes No 
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I f (e) to 6 . 2 . 4 , 
6 . 2 . A . 10 Would you grow these for sale or home consunption? 
Sale only 
Consunption only 
Mainly sale 
Mainly consuii5)tion 
If for sale , 
6 . 2 . 4 . 1 1 What is your expected annual income? 
I f for consunption (only or mainly), 
6 . 2 . 4 . 1 2 Why don't you plant a cash crop and buy food for consunption? 
Don't have to worry about food 
Income from cash crop could be too low 
I f ( f ) for 6 . 2 . 4 , 
6 . 2 . 4 . 1 3 Would you replant with rubber i f you can obtain this subsidy? 
Yes No 
If (g) for 6 . 2 . 4 , 
6 . 2 . 4 . 1 4 What would be a reasonable level for subsidy in your opinion? 
6 . 2 . 4 . 1 5 I f that level of subsidy was given would you replant 
with rubber? Yes No 
I f no to 6 . 2 . 4 . 1 5 
6 . 2 . 4 . 1 6 Why not? 
6 . 2 . 4 . 1 7 ( I f owner is engaged in operation). 
Would you have to spend too much time 
during replanting period on the land? Yes No 
6 . 2 . 4 . 1 8 Can you find alternative employment 
during that period, when not working 
on immature holding? Yes No 
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I f yes to 6 . 1 , 
6 . 3 . 1 Have you applied for subsidy? Yes No 
(Check with records.) 
I f no to 6 . 3 . 1 , 
6 . 3 . 2 Why not? . 
6 . 3 . 3 Why did you decide to replant? 
(a) Expect prices to be high in the future 
(b) Expect high yields from replanted rubber 
, . Rubber is best choice among available 
alternatives 
(d) Steady future income 
(e) Value of land wi l l go up 
(f) Children w i l l benefit in future 
, . The floor price is a guarantee 
^ against too low prices 
(h) 
6 . 3 . 4 Would subsidy be sufficient to meet all replanting 
expenses? Yes No 
I f no to 6 . 3 . 4 , 
6 . 3 . 4 . 1 How would you finance balance? 
Past savings 
Credit 
Current income 
6 . 3 . 4 . 2 What w i l l you do i f the subsidy is not available? 
6 . 3 . 5 Are you aware that the government now permits 
intercropping during immature period? Yes No 
6 . 3 . 6 Would you intercrop? Yes No 
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I f yes to 6 . 3 . 6 , 
6 . 3 . 6 . 1 What would be the income you would expect from 
such Intercropping? 
Year Crop Income 
6 . 3 . 7 In the manual work involved in replanting would you use. 
Mainly family labour 
Mainly hired labour 
Only family labour 
Only hired labour 
6 . 3 . 8 ( If owner is engaged in operations). 
Would you find alternative employment during immature period? 
Yes No 
I f no to 6 . 3 . 8 , 
6 . 3 . 8 . 1 Why, 
No employment opportunities 
Would have no time 
6 . 3 . 9 If you did not replant with rubber what other crops 
would you have grown? 
6 . 3 . 1 0 Why did you choose rubber and not one of them? 
(Cross-check with 6 . 3 . 3 ) 
6.4.1 Expenditure on replanting: 
6.A.1.1 Crop: Rub ber 
(a) Most likely 
Year 
1 
2 
Materials 
(Rs) 
Paid 
labour 
(Rs) 
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Unpaid 
labour 
(man-
days) 
(b) Highest 
Year Materials 
(Rs) 
Paid 
labour 
(Rs) 
Unpaid 
labour 
(man-
days) 
1 
2 
• 
Cp"* T.nwpsf 
Year Materials 
(Rs) 
Paid 
labour 
(Rs) 
Unpaid 
labour 
(man-
days) 
1 
2 
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6 . 4 . 1 . 2 Crop: 
(a) Most likely 
Year Materials 
(Re) 
Paid 
labour 
(Rs) 
Unpaid 
labour 
(man-
days) 
1 
2 
(b) Highest 
Year Materials 
(Rs) 
Paid 
labour 
(Rs) 
Unpaid 
labour 
(man-
days) 
1 
2 
(c) Lowest 
Year 
1 
2 
Materials 
(Rs) 
Paid 
labour 
(Rs) 
Unpaid 
labour 
(man-
days) 
2 6 A 
6 . 4 . 1 . 3 Crop: 
(a) Most l ike ly 
Year Materials 
(Rs) 
Paid 
labour 
(Rs) 
Unpaid 
labour 
(man-
days) 
(b) Higliest 
Year Materials 
(Rs) 
Paid 
labour 
(Rs) 
Unpaid 
labour 
(man-
days) 
(c) Lowest 
Year Materials 
(Rs) 
Paid 
labour 
(Rs) 
Unpaid 
labour 
(man-
days) 
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6 .A . 2 Expected net Incomes: 
6 . 4 . 1 . 1 Crop: rubber 
(a) Most likely 
Year 
Net 
income 
(Rs) 
30 
(b) Highest 
Year 
Net 
income 
(Rs) 
30 
(c) Lowest 
Year 
Net 
income 
(Rs) 
30 
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6 . 4 . 1 . 2 Crop: 
(a) Most l ike ly 
Year 
Net 
income 
(Rs) 
30 
(b) Highest 
Year 
Net 
income 
(Rs) 
30 
(c) Lowest 
Year 
Net 
income 
(Rs) 
30 
30 
267 
6 . 4 . 1 . 3 Crop: 
(a) Most likely 
Year 
Net 
income 
(Rs) 
30 
(b) Highest 
Year 
Net 
income 
(Rs) 
30 
(c) Lowest 
Year 
Net 
income 
(Rs) 
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7. HOUSEHOLD DATA 
7.1 Size of family; 
Able adults m i /« i v 
Old/invalid Young 
over 16 years ^ 
Male 
Female 
7.2 Age (of decision maker): years 
7.3 Sex: Male: Female: 
7.4 Educational level: 
7.5 Race: 
7.6 What are your sources of income: 
7.6.1 Regular 
Source Income 
7.6.2 Irregular 
Source Income 
8. Notes: 
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A P P E N D I X B 
REL I EF M A P OF SRI L A N K A 
C O L O M B O / 
100 - 500 
500 - 1000 
1 0 0 0 - 3 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 - 5 0 0 0 
> 5000 Feet 
Trincomaiee 
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APPENDIX C 
1. CODES: 
(a) Income group 
Regular annual income less than Rs 2500/yr: 1 
Regular annual income between Rs 2500/yr and Rs 5000/yr: 2 
Regular annual income between Rs 5000/yr and Rs 10000/yr: 3 
Regular annual income greater than Rs 10000/yr: 4 
(b) Per cent of income derived from rubber 
Rubber income less than 25% of total regular income: 1 
Rubber income between 25% and 50% of total regular income: 2 
Rubber income between 50% and 75% of total regular income: 3 
Rubber income greater than 75% of total regular income: 4 
(c) Type of labour used in tapping 
Family labour: 1 
Share labour: 2 
Hired labour: 3 
(d) Future course of action 
Replant with rubber: 1 
Continue tapping: 2 
Abandon land: 3 
Plant a different crop: 4 
Sell land: ^ 
Other: 6 
(e) Level of education 
Well educated: ^ 
Literate: 
Illiterate: 
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2. On the basis of the utility functions drawn, the farmers were 
grouped into 3 types according to their risk attitudes. 
(a) Risk - preferrers: Farmers no's: 16, 30, 40, 61, 71, 79 
(b) Risk - neutral: Farmers no's: 4, 28, 38, 46, 56, 58, 69, 
77, 130, 143, 147, 149, 165 
(c) Risk - averters: All the remaining fanners (except those 
whose utility functions were not elicited). 
Income % o f Type of Future Age Level Subjec t ive Farmer Total Total 
number rubber non-rubber group income labour course 
area area derived used in o f 
(acres) (acres) from tapping act ion 
rubber 
Certainty Equivalents 
o f d iscount 
education rate 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
C" 
9 
10 
11 
12 
1 3 
1 4 
16 
16 
1 7 
1.00 
. 5 0 
1 3 . 2 5 
8.00 
. 2 5 
3 . 0 0 
1 . 5 0 
2. 1^ 0 
1 . 5 0 
. 7 5 
. 5 0 
1 . 5 0 
1.00 
. 5 0 
1.00 
1 . 5 0 
1 . 7 5 
3 . 0 0 
.20 
7 . 5 0 
2 . 5 0 
. 5 0 
2.00 
. 50 
1.00 
2.00 
1 . 2 5 
. 7 5 
. 7 5 
1.00 
1 . 2 5 
. 7 5 
1 . 7 5 
1 . 5 0 
3 
1 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
3 
2 
2 
1 
1 
3 
4 
1 
4 
2 
4 
1 
2 
1 
3 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
3 
3 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
5 
1 
2 
2 
1 
1 
2 
3 
1 
61 
3 8 
6 5 
31 
30 
4 5 
32 
6 7 
38 
6 4 
27 
4 8 
5 0 
58 
4 8 
53 
55 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
3 
1 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
3 
3 
2 5 
32 
20 
2 5 
30 
28 
30 
35 
20 
35 
120 
1 5 0 
60 
25 
5 0 
4 8 
4 0 
1 0 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 
7 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 
1 4 0 0 0 
7 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 
7 0 0 0 
1 4 0 0 0 
5 0 0 0 
7 0 0 0 
- 5 0 0 0 
- 1 5 0 0 
- 5 0 0 0 
- 3 5 0 0 
- 1 5 0 0 
- 1 5 0 0 
- 1 5 0 0 
- 1 5 5 0 
- 7 0 0 0 
- 3 5 0 0 
- 1 5 0 0 
- 1 5 0 0 
- 1 5 0 0 
- 3 5 0 0 
- 7 0 0 0 
- 2 5 0 0 
- 3 5 0 0 
- 1 5 0 0 
- 4 0 0 
- 2 0 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 
- 1 5 0 
- 3 0 0 
- 5 0 0 
- 4 0 0 
- 2 0 0 0 
- 8 0 0 
- 3 0 0 
- 5 0 0 
- 3 0 0 
- 1 2 0 0 
- 1 5 0 0 
- 2 0 0 0 
- 1 4 0 0 
- 2 0 0 
- 7 5 
- 1 0 0 
- 300 
- 25 
- 4 0 
- 1 2 5 
- 1 0 0 
- 6 0 0 
- 1 0 0 
- 5 0 
- 1 2 5 
- 5 0 
- 300 
- 2 5 0 
- 1 2 5 0 
- 2 5 0 
1 2 5 0 
2 0 0 
7 0 0 
800 
0 
75 
1 7 5 
4 5 0 
1 6 0 0 
4 5 0 
75 
1 7 5 
75 
4 5 0 
9 0 0 
2 5 0 0 
5 0 0 
3 0 0 0 
4 5 0 
1 5 0 0 
1800 
3 0 
2 0 0 
3 7 5 
9 0 0 
3 5 0 0 
1000 
2 5 0 
200 
9 0 0 
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3 7 5 0 
1 4 5 0 
4 2 5 0 
7 0 0 
2 0 0 0 
2 7 5 0 
1 2 5 
3 5 0 
5 0 0 
1 2 5 0 
5 5 0 0 
1 2 5 0 
3 5 0 
5 0 0 
3 5 0 
1 1 7 5 
2 7 5 0 
4 0 0 0 
2 2 5 0 
5 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
2 7 5 0 
3 5 0 0 
2 0 0 
7 0 0 
6 5 0 
1 6 5 0 
7 0 0 0 
' 1 8 5 0 
7 0 0 
6 5 0 
7 0 0 
2 4 0 0 
4 5 0 0 
4 5 0 0 
3 5 0 0 
7 5 0 0 
1 5 0 0 
5 2 5 0 
5 2 5 0 
800 
1 1 0 0 
1 2 5 0 
1 5 0 0 
1 0 5 0 0 
3 5 0 0 
1 1 0 0 
1 3 5 0 
1 1 5 0 
3 1 5 0 
7 5 0 0 
4 7 5 0 
7 2 0 0 
N3 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
2 . 5 0 
. 5 0 
. 5 0 
6 . 5 
2 . 5 
1 0 . 0 0 
1 . 0 0 
2 . 0 0 
3 . 5 
2 . 2 5 
6 . 0 0 
3 . 5 0 
. 7 5 
2 . 0 0 
. 7 5 
4 . 2 5 
. 7 5 
1 . 2 5 
. 2 5 
2 . 7 5 
. 7 5 
2 . 5 
1 . 50 
2 . 5 0 
. 7 5 
1 . 0 0 
2.00 
7 . 0 0 
. 2 5 
2 . 2 5 
00 
00 
1 . 2 5 
3 . 0 0 
1 . 0 0 
1 . 2 5 
1 . 0 0 
1 . 5 
. 2 5 
00 
. 2 5 
2 . 5 
. 2 5 
3 . 2 5 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
4 
1 
1 
1 
3 
1 
4 
4 
3 
3 
3 
3 
1 
1 
4 
1 
1 
1 
4 
3 
2 
3 
1 
4 
1 
1 
1 
2 
3 
4 
1 
1 
1 
4 
5 
2 
1 
4 
2 
2 
1 
4 
1 
58 
59 
65 
34 
68 
38 
65 
50 
50 
60 
55 
45 
63 
50 
19 
48 
41 
50 
61 
45 
42 
75 
36 
55 
25 
32 
25 
85 
40 
35 
35 
53 
40 
45 
85 
35 
60 
75 
100 
32 
50 
3000 
7000 
3000 
5000 
3000 
5000 
2000 
2 0 0 0 
2000 
2000 
7000 
2000 
2000 
7000 
5000 
6000 
3000 
5000 
2000 
7000 
2000 
2000 
- 1 5 0 0 
- 3 5 0 0 
- 1 5 0 0 
- 2 5 0 0 
- 1 5 0 0 
- 2 5 0 0 
-1000 
- 1 0 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 
- 3 5 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 
- 3 5 0 0 
- 2 5 0 0 
- 3 0 0 0 
- 1 5 0 0 
- 2 5 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 
- 3 0 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 
300 
400 
500 
50 
50 
100 
50 
150 
4 0 0 
200 
450 
850 
375 750 1 5 0 0 
4600 1 7 5 0 2 7 0 0 
1100 1 5 0 0 21C0 
- 800 - 400 
- 800 
- 600 
- 750 
- 1 2 0 0 
- 300 
- 850 
- 200 
- 1 4 0 0 
- 450 
- 225 
75 
150 
40 
75 
100 
40 
900 2000 
500 1000 1500 
75 125 450 
200 500 1100 
60 400 
200 
375 
850 
475 
800 
50 150 
500 1050 
2800 3700 55C0 
300 
125 
600 
300 
1600 
800 
1850 
1200 
750 
1200 
225 
1400 
850 
475 
1800 
1550 
2 5 0 0 
1 5 5 0 
950 
1750 
500 
2 0 0 0 
1050 
650 
19C0 
2 500 
36C0 
31G0 
1000 
2 6 5 0 
1300 
3500 
1 5 5 0 
1100 
N3 
W 
40 
4 1 
4 2 
4 3 
44 
4 5 
4 6 
4 7 
4 8 
4 9 
5 0 
5 1 
52 
5 3 
54 
5 5 
5 6 
5 7 
5 8 
59 
60 
2.00 
9 . 7 5 
1.00 
. 7 5 
3 . 0 0 
2 . 5 0 
1 . 2 5 
4 . 2 5 
2 . 2 5 
. 5 
4 . 5 
1.0 
3 . 5 
4 . 7 5 
2 . 5 
4 . 5 
6 . 7 5 
7 . 0 0 
5 . 5 
7 . 0 
5 . 2 5 
3 . 0 0 
5 . 0 0 
1 . 2 5 
2.00 
4 . 0 0 
. 2 5 
. 7 5 
00 
2.00 
. 2 5 
. 2 5 
. 5 
1.00 
2.00 
2.00 
1.00 
3 . 0 0 
3 . 5 0 
1.00 
. 7 5 
2.00 
3 
3 
1 
1 
3 
1 
1 
4 
1 
1 
3 
1 
2 
3 
1 
1 
4 
2 
2 
1 
3 
1 
4 
3 
3 
1 
4 
2 
3 
1 
3 
3 3 
4 2 
6 3 
4 1 
7 5 
44 
5 7 
4 5 
36 
2 5 
61 
26 
5 9 
68 
6 5 
4 7 
5 0 
7 5 
5 8 
4 0 
37 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
2 
2 
2 
1 
20 
2 5 
4 0 
4 5 
30 
8 5 
60 
18 
35 
4 2 
2 5 
3 5 
28 
4 0 
7 5 
32 
17 
20 
4 0 
22 
1 5 0 0 0 
1 5 0 0 0 
2000 
2000 
1 0 0 0 0 
2000 
2000 
20000 
2000 
2000 
1 0 0 0 0 
2000 
5 0 0 0 
10000 
2000 
2000 
20000 
7 0 0 0 
7 0 0 0 
2000 
1 0 0 0 0 
- 7 5 0 0 
- 7 5 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 
- 5 0 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 
- 5 0 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 
- 2 5 0 0 
- 5 0 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 0 
- 3 5 0 0 
- 3 5 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 
- 5 0 0 0 
- 5 0 0 0 
-2000 
- 4 0 0 
- 3 0 0 
- 7 5 0 
- 2 0 0 
- 3 5 0 
- 3 2 5 0 
- 3 5 0 
- 4 5 0 
8 0 0 1 8 7 5 
5 0 0 1 0 0 0 
- 4 0 0 0 7 5 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 
- 6 0 0 
- 2 0 
- 7 5 7 5 2 0 0 
5 0 0 1 5 0 0 
2 0 0 
3 0 0 
4 0 0 2 7 5 0 5 5 0 0 
1 0 0 1 2 5 2 0 0 
1 5 0 
100 
10 
7 5 
- 1 2 0 
4 2 5 
6 5 0 
2 7 5 
- 2 0 0 0 - 2 0 0 2 5 0 0 6 5 0 0 
- 1 2 0 0 - 3 0 0 7 5 0 1 7 5 0 
1 3 0 0 0 
2 5 0 0 
1 5 0 0 
2 2 5 
1 6 5 0 
6 0 0 
8 7 5 
8 1 0 0 
3 7 5 
3 7 5 
1 4 0 0 0 
3 1 5 0 
1 7 5 0 
3 5 0 
2 4 0 0 
7 7 5 
1 1 0 0 
1 0 1 0 0 
5 0 0 
5 2 5 
1 4 5 0 0 
6 7 5 0 
1 4 0 0 
7 5 0 
4 0 0 0 
1 4 5 0 
1 5 2 5 
1 5 2 0 0 
9 5 0 
9 0 0 
fiOOO lOOCO 1 5 2 5 0 
2 8 0 0 3 5 5 0 5 2 5 0 
61 
62 
6 3 
6 4 
6 5 
66 
6 7 
68 
6 9 
7 0 
7 1 
7 2 
7 3 
7 4 
7 5 
7 6 
7 7 
7 8 
7 9 
80 
81 
82 
3 . 2 5 
. 5 . 2 5 
2 .00 
1 .00 
3 . 5 
2 . 0 
2.0 
3 . 7 5 
1 3 . 2 5 
. 5 
2 . 0 
2 . 2 5 
1.00 
. 7 5 
2.0 
5 . 5 
1.00 
4 . 7 5 
3 . 5 
4 . 0 0 
1 . 5 
1 .00 
2 . 5 0 
2 . 7 5 
4 . 0 0 
00 
3 . 0 0 
1 . 2 5 
6 . 2 5 
2.00 
2 . 2 5 
2 . 2 5 
. 7 5 
. 7 5 
2 . 0 0 
2 . 2 5 
3 . 2 5 
1 . 5 
1 . 7 5 
1 . 5 
. 2 5 
4 . 0 0 
2 . 5 
4 . 7 5 
4 
3 
3 
1 
1 
1 
3 
3 
4 
3 
1 
1 
3 
2 
1 
3 
4 
1 
1 
2 
3 
2 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
2 
3 
2 
1 
1 
3 
1 
3 
3 
2 
1 
2 
3 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
1 
4 
2 
4 
4 
4 
2 
1 
4 
1 
1 
4 
4 
4 
62 
2 5 
7 0 
60 
5 6 
60 
5 2 
5 8 
6 5 
26 
62 
4 0 
3 3 
6 4 
6 5 
68 
3 5 
1 7 
80 
4 9 
5 1 
4 8 
2 5 
4 0 
3 5 
5 5 
5 0 
2 5 
3 2 
10 
1 5 
100 
80 
28 
5 0 
2 5 
12 
3 0 
2 5 
3 5 
20000 
10000 
10000 
2000 
2000 
2000 
10000 
7 0 0 0 
20000 
10000 
3 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 
10000 
7 0 0 0 
2000 
10000 
20000 
3 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 
7 0 0 0 
10000 
7 0 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 0 
- 5 0 0 0 
- 5 0 0 0 
- l O G O 
- 1 0 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 
- 5 0 0 0 
- 3 5 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 0 
- 5 0 0 0 
- 1 5 0 0 
- 1 5 0 0 
- 5 0 0 0 
- 3 5 C O 
- 1 0 0 0 
- 5 0 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 0 
- 1 5 0 0 
- 1 5 0 0 
- 3 5 0 0 
- 5 0 0 0 
- 3 5 0 0 
- 8 0 0 0 - 5 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 5 0 0 0 1 G 5 0 0 1 8 0 0 0 1 9 0 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 
- 4 5 0 0 
- 9 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 
- 4 0 0 
- 2 0 0 0 
- 9 0 0 
- 2 7 5 
- 1 6 0 0 
- 4 0 0 0 
- 6 0 0 
- 1 2 0 0 
- 4 0 0 
- 3 0 0 0 
- 1 0 0 
- 8 0 0 
- 1 2 5 
- 1 5 0 
- 1 5 0 
- 2 5 
- 4 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 
- 5 0 
- 7 5 0 
9 0 0 
2000 
1 0 0 
1 7 0 0 
4 7 5 
7 5 0 
3 0 0 
2 2 5 
1 4 0 0 
3 5 0 0 
1 7 5 
1 5 0 0 
2 0 0 0 
6 0 0 0 
1 5 0 0 
2 3 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
1 5 5 0 
6 5 0 
3 0 0 
3 0 0 0 
7 0 0 0 
5 0 0 
2 2 5 0 
2 9 0 0 
8 5 0 0 
1 6 5 0 
2 6 0 0 
1 2 2 5 
2 1 5 0 
1 0 0 0 
4 5 0 
3 8 0 0 
9 5 0 0 
8 2 5 
2 5 0 0 
3 7 5 0 
1 1 0 0 0 
2 4 0 0 
2 7 5 0 
1 4 5 0 
2 7 5 0 
1 9 5 0 
5 6 0 
6 0 0 0 
1 2 0 0 0 
1 0 5 0 
2 7 0 0 
6 0 0 0 
1 6 0 0 0 
4 2 0 0 
2 9 0 0 
2 2 5 0 
5 5 0 0 
3 1 0 0 
9 2 5 
7 2 5 0 
1 8 0 0 0 
1 4 5 0 
2 8 0 0 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
103 
1 . 5 
4 . 5 
3 . 5 
4 .25 
1.75 
2 . 5 
2 . 5 
2 .00 
3 .00 
1 .5 
1.75 
2 .5 
1 .25 
1 .75 
14 
4 .75 
1 .25 
3 .5 
3 .75 
4 . 5 
1 .5 
3 .75 
3 .25 
1 . 5 
1 .25 
5 .00 
4 . 5 
1 .75 
00 
5 .50 
1 .75 
2 . 0 0 
2 .5 
1 . 5 
2 . 0 
2 . 5 
4 .00 
1 .75 
1 .25 
1. 25 
2 .00 
1 . 5 
4 
3 
1 
4 
2 
3 
2 
3 
4 
1 
2 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
55 
48 
48 
31 
40 
62 
55 
40 
30 
42 
34 
45 
48 
45 
65 
59 
55 
52 
55 
53 
57 
10 
18 
45 
15 
35 
20 
25 
30 
15 
25 
40 
38 
65 
45 
28 
24 
38 
25 
25 
20 
35 
20000 
15000 
2000 
20000 
5000 
20000 
5000 
15000 
20000 
2000 
5000 
5000 
2000 
2000 
15000 
10000 
2000 
5000 
7000 
20000 
2000 
- 1 0 0 0 0 
- 7 5 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 0 
- 2 5 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 0 
- 2 5 0 0 
- 7 5 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 
- 2 5 0 0 
- 2 5 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 
- 7500 
- 5 0 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 
- 2 5 0 0 
- 3 5 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 
- 300 - 60 200 490 
- 425 - 75 250 300 
-6250 - 600 1600 4125 
-1500 - 300 1000 2500 
- 350 - 80 200 550 
- 500 - 75 110 350 
- 700 - 150 775 1600 
-2300 - 100 2000 4100 
- 390 - 20 50 475 
625 
410 
850 1420 
540 950 
6000 7500 11625 
3100 4150 7200 
800 1000 1550 
600 700 3200 
2800 3500 5100 
6200 8000 14200 
675 850 1475 
n : —? 
6 . 5 
3 . 5 
3 . 0 
1.0 
4 . 0 
.5 
1 .25 • 
1 . 0 0 
5 . 0 0 
2 . 2 5 
4 . 2 5 
3 . 0 0 
4 . 2 5 
2 . 0 0 
2.00 
4 . 7 5 
1. 75 
1 . 5 
1 . 2 5 
4 . 2 5 
5 . 5 
1 . 7 5 
3 . 5 
1 . 7 5 
1 . 5 
2.0 
2 . 2 5 
.75 
00 
.12 
1 . 2 5 
3 . 5 
2.0 
. 25 
2.00 
. 25 
3 . 0 0 
5 . 0 0 
1 . 7 5 
.75 
.5 
1 . 5 
4 . 2 5 
3 . 5 
3 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
3 
3 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
• 4 
1 
1 
1 
4 
4 
1 
2 
4 
3 
1 
4 
1 
1 
4 
2 
1 
1 
3 
4 
3 
4 
2 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
3 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
3 
1 
1 
3 
3 
1 
1 
4 
2 
1 
1 
4 
4 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
66 
38 
32 
57 
32 
38 
22 
53 
60 
55 
61 
58 
32 
40 
62 
50 
39 
49 
45 
49 
58 
45 
22 
40 
45 
100 
35 
30 
40 
25 
30 
35 
25 
40 
75 
10 
60 
35 
75 
10 
15 
35 
15000 
3000 
5000 
3000 
7000 
3000 
5000 
2000 
15000 
10000 
5000 
2000 
5000 
3000 
2000 
20000 
2000 
2000 
3000 
20000 
20000 
3000 
- 7 5 0 0 
- 1 5 0 0 
- 2 5 0 0 
- 1 5 0 0 
- 3 5 0 0 
- 1 5 0 0 
- 2 5 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 
- 7 5 0 0 
- 5 0 0 0 
- 2 5 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 
- 2 5 0 0 
- 1 5 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 
-10000 
- 1 0 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 
- 1 5 0 0 
-10000 
- 1 0 0 0 0 
- 1 5 0 0 
- 3 0 0 0 
- 500 
- 325 
- 400 
- 700 
- 500 
- 1 0 0 0 
- 300 
-3200 
- 1 1 0 0 
- 8 0 0 
- 375 
- 950 
- 300 
- 2 6 0 
-5000 
- 300 
- 175 
- 675 
- 1 0 0 
- 75 
- 120 
- 100 
- 125 
- 250 
- 50 
- 750 
- 50 
- 150 
- 2 0 
- 50 
- 6 0 
- 2 0 
- 1 0 0 0 
- 75 
- 2 0 
1500 
450 
300 
320 
150 
300 
500 
275 
1050 
1000 
375 
275 
500 
225 
150 
2400 
140 
250 
3375 
675 
700 
850 
500 
750 
1200 
550 
2400 
2100 
850 
450 
1100 
550 
270 
4800 
200 
300 
4800 
1275 
1200 
1175 
850 
1200 
1500 
825 
3150 
2950 
1200 
700 
1400 
600 
375 
6500 
375 
425 
6100 
1650 
1575 
1450 
1700 
1350 
2100 
1000 
4100 
3875 
1700 
875 
2275 
1000 
500 
8750 
475 
575 
^750 
2200 
2700 
2200 
4550 
2100 
3250 
1500 
SOOO 
6900 
2875 
1300 
3600 
1450 
1150 
15000 
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900 
N3 
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129 
130 
131 
132 
133 
134 
135 
136 
137 
138 
139 
140 
141 
142 
143 
144 
145 
146 
5 . 5 
4 . 7 5 
. 5 
2.0 
1. 37 
.75 
. 5 
.5 
2 . 5 
2 . 7 5 
1 . 7 5 
4 . 0 
1.0 
1 . 2 5 
1 . 5 
7 . 0 
3 . 2 5 
2 . 5 
4 . 5 
9 . 0 
4 . 0 
1 . 2 5 
2.0 
1 . 7 5 
.62 
1 . 2 5 
. 7 5 
. 7 5 
1 . 5 
. 7 5 
5 . 6 7 
. 7 5 
1 . 2 5 
. 7 5 
00 
. 7 5 
3 . 5 
1 . 2 5 
1 . 7 5 
3 . 5 
2.0 
1 . 5 
3 
2 
3 
1 
3 
2 
1 
1 
3 
4 
1 
3 
3 
4 
2 
3 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
2 
1 
4 
1 
1 
4 
1 
1 
1 
4 
2 
1 
1 
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4 
2 
4 
2 
4 
4 
2 
1 
2 
38 
62 
50 
42 
62 
66 
52 
43 
54 
66 
53 
57 
61 
63 
51 
36 
68 
63 
48 
40 
62 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
30 
80 
25 
120 
15 
35 
100 
55 
60 
08 
22 
15 
20 
35 
30 
25 
40 
18 
25 
60 
10000 
7000 
10000 
2000 
15000 
5000 
2000 
2000 
10000 
20000 
2000 
15000 
10000 
15000 
7000 
10000 
7000 
5000 
20000 
15000 
10000 
- 5 0 0 0 
- 3 5 0 0 
- 5 0 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 
- 7 5 0 0 
- 2 500 
- 1 0 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 
- 5 0 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 
- 7 5 0 0 
- 5 0 0 0 
- 7 5 0 0 
- 3 5 0 0 
- 5 0 0 0 
- 3 5 0 0 
- 2 5 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 0 
- 7 5 0 0 
- 5 0 0 0 
- 1 5 0 0 
- 1 2 0 0 
- 1 4 0 0 
- 400 
- 6 0 0 0 
- 600 
- 400 
- 400 
- 1 5 0 0 
- 3 5 0 0 
- 4 0 0 
- 1 6 5 0 
- 1 1 0 0 
- 1 5 0 0 
- 1 1 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 
- 1 4 5 0 
- 750 
- 4 0 0 0 
- 2 9 2 5 
- 100 
- 250 
- 300 
- 100 
- 5 0 0 0 
- 125 
- 90 
- 100 
- 400 
- 500 
- 8 0 
- 300 
- 50 
- 300 
- 300 
- 250 
- 300 
- 200 
- 900 
650 
325 
450 
1000 
130 
5000 
100 
135 
250 
1110 
2750 
250 
825 
1000 
1125 
450 
650 
475 
500 
2000 
1050 
1 0 0 0 
8 0 0 
2 5 0 0 
200 
1 0 0 0 0 
325 
260 
550 
2 7 5 0 
5600 
300 
1600 
2100 
2 6 0 0 
875 
1450 
1100 
1350 
4 5 0 0 
1900 
1 6 7 5 
1100 
305C 
375 
1 2 0 0 0 
550 
375 
8 0 0 
4 1 0 0 
8150 
4 2 0 
2450 
3000 
3850 
1150 
2 6 0 0 
1375 
2 0 0 0 
6 5 5 0 
2 8 5 0 
2550 
2300 
4200 
475 
12500 
700 
500 
1000 
5200 
10000 
540 
3150 
3900 
5200 
2375 
3250 
1900 
2500 
8100 
3750 
5 1 0 0 
3150 
7 5 0 0 
950 
1 3 5 0 0 
3100 
1 0 5 0 
1 5 0 0 
8 0 5 0 
1 5 1 0 0 
950 
6 7 5 0 
6 9 0 0 
8 7 0 0 
3100 
5500 
3650 
3800 
1 3 2 0 0 
7800 
147 
148 
149 
150 
151 
152 
153 
154 
155 
156 
157 
158 
159 
160 
161 
162 
163 
164 
165 
9 . 5 
2 . 5 
. 5 
. 5 
3 . 5 
3 . 0 
3 . 0 
1.6 
2 . 7 5 
4 . 0 
.75 
4 . 7 5 
1.00 
2 . 5 
2.0 
1 .00 
4 . 5 
1.0 
7 . 0 
2 . 5 
1 . 5 
. 5 
. 5 
2.0 
. 7 5 
2 . 0 0 
1 . 2 5 
.75 
4 . 2 5 
1 . 2 5 
00 
1 . 2 5 
4 . 2 5 
3 . 5 
1 . 0 0 
4 . 7 5 
2 . 7 5 
8 . 0 0 
4 
3 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
3 
1 
3 
1 
3 
2 
4 
4 
2 
4 . 
3 
4 
2 
1 
1 
1 
3 
4 
3 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
4 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
2 
3 
2 
2 
1 
1 
3 
3 
3 
1 
3 
1 
3 
2 
2 
3 
1 
3 
2 
3 
65 
51 
29 
47 
39 
49 
48 
67 
50 
24 
35 
38 
53 
34 
62 
28 
47 
56 
58 
20 
25 
40 
35 
25 
50 
25 
35 
20 
45 
22 
34 
12 
18 
35 
15 
20 
30 
20000 
10000 
10000 
2000 
5000 
2000 
5000 
10000 
2000 
10000 
2000 
10000 
7000 
20000 
20000 
7000 
20000 
10000 
20000 
- 1 0 0 0 0 
- 5 0 0 0 
- 5 0 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 
- 2 5 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 
- 2 5 0 0 
- 5 0 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 
- 5 0 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 
- 5 0 0 0 
- 3 5 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 0 
- 3 5 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 0 
- 5 0 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 0 
- 3 5 0 0 - 700 3000 6500 8750 1 1 1 0 0 155C0 
- 1 5 0 0 - 400 1 0 0 0 2750 4100 5000 75C0 
- 1 0 0 0 - 300 1200 2800 
- 700 - 125 275 750 
- 3 0 0 0 - 500 3000 7500 
- 2 0 0 0 - 200 1850 4100 
- 650 - 200 450 950 
- 4 2 0 0 - 800 2500 3000 
- 4 0 0 0 - 2 5 0 0 1500 3000 
- 3 0 0 0 - 800 2200 5500 
4200 5500 80CO 
1150 1850 3500 
8050 11000 1 4 7 5 0 
6000 7750 1 3 7 5 0 
1175 2200 3800 
4200 5500 9 5 5 0 
4250 5100 8000 
8000 10000 1 5 0 0 0 
ro 
vo 
